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Section1\r\n\t{size:8.5in 11.0in;\r\n\tmargin:1.0in 1.25in 1.0in 1.25in;\r\n\tmso-header-margin:.5in;\r\n\tmso-footer-margin:.5in;\r\n\tmso-paper-source:0;}\r\ndiv.Section1\r\n\t{page:Section1;}\r\n--\u003e\r\n\u003c/style\u003e\r\n\u003c!--[if gte mso 10]\u003e\r\n\u003cstyle\u003e\r\n /* Style Definitions */\r\n table.MsoNormalTable\r\n\t{mso-style-name:\"Table Normal\";\r\n\tmso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;\r\n\tmso-tstyle-colband-size:0;\r\n\tmso-style-noshow:yes;\r\n\tmso-style-parent:\"\";\r\n\tmso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;\r\n\tmso-para-margin:0in;\r\n\tmso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;\r\n\tmso-pagination:widow-orphan;\r\n\tfont-size:10.0pt;\r\n\tfont-family:\"Times New Roman\";\r\n\tmso-ansi-language:#0400;\r\n\tmso-fareast-language:#0400;\r\n\tmso-bidi-language:#0400;}\r\n\u003c/style\u003e\r\n\u003c![endif]--\u003e\r\n\u003c/head\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbody lang=EN-US style=\u0027tab-interval:.5in;text-justify-trim:punctuation\u0027\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=Section1\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal align=center style=\u0027text-align:center;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eLAW AND PROCEDURE\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal align=center style=\u0027text-align:center;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eFOR\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal align=center style=\u0027text-align:center;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eDECISION OF CASE\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal align=center style=\u0027text-align:center;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eON\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal align=center style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:center;\r\nmso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;mso-layout-grid-align:none;\r\ntext-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eTHE BASIS OF OATH\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal align=center style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:center;\r\nmso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;mso-layout-grid-align:none;\r\ntext-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eBy\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal align=center style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:center;\r\nmso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;mso-layout-grid-align:none;\r\ntext-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003ci\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eSaeed Akhtar Civil\r\nJudge Class-1,\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal align=center style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:center;\r\nmso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;mso-layout-grid-align:none;\r\ntext-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003ci\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eDera Ghazi Khan\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eThe common legal\r\nrecognized mode for decision of a controversy raised in a suit is to decide it\r\non the basis of available evidence of the party(s). However, there are some\r\nexceptions to this, firstly to decide the lis on the basis of legal issue,\r\nsecondly, to decide the lis on the basis of admission of other party to the\r\nfacts and controversy raised by first party and lastly to decide the lis on the\r\nbasis of an oath of party to lis or of third person. In these situations,\r\nordinarily there is no need to record evidence of the party(s) for decision of\r\na lis raising a controversy. Here, we shall be concerned with decision of the\r\ncase on the basis of oath. Commonly, it is known as decision of the case on\r\nSpecial Oath. But, in statutory law there is nothing mentioned as Special Oath.\r\nExactly, at present, there is no comprehensive statutory law dealing with\r\ndecision of the case on oath except Article 163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order,\r\n1984 and Section 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Oaths Act, 1873.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e1.\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e    \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eLAWS\r\nDEALING WITH DECISION OF CASE ON THE BASIS OF OATH\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:\r\nnone;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;\r\ntext-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eIn Pakistan following\r\nstatutory laws are applicable for decision of a case on the basis of oath.