Law: Municipal Administration Ordinance, (X of 1960)

Section: 119

Law: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)

Section: 100

(a) Municipal Administration Ordinance (X of 1960) S. 119 read with Civil Procedure Code (V of 1900, S. 100-Second appeal - Principle that Court, in second appeal, cannot go into questions of fact-Based upon concept of second appeal under S. 100 of C. P. C., 1908-Expression "second appeal"-Has no technical meaning outside provision of S. 100-Appeal under S. 119 of Ordi nance X of 1960-Not an appeal under S. 100 of C. P. C.-Qualifica tion limiting power of appellate authority under S. 119 of Ordinance X of 1960-Not to be read into section. The principle that in the course of a second appeal the Court cannot go into questions other than those of law is based upon the concept of a second appeal under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code which itself lays down this limitation. Outside this provision the expression "second appeal" has no technical meaning, whatever, and the authority of the Commissioner to hear an appeal arises from section 119 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960. An appeal under section 119 of Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960, was by no means a second appeal under section 100 of the C. P. Code. It was an appeal without further limitation although from an order which in this case happens to be an appellate order. There is no reason whatever and none had been advanced at the bar why any quali fication should be read into section 119 so as to limit the power of the appellate authority. (b) West Pakistan Municipal Committees (Appeals) Rules, 1960 R. 2-Appeal-Orders made by "an officer or servant of a Municipal Committee" -Appealable to Chairman. (c) West Pakistan Municipal Committees (Appeals) Rules, 1960 R.3-Appeal-Condonation of delay-Appellate authority-Can condone delay if appeal filed beyond time-Nothing showing exer cise of such power by appellate authority, yet opposing party not having challenged, appeal on this ground at any stage, such new plea not allowed to be raised at writ stage and regularity of official action presumed. Date of hearing : 23rd May 1974.                                      …