Law: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973

Section: 185(3)

Law: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)

Section:  O. XLVII, r. 1

(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)  Art. 185--Appellate powers of Supreme Court-Supreme Court, following Privy Council practice, generally disallows agitation of points on which leave to appeal not granted-Such, however, not an in flexible rule-Court, in some cases, may, in interests of justice, depart from such practice-Supreme Court, held, has power, under Constitution, to do complete justice and has never deprived itself of such power.        The general practice of the Supreme Court following the Privy Council practice, bas been not to allow counsel to agitate points on which leave to appeal had not been granted but this is not an inflexible rule, and there may well be cases in which the Supreme Court, in the interest of justice, may be constrained to depart from this practice, although such cases will, no doubt, be extremely rare, The Supreme Court has undoubtedly the power, under the Constitution itself, to do complete justice and, therefore, it has never tied itself down in such a manner as to deprive itself of this power. The rule is at best a rule of practice only developed as a result of the practice of the Judicial Committee and, therefore, like all rules of practice it can legitimately be departed from if the interests of justice so demand. Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din v. Chief Settlement Commissioner P L D 1964 S C 829;John E. Brownlee v. Vivian Mac-Millan A I R 1940 P C 219; Ashfaq-ur- Rehman Khan v. Ch. Muhammad Afzal P L D 1971 S C 766 ; S. Sibtain Fazli v. Star Film Distributors P L D 1964 S C 337; Pakistan v. Waliullah Sufyani, P L D 1965 S C 310; Abdul Majid Khan v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner P L D 1968 S C 154 ; Bibhabati v. Ramendra Narayan A I R 1947 P C 19 and Federation of Pakistan v. Ali Ihsan P L D 1967 S C 249 ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) Art. 185(3)-Leave to appeal-Rule laid down in P L D 1964 S C 829-Consistently interpreted as merely laying down that discretionary relief should not be granted to party knowingly standing by and allowing authority to usurp jurisdiction not possessed by it and which person seeking relief could well prevent-Petitioner having been a respondent…