Case Details

Citation(s)
1975 SLG 3173 = 1975 SLD 3173 = 1975 PLD 391
Court of Special Judge, Karachi
Petition No. 1133 of 1974, decided on 15th October 1974.
Presented By:Tufail ALI A. Rehman, C. J., Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim and Jamaluddin H. Ahmad, JJ
A. Khaliq G. Khan for Petitioner. Yahya Bakhtiar, Attorney-General for Pakistan assisted by Ghulam Ali Memon for
Respondent. Zafar Hussain Mirza, Advocate-General (Sind.) and Khalid M. Ishaque Amicus curiae.

MEHBOOB ALI-Petitioner

VERSUS

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER & TRIBUNAL AND 3 OTHERS- Respondents

Law: Constitution of Pakistan 1973

Section: 10(4)

Law: West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance (XXXV of 1959)

Section:

(a) West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance (XXXV of 1959) And Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 10(4)-Words "law ,providing for preventive detention" in Art. 10(4)-Act XXXv of 1959 not a "law providing for preventive detention" within meaning of Art. 10 (4) of Constitution. The question referred to the Full Bench was : Is the West Pakistan ,Control of Goondas Ordinance a "law providing for preventive detention" within meaning of Art. 10(4) of the Constitution? The Full Bench answered the question in the negative and Held : It will be noticed, the utmost that can be done under the West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance, 1959 at the conclusion of the Proceedings is to require that a bond be executed : indeed, except for orders of an interim nature there is no power in the Tribunal at the conclusion of the proceedings to direct simplicitor the detention of a person in custody. Under section 14, however, if he fails to execute the bond or cannot produce sureties to the satisfaction of the Tribunal, the Tribunal may order him to be detained in prison until he executes the bond or until a satisfactory surety is furnished, the period of detention of course not in any case exceeding the term for which he was required to execute a bond. This is :he manner in which final orders of the Tribunal may result, effectively even though not directly, in the detention of the person complained against. The question, therefore, really is whether there is anything in the context which shows plainly that the framers of the Constitution did not intend to give the expression its plain and full meaning or whether there are any other .compelling reasons to cut down that meaning. In the first place the expression "laws providing for preventive detention" 'have acquired over the years, particularly for us in the Indo-Pak Continent, such a meaning by reason of history as to have made the phrase a term of art. If the words "preventive detention" are to be given their full meaning :and are to include all detention other than punitive then obviously the custody .of an accused person during trial, either by reason of bail having…
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