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e1.1\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eARTICLE\r\n163 OF THE QANUN-E-SHAHADAT ORDER, 1984\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eArticle\r\n163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 is substantive and procedural provision\r\nof statutory law which is reproduced for convenience as under:\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u003cb\u003eAcceptance\r\nor denial of claim on oath. --- (1) When the plaintiff takes oath in support of\r\nhis claim, the court shall, on the application of the plaintiff, call upon the\r\ndefendant to deny the claim on oath. \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e(2)\r\nThe Court may pass such orders as to costs and other matters as it may deem\r\nfit. \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e(3)\r\nNothing in this Article applies to laws relating to the enforcement of Hudood\r\nor other criminal cases. \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:\r\nnone;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;\r\ntext-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eThis provision of law\r\ncontains power of the court to decide the case on oath and it also provides a\r\nshort procedure thereof. The procedure provided in Article 163 of the\r\nQanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 is neither exhaustive nor sufficient to deal with\r\nand cover all situations which may be faced by court seized with the case for\r\ndecision of the same on oath. Article 163 specifically ordains that no decision\r\nof case on oath is permissible which relates to enforcement of Hudood or other\r\ncriminal cases.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e1.2\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eWHETHER\r\nARTICLE 163 OF THE QANUN-E-SHAHADAT ORDER, 1984 IS CONTRARY TO INJUNCTION OF\r\nISLAM\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eArticle 163 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order,\r\n1984, is not contradictory to islamic injunctions. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eQazi Muhammad Haroon,\r\nAdvocate, High Court, Balochistan v. Federal Government of Pakistan \u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e(PLD\r\n2013 FSC 7). In the absence of any legal/Constitutional command to the\r\ncontrary, the Islamic mode for resolution of land dispute, was perfectly\r\nlawful. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAbdul Qayyum Beg v. Rehmat Wali and 4 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1993 SC\r\n289).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e1.3\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eSECTION 8, 9, 10 AND 11 OF THE OATHS ACT,\r\n1873\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eThe Oaths Act, 1873 also contains some\r\nprovisions which are substantive as well procedural in nature to decide the\r\ncase on oath. For convenience Section 8 of the Oaths Act, 1873 is reproduced:\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cu\u003ePower\r\nof Court to tender certain oaths\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/b\u003e.\u003cb\u003e If any party to, or witness in,\r\nany judicial proceeding offers to give evidence on oath or solemn affirmation\r\nin any form common amongst, or held binding by, persons of the race or\r\npersuasion to which he belongs, and not repugnant to justice or decency, and\r\nnot purporting to affect any third person, the Court may, if it thinks fit,\r\nnotwithstanding anything herein before contained, tender such oath or\r\naffirmation to him.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:\r\nnone;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;\r\ntext-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eSection 8\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e provides certain conditions in order to exercise\r\npower for decision of the case on oath which are as under:\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003ea)\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e    \u003c/span\u003eThere\r\nmust be an offer by the party or by the witness to the proceeding to give\r\nevidence on oath or solemn affirmation.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eb)\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e    \u003c/span\u003eThere\r\nmust be pending judicial proceeding for decision of which offer is made. The\r\nnature of the proceeding pending is very material. If a proceeding does not\r\nfall within ambit of judicial proceeding then Section 8 of the Oaths Act, 1873\r\nbecome inapplicable. For example, a family case which is quasi-judicial in\r\nnature could not be decided in terms of Section 8 and 9 of the Oaths Act, 1873.\r\nIn case of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eKhizar Hayat v. Judge Family Court, Sargodha and another\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n[Lahore] (2018 MLD 1480), case of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eRehmdil v. Mst. Bibi and 3 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n[Balochistan (Turbat Bench)] (2023 CLC 994), case of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAbdul Rehman v. Mst.\r\nRuqia Begum and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (2018 CLC Note 35), case of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad\r\nTabish Naeem Khan v. Additional District Judge, Lahore and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (2014\r\nSCMR 1365), case of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAsim Irfan Ahmad v. Additional District and Sessions\r\nJudge, Islamabad and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Islamabad] (2023 YLR 1123) it was held by\r\nsuperior Courts of Pakistan that proceeding before Family Court is\r\nquasi-judicial in nature. The provisions of Section 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the\r\nOaths Act, 1873, on their own force, are not applicable to the proceedings\r\nbefore Family Court for\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-spacerun:yes\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003ethe\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-spacerun:yes\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003ereasons\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-spacerun:yes\u0027\u003e \r\n\u003c/span\u003estated\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-spacerun:yes\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eabove.