Case Details

Citation(s)
2026 SLG 4645 = 2026 SLD 4645 = 2026 PLJ 1
Federal Constitution Court of Pakistan
F.C.P.L.A. No. 487 of 2025
Presented By: Amin-ud-Din Khan, C.J. and Ali Baqar Najafi JUDGE
Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR for Petitioner. Mr. Waseem Mumtaz Malik, Addl. AG for
Respondent Nos. 1-3. Raja Fahim Altaf, ASC and Mr. Moeen-ud-Din, AHC for
Respondents No. 4-6. N.R. for
Respondents 8-9. Date of hearing: 13.5.2026.

SHAUKAT ALI--Petitioner

VERSUS

MEMBER (JUDICIAL-III) CONSOLIDATION, BOARD OF REVENUE and others--Respondents

Law: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973

Section: 17, 18, 18(2)(c)

Law: Punjab Land Revenue Rules, 1968

Section: 199

Law: Code Of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Section: O.XLVII R. 1

Punjab Land Revenue Rules, 1968-- ----Rr. 17, 18 & 18(2)(c)--Constitution of Pakistan 1973, Art. 199--Appointment of Lambardar--No vested right to appointment--Comparative merit--Discretion of Revenue Authorities--Subjective satisfaction--Fairness and non-arbitrariness--Supervisory jurisdiction of superior Courts--Misreading and non-reading of evidence--Permanent resident of estate--Meritorious candidate ignored--Violation of fair play--Absentee candidate--Government servant posted away from estate--Statutory disqualification--Impugned orders without lawful authority--Better suited candidate declared entitled to appointment--A plain and purposive reading of aforesaid rule made it abundantly clear that same did not create, confer, or recognize any vested or enforceable right in favour of any individual to claim appointment as Lambardar as a matter of entitlement--At its highest, provision was directory in character, serving merely as a set of guiding principles intended to regulate discretionary process of selection--Legislative intent underlying rule was to ensure that appointment was made of a person who, in considered and subjective satisfaction of competent authority, emerged as most suitable, competent and fit candidate from amongst eligible aspirants--Question of suitability for appointment to office of Lambardar could not be adjudged on basis of any rigid, inflexible or purely objective yardstick, as exercise entailed a broad-based comparative evaluation resting substantially upon subjective satisfaction of appointing authority. Such discretion, though wide, was not unbridled but remained circumscribed by requirements of fairness, reasonableness and non-arbitrariness--Accordingly, unless it was demonstrably shown that such discretion had been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, mala fide or in flagrant disregard of applicable rules, same did not ordinarily call for interference by constitutional or appellate fora--Jurisdiction of superior Courts in matters relating to appointment of Lambardar was essentially supervisory in nature and was exercisable within well-defined constitutional and legal parameters. Interference was warranted only where…
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