| Citation(s) |
|---|
| 1971 SLG 3167 1971 SLD 3167 = 1971 PLD 223 |
Dacca High Court
Petition No. 586 of 1967, decided on 12th March 1970.
Presented By: B. A. Siddiky, C. J. and K. Hossain, J
M. J. Jaffar with S. M. Husain for Petitioner. Afzalul Haque for
Respondent No. 1.
Petition No. 586 of 1967, decided on 12th March 1970.
Presented By: B. A. Siddiky, C. J. and K. Hossain, J
M. J. Jaffar with S. M. Husain for Petitioner. Afzalul Haque for
Respondent No. 1.
PAKISTAN RIVER STEAMERS LTD.-Petitioner
VERSUS
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, DACCA ZONE, DACCA AND ANOTHER-Respondents
Law: Income-tax Act (XI of 1922)
Section: 35, 23, 30, 33 (4)
(a) Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), S. 35 read with Ss. 23, 30 & 33(4) - Words "any assessment order" in S. 35 - Meaning -Appellate authority remanding case back to Income-tax Officer Order of fresh assessment passed by Income-tax Officer on such remand-Held, subject to appeal and covered by provisions of S. 35-Such order can be rectified within four years from its date [(1959) 36 I T R 492, dissented from]. "Where in pursuance to the directions of the Appellate Tribunal in an order under section 33(4) of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 the Income-tax Officer revises the assessment, the order passed by the Income-tax Officer partakes the character of a fresh assessment order and is referable only to section 23 of the Act and as such an appeal would lie under section 30 of the Act to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner." In addition it may be stated that the order of assessment on the admission of appeal loses its finality and becomes sub judice and subject to the decision of the next higher Appellate Authority provided in the Act and when the case is remanded back to the Income-tax Officer by the Appellate Authority, the order of assessment passed by the said Income-tax Officer to the extent the order of remand is covered becomes non est it loses its existence altogether and the fresh order that is passed after remand will be the only order of assessment. To hold otherwise will lead to absurdity inasmuch as we would be thinking of two orders passed by the Income-tax Officer, one that was passed before the order of remand and the other passed after the order of remand; and in that event there will be in existence two assessment orders for the same year of assessment; there will not only be two orders but two inconsistent orders. It cannot be supposed that the Legislature contemplated such absurdity, nor can such interpretation be given, when a more reasonable and harmonious construction could be put on the words of that section. It is, therefore, held that the words "any assessment order" under section 25 mean an operative and final order. This assessment order must be read in the context of other provisions of the Act to mean…