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-spacerun:yes\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eHowever,\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-spacerun:yes\u0027\u003e \r\n\u003c/span\u003eby\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-spacerun:yes\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003evirtue\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-spacerun:yes\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eof Sub-section (2) Section 17 of West\r\nPakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 the provisions of Sections 8, 9, 10 and 11 of\r\nthe Oaths Act, 1873are made applicable to all proceedings before the Family\r\nCourts in respect of Part I of Schedule annexed with. Family Court is not\r\nspecifically precluded from decision of case on the basis of oath in terms of\r\nArticle 163 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. However, by virtue of Subsection\r\n(1) Section 17 of West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 all provisions of\r\nQanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 including Article 163 is made inapplicable to the\r\nproceedings before Family Courts. Superior Courts of Pakistan have up held\r\ndecisions of cases on oath by Family Courts in case \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eIrfan Javed and 2\r\nothers v. Additional District Judge, Toba Tek Singh and 2 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n[Lahore] (2023 MLD 483) and in case of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eSajid Mehmood v. Mst. Shazia Azad\r\nand others \u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e(2023 SCMR 153), case of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst. Raheela Salamat v.\r\nAdditional District Judge, Faisalabad and 2 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (2010 YLR\r\n314),case of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Imam-ud-Din v. Mst. Saira Bano and 2 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n[Balochistan] (2021 CLC 911)but in these cases whether family case being\r\nquasi-judicial in nature could be decided on the basis of oath never remained\r\nunder discussion. \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003ec)\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e    \u003c/span\u003eThe\r\nform and wording of the oath must be common or binding amongst the parties to\r\nthe lis.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003ed)\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e    \u003c/span\u003eThe\r\noath, its form and wording must not be repugnant to justice, decency and it\r\nmust also not be illegal and void. \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003ee)\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e    \u003c/span\u003eThe\r\noath must relate to the fact in issue between the parties and it must not\r\naffect the person who happen not party to the suit. \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003ef)\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e     \u003c/span\u003eIf\r\nall above conditions are fulfilled then lastly the court must also think it fit\r\nto decide the case on oath. The words \u0026quot;the Court may, if it thinks\r\nfit\u0026quot; relates to the facts and circumstances of the case. The fitness of\r\nthe case, in the opinion of the court, for its decision on oath must be based\r\nupon the judicial considerations. For example, decision of the case on oath\r\nwhen evidence of the parties either has commenced or concluded is not\r\nconsidered fit by the superior Courts of Pakistan. When evidence of the parties\r\nis commenced or is concluded then case must be decided on the basis of evidence\r\nalone.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:\r\nnone;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;\r\ntext-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eSection 9 of the Oaths\r\nAct, 1873 also is relevant in this regard which provides power of the court to\r\nadminister oath to the party or to the witness if such an offer is accepted by\r\nother party. For convenience \u003cb\u003eSection 9\u003c/b\u003e is reproduced as under:\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cu\u003eAdministration\r\nof oath if accepted\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/b\u003e.\u003cb\u003e If such party or witness agrees to make such\r\noath or affirmation, the Court may proceed to administer it, or, if it is of\r\nsuch a nature that it may be more conveniently made out of Court, the Court may\r\nissue a commission to any person to administer it, and authorize him to take\r\nthe evidence of the person to be sworn or affirmed and return it to the Court.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:\r\nnone;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;\r\ntext-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eIn terms of Section 9 of\r\nthe Oaths Act, 1873 court could administer oath to the party or to the witness\r\nwho had shown his willingness to take oath. The oath may also be administered\r\nthough appointment of commission in terms of Sections 75 to 78 read with Order\r\nXXVI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:\r\nnone;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;\r\ntext-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eSection 10 of the Oaths\r\nAct, 1873 relates to binding effect of the oath administered to the party or to\r\nthe witness. For convenience Section 10 of the Oaths Act, 1873 is reproduced as\r\nunder:\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cu\u003eEvidence\r\nconclusive as against person offering to be bound\u003c/u\u003e. The evidence so given\r\nshall, as against the person who offered to be bound as aforesaid, be\r\nconclusive proof of the matter stated.