| Citation(s) |
|---|
| 1971 SLG 3066 1971 SLD 3066 = 1971 PLC 294 |
Pakistan Labour Court
Industrial Relations Case No. 243 of 1970, decided on 5th September 1970.
Presented By: Md. Nurul Islam Khan, Chairman, M. Karim and S. A. Haleem, Members
Industrial Relations Case No. 243 of 1970, decided on 5th September 1970.
Presented By: Md. Nurul Islam Khan, Chairman, M. Karim and S. A. Haleem, Members
MAY & BAKER EMPLOYEES' UNION
VERSUS
MAY & BAKER LTD. DACCA
Law: Industrial Relations Ordinance, (XXIII of 1969)
Section: 28, 32
Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969) S. 28 & 32- Strike-Workers' Union have option to deer strike even after lapse of statutory notice period of 21 days--Employer cannot force them to enjoy or exercise right of shrike--Strike not actually commenced by workers-Cannot be presumed to have commenced. Conciliation proceedings, in the instant case, continued even up to the last date of the statutory notice period of strike notice from the Workers' Union under section 28 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. 1969. The employer, on the presumption and on contention that statutory notice period of strike could be extended neither by the conciliator nor by the Workers' Union (Collective Bargaining Agent) the strike commenced immediately on the expiry of the notice period and as such disallowed the workers to join duly unless the strike vas called off by the Workers' Union: Held: How long the conciliator continues conciliation would depend on the mutual, consent of the parties involved in the matter. In fact, even negotiation could continue eternally though there is a specific provision for negotiation between the parties as per provision of section 26 of the Ordinance. In that sense the conciliation could continue till the strike/lock-out is actually resorted to by the parties concerned. In the present cage the employer has hazarded a presumption that even though actually the workers might not have ceased working, they arc presumed to be on strike after the lapse of 21 days due to a misconstruction of the spirit and implication of section 28 of the Ordinance. According to section 2(xxv) strike means a cessation of work by a body of persons employed in any establishment acting in com bination or concerted refusal, or refusal under a common under standing of any number of persons who are or have been so employed to continue to work or to accept employment. In the present case there has been no cessation of work. Only there has been a presumption on the part of the employer on the basis of a misconstruction of the law that the cessation of work need not be actual, but it could be only presumptive for the operation of section 32(1) of the…