| Citation(s) |
|---|
| 2026 SLG 4648 = 2026 SLD 4648 = 2026 PLJ 367 |
Supreme Appellate Court, Pakistan
C.P.L.A. No. 663-P of 2025
Presented By: Munib Akhtar and Ms. Musarrat Hilali JUDGES
Mr. Adnan Khattak, ASC for Petitioner. N.R for
Respondent. Date of hearing: 7.1.2026.
C.P.L.A. No. 663-P of 2025
Presented By: Munib Akhtar and Ms. Musarrat Hilali JUDGES
Mr. Adnan Khattak, ASC for Petitioner. N.R for
Respondent. Date of hearing: 7.1.2026.
COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (PESHAWAR ZONE), REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, JAMRUD ROAD, UNIVERSITY TOWN, PESHAWAR--Petitioner
VERSUS
M/s. DIAMOND FILLING & CNG STATION, JAMRUD ROAD,PESHAWAR--Respondent
Law: Sales Tax Act, 1990
Section: 25(2), 45B, 46, 47
Law: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973
Section: 169
Sales Tax Act, 1990 (III of 1990)-- ----Ss. 25(2), 45B, 46 & 47--Auditor General’s (Functions, Powers and Terms and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2001 (XXIII of 2001), S. 15--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 169--Audit observation--Show cause notice--Recovery of sales tax--Appeal before Commissioner (Appeals)--Accepted--Department led appeal--Dismissed--Tax reference--Auditor General of Pakistan--DGRRA--Jurisdiction--Private sector entity--Sales tax audit--Independent audit--Tax reference--Scope of Auditor General’s powers--Public sector audit--Private companies--Misreading of statute--Fiscal statute--Tax proceedings--Delegated authority--Counsel for the Department had placed reliance on the second proviso to subsection (2) of s. 25 of the 1990 Act (as it stood at the relevant time) to contend that the DGRRA had the jurisdiction to make an audit observation in cases such as that of the present taxpayer even though the taxpayer was manifestly an entity in the private sector, i.e., had not been set up or established by either the Federation or a Province--Court was, with respect, not satisfied by this contention and had dismissed the petition at the conclusion of the hearing--However, no power vested in the Auditor-General to audit the accounts/record of a private party under the Constitution and/or the 2001 Ordinance--Even a moment's glance had shown that the section was far removed, in its intent, scope and purpose, from the audit of an entity in the private sector under, and for purposes of, a fiscal statute--Scope of the powers of the Auditor General (and therefore of any officer subordinate to him) under that provision was entirely separate and different from those under s. 25 of the 1990 Act--It was therefore obvious, and had been expressly held as noted above, that any person authorized to act under the former statute had no authority to act under the latter, and vice versa--Its effect had only been to clarify that any taxpayer that came within the scope of the 2001 Ordinance and whose accounts had been audited by the Auditor General could not for that reason alone claim immunity from an audit by an officer of Inland Revenue…