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:\r\nnone;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;\r\ntext-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eIn terms of Section 10\r\nof the Oaths Act, 1873 the statement so made by the party or witness on oath\r\nhas been given status of evidence and too conclusive in nature. Article 2(9) of\r\nthe Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 proves that when one fact is declared by\r\nQanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 to be conclusive proof of another, the Court\r\nshall, on proof of the one fact, regard the other as proved and shall not allow\r\nevidence to be given for the purpose of disproving it. Court could decide the\r\nsuit on the basis such a statement made on oath by the party or by the witness.\r\nHowever, in certain circumstances, which shall be discussed later on, the court\r\ncould refuse to decide the case on the basis of statement made on oath.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:\r\nnone;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;\r\ntext-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eSo far as the\r\nconclusiveness and unwaveringness of evidence as against the person offering to\r\nbe bound is concerned, Section 11 elucidates lucidly and unambiguously that the\r\nevidence so given shall, as against the person who offered to be bound as\r\naforesaid, be conclusive proof of the matter stated. The phraseology\r\n\u0026quot;conclusive proof\u0026quot; brings into play inconspicuously the general\r\nprinciple of estoppel and sets forth that a party, who offers to be bound by\r\nthe evidence given by the opposite party or a witness on special oath, shall\r\nnot have the right to challenge the evidence which shall be conclusive and\r\ndefinitive proof of the matter. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eSajid Mehmood v. Mst. Shazia Azad and\r\nothers\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (2023 SCMR 153). The words \u0026quot;be conclusive proof of the\r\nmatter stated\u0026quot; in Section 11 of the Oaths Act, 1873, obviously mean that\r\nthe evidence on oath so given shall be conclusive proof in the suit in which\r\nsuch evidence is recorded of the matter in respect of which the parties have\r\nagreed to be bound. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Alt v. Major Muhammad Aslam and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(PLD 1990 SC 841).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:\r\nnone;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;\r\ntext-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eSection 11 of the Oaths\r\nAct, 1873 provides for refusal of the party or witness to take oath in terms of\r\noffer made for taking such an oath by it/him and decision of the case on its\r\nbasis. The party or witness who offering to take oath and requesting the court\r\nto decide the case on its basis may on justified reasons could be allowed to\r\nrelies therefrom. The Court in such a situation is required to take in writing\r\nall the proceedings and the reasons offered by the party or witness to refuse\r\nto take proposed oath.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e1.4\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eDECISION\r\nON OF CASE ON THE BASIS OF STATEMENT MADE ON OATH POSSIBLE IF BOTH PARTIES\r\nAGREE TO THAT PROCESS\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eDecision on oath is possible if both\r\nparties agree to that process. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Sharif v. Bashir Ahmad\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n[Lahore] (1987 CLC 2006). Provisions of Art.163, Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984\r\nwere applicable only when plaintiff had taken oath in support of his claim in a\r\ncase for decision. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eSher Bahadur Khan and another v. Haji Wali Bat Khan\r\nand 7 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Peshawar] (1992 MLD 46). Learned counsel for the\r\npetitioner has stated that the petitioner put in an application for decision of\r\nthe case on oath but the respondent refused to agree to that process and has\r\nargued that an adverse presumption from the same may be drawn against the\r\nrespondents. This is not the correct legal position. Decision on oath is possible\r\nif both the parties agree to that process. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Sharif v. Bashir\r\nAhmad\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (1987 CLC 2006).