Case Details

Citation(s)
1994 SLG 1556 1994 SLD 1556 = 1994 PLD 112

First Rent Appeal No.312 of 1992, decided on 13th November, 1993.
Mamoon Kazi, J

Mrs. MJ. HEMANI---Appellant

VERSUS

ABID ALI ---Respondent

Law:

Section:

The eviction application filed by the appellant has been rejected by the learned Eighth Rent Controller, South, Karachi vide his order dated 13-4-1992 on the ground that as the premises in question were let out by the appellant to the respondent as a saw mill, the provisions of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance were. not applicable and hence the learned Controller had no jurisdiction to try the case.   Admittedly the issue qua the learned Controller's jurisdiction was not raised by the respondent in his written statement. However, during the pendency of the case an application under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. was filed for rejection of the rent application. The learned Controller although, came to a conclusion that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not attracted in eviction proceedings before the Rent Controller but nevertheless a$ the question raised related to his jurisdiction, the question was determined by him as a preliminary issue.   Although Mr. Raja Sher Muhammad has argued that since the question was not initially raised by the respondent at the time of filing of the written statement, no sufficient opportunity was afforded to the appellant to lead evidence on the point but Mr. R.F. Virjee has invited my attention to the pleadings and the affidavits respectively filed on behalf of the parties and the evidence recorded by the learned Controller from which it is not difficult to determine the nature of the premises rented out by the appellant. The eviction application filed on behalf of the appellant clearly indicates that the premises which were rented out consisted of a saw mill. This is also further confirmed by the affidavit subsequently filed on behalf of the appellant by her husband Jabirali. No doubt, in the written statement filed on behalf of the appellant, the premises have been referred to as a shop but the entire evidence led by the parties makes it abundantly clear that the word "shop" has not been used in the written statement in a technical sense because barring the same, the entire evidence led by the parties indicates that the premises let out by the appellant were a saw mill.   The question…
🔒
Continue readingLogin or create an account to access the complete content.Login / Register