Case Details

Citation(s)
2026 SLG 4643 = 2026 SLD 4643 = 2026 PLJ 30
Federal Constitution Court of Pakistan
F.C.P.L.A. No. 566 of 2026
Presented By: Aamer Farooq and Syed Arshad Hussain Shah JUDGES
Mr. Tariq Aziz, ASC for Petitioner. Nemo for
Respondents. Date of hearing: 15.4.2026.

GHULAM HUSSAIN KHAWAJA--Petitioner

VERSUS

PROVINCE OF SINDH and others--Respondents

Law: Sindh Cooperative Housing Societies Act, 2020

Section: 59(1) , 81(1)(vi)

Law: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973

Section: 199, 185(3)

Sindh Cooperative Societies Act, 2020 (XXVIII of 2020)-- ----Ss. 59(1) & 81(1)(vi)--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Arts. 199, 185(3)--Cooperative Society--Elections--Election Officer--Administrator--Registrar’s Order--Show Cause Notice--Consent Order--Void ab Initio--Estoppel--It was contended that once High Court had declared actions of Registrar to be void ab initio, it had lacked jurisdiction to appoint an Administrator/Election Officer, particularly when no such relief had been sought by petitioners--It was further argued that such appointment had amounted to exercise of suomotu jurisdiction, which had not been bestowed upon High Court by Constitution--As far as appointment of an Administrator other than from officers of Cooperative Department was concerned, it was noted that contents of petition itself had revealed that a similar dispute relating to Society had arisen in year 2020, when original jurisdiction of High Court had been invoked through institution of two suits, which had culminated in setting aside orders of Registrar and appointment of Nazir of High Court as Election Officer to conduct elections and hand over management of Society to elected body--This fact had demonstrated that appointment of an Administrator/Election Officer from outside Cooperative Department had not been alien to established practice--It had further negated contention of counsel that impugned order had been beyond mandate of High Court and had amounted to exercise of suomotu jurisdiction--It was a well-settled principle that a consent order could not be challenged and remained binding upon parties--Such practice had consistently been condemned and disapproved by superior judiciary because parties had been precluded from challenging same, as an undertaking given before a Court of law had to be accorded sanctity; on one hand, a legal estoppel had operated against them, and on other, such conduct had been considered immoral and unethical--Appeal refused.…
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