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e1.5\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eDIFFERENCE\r\nBETWEEN OATH UNDER SECTION 8 TO 11 OF THE OATHS ACT, 1873 AND ARTICLE 163 OF\r\nTH|E QANUN-E-SHAHADAT ORDER, 1984\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eArticle 163 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order,\r\n1984 is relevant and not Sections 8 to 11 of the Oath Act, 1873. The oath\r\nprescribed in Oaths Act, 1873 is binding, upon the parties, while oath under\r\nArticle 163 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 is not binding. In case of rebuttal\r\nof oath by the other side, the Court would proceed by recording evidence. The\r\nMagistrate seems to have influenced from Oath Act, 1873 and lost sight of\r\nArticle 163 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAbdul Khaliq v. Gul Faraz\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(PLD 2011 Peshawar 112). Article 163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984\r\nprovides a mechanism to accept or denial through the claim on oath although it\r\nis different from Oaths Act, 1873 and though the said Article is applicable in\r\ncivil proceedings only \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst. Jamila v. The State \u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e[Islamabad] (2019\r\nP.Cr.\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-spacerun:yes\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eJ 1176).Article 163 of the\r\nQanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and Section 9, 10 and 11 of the Oaths Act, 1873\r\nare not in consonance with each other rather are contradictory. Article 163 of\r\nthe Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 exclusively deals with the civil matters as it\r\nfirstly relates to plaintiff and secondly it specifically has excluded the\r\ncases relating to criminal matters. Section 9 of the Oaths Act, 1873 deals with\r\nthe cases in judicial proceedings. It does not exclude decision of case on the\r\nbasis of oath in criminal matters, whereas, Article 163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat\r\nOrder, 1984specifically prohibits decision of the criminal cases on oath. Both\r\nthe provisions as discussed supra i.e. Article 163 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order\r\nand Sections 8 to 11 of Oaths Act, 1873 are opposite to each other. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad\r\nRafique v. Nasir Mehmood\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 2016 Lahore 428). Oath under\r\nQanun-e-Sahadat Order, 1984 and the one under the Oaths Act, 1873, were\r\ndiametrically opposed to each other, and no inference could be drawn by the\r\nCourt against the plaintiff on his refusal to take oath under Article 163 of\r\nQanun-e-Sahadat Order, 1984. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eBashir Ahmed v. Muhammad Luqman\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(1999 SCMR 378). The oath within, the contemplation of Sections 8 to 11 of the\r\nOaths Act, 1873 stems from a voluntary agreement between the parties and when\r\ntaken has a binding effect leaving the party making the offer with no choice to\r\nturn around and strike a discordant note as observed in Maulvi \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad\r\nRamzan v. Muhammad Ismail\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e 1982 SCMR 908, \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eFirm Chiragh Hussain v.\r\nKhawaja Habib Joo\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e PLD 1983 SC (AJ\u0026amp;K) 86, \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eKhan Sher v. Mst.\r\nKabla and another\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e PLD 1988 Peshawar 86 and \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuzaffer Ali and 2\r\nothers v. Ch. Asghar Ali\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e 1991 CLC 2110 while the oath, envisaged by\r\nArticle 163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 is entailed by the initiative taken\r\nby the plaintiff who takes an oath in support of his claim first and then on\r\nhis application the Court calls upon the defendant to deny the claim on oath\r\nand in any event the Court is not precluded from recording evidence of the\r\nparties and deciding the case on merits as observed in \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eRehmatullah v.\r\nNasir Khan and 7 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e 1991 MLD (Posh.) 101, \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eNazir Ahmad v.\r\nDistrict Judge, Laiah\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e PLD 1986 Lahore 137 and \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Shahbaz v.\r\nGhulam Rasool\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e 1987 CLC 1512. In technical terms the oath referred to in\r\nArticle 163 of the Oanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 is a general oath and the oath\r\nprovided by the Oaths Act,1873 is a special oath and both are diametrically\r\nopposed to each other. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eBhore Khan v. Noor Din \u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e(PLD 1993 Peshawar\r\n72).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e    \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003ePROCEDURE\r\nFOR DECISION OF CASE ON THE BASIS OF OATH\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eThe statutory law available at present\r\ndoes not prescribe procedure comprehending all issues which could crop up for\r\ndecision by the court seized with matter for its decision on the basis of oath.\r\nThis fact has been judicially recognized by superior Courts of Pakistan in case\r\nof \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eIrfan Javed and 2 others v. Additional District Judge, Toba Tek Singh\r\nand 2 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (2023 MLD 483), case of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Alt v.\r\nMajor Muhammad Aslam and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1990 SC 841), case of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAhmad\r\nKhan and others v. Jewan\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 2002 SC 655) and case of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMahmood\r\nAli Butt v. Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore and 10 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(PLD 1997 SC 823).Some guidelines could be found from Article 163 of the\r\nQanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and from Section 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Oaths Act,\r\n1873. Besides this some principles have been settled by our superior Courts in\r\nthis regard. We are bound to follow the decision of Supreme Court, respective\r\nHigh Court and Federal Shariat Court in terms of Article 189, 201 and 203-GG of\r\nthe Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973. Further in terms of\r\nArticle 4 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 the decision\r\nof the superior Courts deciding question of law or enunciating principles of\r\nlaw falls within definition of law. An attempt is made to collect all decisions\r\nof Superior Courts of Pakistan to know the procedure to be followed by the\r\nCourts for decision of case on the basis of oath in terms of Sections 8, 9, 10\r\nand 11 of the Oaths Act, 1873 and Article 163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order,\r\n1984 which is as under:\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.1\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eWHEN\r\nDECISION OF CASE ON THE BASIS OF STATEMENT MADE ON OATH IS PERMISSIBLE\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eIn Islamic Law the decision of lis on\r\noath is permissible when although a party has a cause of action against other\r\nparty but has no evidence for its proof. When party has evidence for proof of\r\nits case and the same is either in progress or is concluded then decision of\r\nthe case on oath is not permissible under law. Same is provided in terms of\r\nSection 8 of the Oaths Act, 1873 which provides that offer of the party or\r\nwitness for decision of the case on oath may proceed further if Court thinks\r\nfit. It shall not be in fitness of things that offer of a party or witness for\r\ndecision of case on the basis of oath be proceeded with when party has evidence\r\nfor proof of its cause.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eIt is also possible under Article 163 of\r\nQanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 if there is no evidence available with a plaintiff\r\nand he can support his claim only by his own oath and by no other means. In\r\nthat case if the plaintiff of a case takes the oath the respondent also takes\r\nthe oath and if he refuses the claim of the plaintiff the case or plea of the\r\nplaintiff fails. This is known as Half-e-Radd. But when evidence is available\r\nand can be produced then resort to Article 163 ibid cannot be made. Both\r\nparties have led evidence and, therefore, the provisions of Sections 8,9, 10\r\nand 11 of the Oaths Act, 1873 could not apply to it. Therefore, no adverse\r\npresumption against the respondent could be drawn \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Sharif v.\r\nBashir Ahmad\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (1987 CLC 2006). The superior Courts also laid\r\ndown a principle by interpreting Article 163 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984\r\nthat when evidence is available and can be produced then resort to Article 163\r\ncannot be made. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eQazi Muhammad Saqib Khan v. Ghulam Abbas and 2 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n[DB Lahore] (2003 MLD 131).The application under Article 163 of the\r\nQanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 containing was rejected by the trial Court on the\r\nground that both parties completed their evidence and case was fixed for final\r\ndecision on the same date, consequent upon conclusion of arguments. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eHaji\r\nNauroze Khan v. Malik Raz Muhammad and 2 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [DB Quetta] (2006 CLC\r\n144).The Superior Courts also laid down a principle by interpreting Article 163\r\nthat when evidence is available and can be produced then resort to Article 163\r\ncannot be made. Where both the parties have led evidence, the provision of this\r\nArticle should not be applied \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst. Rashida Abdul Rehman v. Zahoor Hussain\r\nand 5 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (2007 CLC 1372). It seems thus evident that under\r\nthe original concepts in Islamic Fiqh a plaintiff has first to raise a claim.\r\nIf he has witnesses in support of the claim the matter has to be decided on the\r\nbasis of evidence led, apparently, from either side. It is only in cases where\r\nthere are no witnesses available in support of the claim that the plaintiff,\r\nupon raising the demand, is entitled to exact do oath from the defendant and\r\nthat is the plaintiff\u0027s right. If the defendant declines to make oath the\r\nplaintiff (on taking oath himself) should have his decree. Alternatively, on\r\nthe defendant making oath of denial the plaintiff must fail. It is these\r\nconcepts of Fiqh, which are implicitly ingrained in the framing of Article 163\r\nof the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Similar views were expressed by Abdul\r\nKarim Khan Kundi, J. (as he then was), in Khan Sher versusKabla (Mst.) PLD 1988\r\nPeshawar 65, where \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eNazir Ahmad v. District Judge, Leiah\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e PLD 1986\r\nLahore 137, was substantially dissented from. The rule seems to be also\r\nrecognised by the Supreme Court in \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Fazil v. Bibi Sughran\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n1991 SCMR 1371. