Case Details

Citation(s)
1959 SLG 4169 = 1959 SLD 4169 = 1959 PLD 84
Privy Council
Privy Council Appeal No. 16 of 1957, decided on 17th March, 1958, from the Supreme Court of Cyprus.
Presented By: Lords Morton of Henryton and Somervell of Harrow and Denning
B. J. M. Mackenna Q. C., I. G. le Quesne for Appellant.   Solicitors: Chas Russell & Co.   Sir David Cairns Q. C. for
Respondent.   Solicitors: I. Baillieu.  

ROBERT CHATTAN ROSS-CLUNIS--Appellant  

VERSUS

  VASSOS PAPADOPOULLOS and others--Respondents

Law: Police Act (V of 1861)

Section: 15

Law: Emergency Powers Order in .Council, 1939

Section: 6(1),6(2)

(a) Interpretation of Statutes---   Statutes encroaching upon private rights-Subject to strict construction.   (b) Collective punishment   Emergency Powers (Collective Punishment) Regulations 1955 to (No. I) 1955, Regulation 3 and Emergency Powers Order in Council, 1939, S. 6 (I)-Regulation whether ultra vires the powers rested in Governor-[Police Act (V of 1861), S. 15].   It was urged in this case that the specific powers set out in section 6 (2) of the Emergency Powers Order in Council, 1939 were illustrative of the type of regulation covered by the general words in section 6 (1), and these general words should not be construed so widely as to cover a regulation such as Regulation 3 of the Emergency Powers (Collective Punishment) Regulation 1955 to (No. 1) 1955. The imposition of collective fine, it was said, resulted in the punishment of the innocent for the crimes of the guilty and was contrary to British ideas of justice.   Held, that statutes which encroach upon the rights of the subject, whether as regards person or property, are subject to a "strict" construction. Most statutes can be shown to achieve such an encroachment in some form or another, and the general principle means no more than that, where the import of some enactment is inconclusive or ambiguous, the Court may properly lean in favour of an interpretation that leaves private rights undisturbed. But in a case such as the present the weight of that principle was too slight to counter-balance the considerations which had or may have had led the Governor to deem such regulation necessary or advisable for the transcendent objects set forth. For here the words in section 6 (1) of the Emergency Powers Order in Council, 1939 that invest the Governor with power are neither vague nor ambiguous: Parliament has chosen to say explicitly that he shall do whatever thing he may deem necessary or advisable.   That does not allow him to do whatever he may feel inclined, for what he does must be capable of being related to one of the prescribed purposes, and the Court is entitled to read the Act in this way. Expropriation is altogether capable of being so related.…
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