| Citation(s) |
|---|
| 1993 SLD 855 = 1993 CLC 1540 |
Quetta High Court
Civil Petition No.3 of 1992, decided on 4th April, 1993.
Presented By: Before Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhary, J
Abu Bakar Chandrigar for Appellant.
Respondent: Ex parte.
Civil Petition No.3 of 1992, decided on 4th April, 1993.
Presented By: Before Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhary, J
Abu Bakar Chandrigar for Appellant.
Respondent: Ex parte.
Messrs INDUSTRIAL. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN---Petitioner
VERSUS
Messrs SARELA CEMENT LIMITED COMPANY---Respondent
Law: Companies Ordinance, 1984
Section: 9(3) , 306
Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)--- ----S. 9(3)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.IX, R.6(1)---Jurisdiction of Court---Court has been empowered under S.9(3), Companies Ordinance, 1981 to follow summary procedure---Court, to effectively decide any matter under Companies Ordinance, 1984, was under obligation to carefully apply its judicial mind, so as to dispose of cases before it by an intelligent judicial act. Under section 9(3) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 the Court seized with the matter, has been empowered to follow the summary procedure. No doubt by adopting summary proceedings a lengthy procedure provided under the Civil Procedure Code can only be curtailed. However, to effectively decide the matter Court was under obligation to carefully apply its judicial mind, so the cases were disposed of by an intelligent judicial act and if need be the point for determination be also noted down in the peculiar circumstances of the case, evidence be also recorded and thereafter on the basis of material produced in support of contentions the dispute should be resolved. The Courts were not under legal obligation to grant relief even in ex parte proceedings merely on the basis of the plaint. Although according to Order IX, rule 6(1), C.P.C. a decree could be passed without recording evidence if the opposite side was being proceeded ex parte provided summons were duly served. Provision of Order IX, Rule 6(1), C.P.C. does not cast bounden obligation on the Court to pass a decree because preminently therein the word `may' has been used which confers a directory judicial discretion on the Court for granting relief and the provision of O.IX, R.6(1), C.P.C. if not applied with caution, there would be apprehension that the plaintiff or petitioner might succeed in getting ex parte order/decree on the basis of the facts which might not be found true. Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)--- ----S. 306---Company's inability to discharge its liability when to be presumed---Creditor was required to deliver notice in terms of S.306, Companies Ordinance, by registered post or otherwise at the registered office of the…