| Citation(s) |
|---|
| 1965 SLG 122 1965 SLD 122 = 1965 PLD 59 |
Second Appeal from Order No. 25 of 1960, decided on 7th August 1964.
S. A. Mahmood, Jamil Hussain Rizvi and Sardar Muhammad Iqbal, JJ
ASHFAQ-UR-REHMAN KHAN----Appellant
VERSUS
Ch. MUHAMMAD AFZAL, MUTWALLI, WAQF PROPERTY AND ANOTHER----Respondents
Law:
Section:
S. A. MAHMOOD, J.-----This reference to tie Full "Fularises out of a second appeal to this Court from an order by the Rent Controller directing Ashfaq-ur-Rahman Khan appellant to deposit arrears of Rs. 3,150 by the 10th of July 1959, which order was maintained on appeal by the appellate authority. 2. On an application brought by Ch. Muhammad Afzal for the eviction of Ashfaq-ur-Rahman Khan on the ground that a sum of Rs. 7,500 was due from him as arrears of rent, as shown in the statement of rent account attached to the application, the rent of the premises being Rs. 67-3-3 p. m., which was admitted by the appellant, the Rent Controller ordered him to deposit Rs. 3,150 as arrears of rent, by the 10th of July 1959. The appellant appealed and contended that the Rent Controller did not have the power to order deposit of rent in excess of the rent which was legally recoverable. The appellate authority rejected his contention, relying on The Dhurrumtolia Properties Ltd. v. Dhunbai Persoshaw-Sorabjee (A I R 1931 Cal. 457), in which the term "rent in arrear" used in section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act was held to include all that was due to the lessor up to the date when the application for ejectment was heard and order for relief against forfeiture was made. The second appeal came up before me sitting singly, and it was argued on behalf of the appellant that the words "all the rent due" used in subsection (6) of section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959) meant the "rent legally due and recover able" and not the rent which had become time-barred. It was contended on the other hand on behalf of the landlord that interpretation meant that the word "all" was redundant and that the word "legally" had to be introduced. In view of the importance of the question involved, on a reference by me, this Full Bench has been constituted to answer the following question: "Whether the words 'all the rent due' in subsection (6) of section 13 of Ordinance VI of 1959, include rent which; though unpaid, cannot be recovered in view of the Statute of Limitation…