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Luqman v. Bashir Ahmad\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1994 Karachi\r\n492). The apex Court, while interpreting the provision of Article 163 of the\r\nQanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, has laid down principle that when both the parties\r\nhave led evidence, the provision of this Article shall not be applied. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMir\r\nSahib Khan and others v. Ghazi Muhammad and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 2014 Peshawar\r\n29). Article 163 will come into play only when the plaintiff could not\r\nsubstantiate his claim through evidence but when a claim could be established\r\nthrough evidence there will be no occasion for the disposal of the suit on\r\ntaking oath by the plaintiff in support of his claim and oath by the defendant\r\nin denial of the claim. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eLaiq Dad and others v. Mst. Noor Jehan and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(PLD 2004 Peshawar 30). The provision of Article 163 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order,\r\n1984 is operative in a case when the plaintiff has no evidence in support of\r\nhis claim and he seeks decision on the basis of an oath then he may place his\r\ncase on a special oath and if the same is denied on oath by the defendant on\r\noath, the plaintiff\u0027s Suit fails. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAli Asghar Dawood Bhoy through Attorney\r\nv. Ibrahim\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Sindh] (2020 CLC 1503). Article 163 can be invoked only in\r\ncases where the plaintiff cannot produce requisite evidence in support of his\r\nclaim when he may opt to the decision of the case on oath. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eKhan Sher v.\r\nMst. Kabla and another\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1988 Peshawar 65).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.2\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eMATTER\r\nLEFT TO THE COURT TO DEVISE REASONABLE PROCEDURE TO PROCEED WITH THE MATTER FOR\r\nDECISION OF CASE ON THE BASIS OF OATH\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eIf, on the other hand, when the claim\r\nmade is shown to be prima facie valid but the plaintiff is unable to produce\r\nevidence and demands that the defendant to be put to his oath, in that case\r\nQazi must administer oath to him. The demand of plaintiff is requisite to the\r\nexaction of oath as it is his right. This has not been so provided in Article\r\n163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 as the matter has been left to the\r\nCourt to proceed with the matter as it may deem fit. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMahmood Ali Butt v.\r\nInspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore and 10 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1997 SC\r\n823). It may not be out of place to observe that Sections 9, 10 and 11 of the\r\nOaths Act, 1873 have not provided any procedure for recording of the statement\r\non special oath but the Court can lay down its own procedure to ensure that\r\nprejudice is not caused to any of the parties depending upon the circumstances\r\nof each case. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAhmad Khan and others v. Jewan\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 2002 SC 655).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.3\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eOFFER\r\nAND ACCEPTANCE FOR DECISION OF CASE ON THE BASIS OF OATH MUST BE MADE THROUGH\r\nWRITTEN APPLICATION AND WRITTEN REPLY RESPECTIVELY\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eEssentially, there is an ambiguity in\r\nacceptance of offer by Jewan, therefore, learned Presiding Officer may have\r\ncalled upon the plaintiffs (petitioners) to submit application specifying the\r\nnature of the statement which they wanted to obtain on oath for the decision of\r\nthe case and then the defendant Jewan should have also been provided an\r\nopportunity to categorically accept or reject the offer being made by the plaintiffs.\r\n\u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAhmad Khan and others v. Jewan\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 2002 SC 655).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.4\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eSEPARATE\r\nSTATEMENTS OF THE PARTIES FOR OFFER TO TAKE OATH AND ACCEPTANCE THEREOF MUST BE\r\nRECORDED ON SEPARATE DATES\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eThe Court should be careful to see that\r\nsuch offers and acceptances are not recorded with the same snap speed with\r\nwhich they are made, for such offers and acceptances would not be founded in\r\npiety and grace and would not be made at the highest level of truth. For no\r\nsooner a person makes an offer to another to make a statement on the Holy\r\nQur\u0027an or his Holy Book, whichever it may be, with regard to any matter or\r\nfact, the effect of which will be to bind him in a particular manner, for good\r\nor for worse, he does so on the assumption that the person who will accept it\r\nis conscious of his trust and whilst making the statement on the Holy Book\r\nshall place himself figuratively before his Maker and his Holy Prophet and\r\nstate the truth, on pain of divine wrath. The Court should, therefore, be\r\nsomewhat circumspect in this matter and refrain from permitting parties to\r\nenter into such agreements, which otherwise do not appear to have been made by\r\nthem in some reasonable frame of mind, or which appear to be the result of\r\nindecent haste, or which otherwise, from the apparent conduct of any of the\r\nparties, appear to be such as would make a mockery of the oath. