Case Details

Citation(s)
1956 SLG 383 1956 SLD 383 = 1956 PLD 338
WEST PAKISTAN, KARACHI
Civil Reference No. 145 of 1955, by Muhammad Bachal, J. under section 12, Sind Courts Act decided on 2nd Novem ber 1955.
Before S. A. Rahman C. J. and Lari, J
Sharif-ud-Din, Shah Jamal Alam Khalid, M. Ishaq, Moin ullah and Fazal Ali for Plaintiffs.   E. V. Castellino and S. Nasir-ud-Din for Defendant

MIRA KHAN and others-Petitioners

VERSUS

  MEHARBAN HUSAIN and others-Respondents

Law: Government of India Act, 1935

Section: 299

P L D 1956 (W. P.) Karachi 338        (a) Government of India Act, 1935, (26 Geo. Vc. 2), S. 299, Schd. VII, List 11, Item 9Term 'compulsory acquisition' Whether embraces the word 'requisition' of immovable property Land-Meaning of-Acquisition of land in item 9 together with item 21 in List 11 of Schd. III covers 'requisition of land Rights 'in and over land-Definition of.   It was urged on behalf of the plaintiffs in the present case that there was a lacuna in the Constitution Act in as much as 'requisitioning' was not mentioned as a subject of legisla tion in any one of the three lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution Act and that 'compulsory acquisition of land' in item 9 of List II does not embrace requisition. Con sequently the Act and Ordinance were without authority because in the absence of any notification by the Governor -General under section 104 of the Constitution Act, the Federal or the Provincial Legislature was not authorised to enact laws with respect to requisition. Moreover, the definition of 'public purpose' in the Ordinance and the Act includes purposes beyond the competence of the Provincial Legis lature and as such the enactments were ultra vices. And lastly the Ordinance and the Act fail to provide for the compensation to the tenant ousted from the requisitioned premises. This contravened section 299 of the Constitution Act.   Held, in accordance with the well recognised cannon of interpretation that constitutional provisions should be given the widest possible construction and the subject-matter of legislation should be held to extend to all ancillary and subsidiary matter, the word 'acquisition' has a wide concept meaning procuring or taking property permanently or tem porarily and it does not necessarily imply the 'acquisition' of legal title by the State in the property taken possession of. The word 'acquisition' in item 9 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution Act, therefore, includes 'requisition.'   A narrow concept of the term 'acquisition' occurring in item 9, List II, would introduce a…
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