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad\r\nAlt v. Major Muhammad Aslam and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1990 SC 841). It is also\r\nnot advisable for the Courts to accept the offer of anyone of the parties for\r\ndecision of the case on oath so promptly because there is every possibility\r\nthat may be, for the time being, the offer for the decision of the case on\r\nspecial oath is accepted without knowing its consequences but after some time\r\nthe party may resile from such offer for any cogent reason. In this behalf this\r\nCourt has already made certain observations in the case of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Ali\r\nv. Maj. Muhammad Aslam and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e PLD 1990 SC 841. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAhmad Khan and\r\nothers v. Jewan\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 2002 SC 655).The need for recording separate\r\nstatements of the parties in respect of the offer and acceptance made in such\r\ncases deserves to be over-emphasised, for such a procedure would give parties\r\nsome short time to think over the matter and extricate themselves from hasty\r\ndecisions, before appending their signatures to their statements. We do not\r\nwish to go down on the record as suggesting that this procedure must invariably\r\nbe observed, for there is no such legal compulsion, not do we want to suggest\r\nthat certain safeguards suggested here should be treated as rules of prudence to\r\nbe observed in such cases, because sections 9 to 11 of the Oaths Act, 1873 do\r\nnot admit of such intrusions, but we would say that all this may be treated as\r\na note of caution, for a Court is as much bound to ensure the solemnity of\r\nthese proceedings, as the parties are bound to respect them. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Alt\r\nv. Major Muhammad Aslam and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1990 SC 841).No separate\r\nstatements regarding offer by the respondent or acceptance by the petitioner\r\nwere recorded by the learned trial Court rather their signatures were obtained\r\non the margins of interim orders sheets. Impugned proceedings before the\r\nlearned trial Court therefore lack due care, caution and solemnity. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAbdul\r\nAziz v. Muhammad Yousaf \u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e(PLD 2015 Lahore 348). In the absence of any\r\nsuch satisfactory or sufficient cause the Court is obligated to implement the\r\nagreement and to record the statement of the party concerned to make decision\r\nin the case accordingly. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eSajid Mehmood v. Mst. Shazia Azad and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(2023 SCMR 153).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.5\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eOFFER\r\nAND ACCEPTANCEFOR DECISION OF CASE ON THE BASIS OF STATEMENT ON OATH SHOULD BE\r\nRECORDED IN WORDING OF THE PARTIES\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eBefore the High Court an objection was\r\nraised that the offer and acceptance was recorded in the shape of a note, which\r\ncould not be acted upon, as the trial Court had failed to record separate\r\nstatements of the appellant and respondent No. 1 showing the precise wording of\r\ntheir offer and acceptance and that, therefore, the offer and acceptance had no\r\nvalidity. As already stated by us, this should have been done, as it was a\r\nsalutary procedure. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Alt v. Major Muhammad Aslam and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(PLD 1990 SC 841).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.6\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eOMISSION\r\nTO RECORD SEPARATE STATEMENTS FOR DECISION OF CASE ON THE BASIS OF STATEMENT ON\r\nOATH\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eIt is also settled principle of law that\r\nomission to record appellant\u0027s statement separately was merely an irregularity,\r\nwhich would not in law invalidate the entire proceedings of taking oath and\r\nrecording the statement. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Mazhar v. Arshad Mehmood\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (DB\r\nDecision) (PLD 2005 Lahore 304). The plaintiff was present in Court when the\r\noffer was made by the defendant and he must have agreed with the offer,\r\notherwise the learned trial Court would not have proceeded to record the\r\nstatement of the defendant. Even otherwise the omission to record the\r\nplaintiff\u0027s statement separately is merely an irregularity which does not, in\r\nlaw, invalidate the entire proceedings of taking oath and recording statement. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad\r\nSiddique v. Noor Muhammad and 2 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (1996 CLC 695). Thus\r\nvisualized, a mere irregularity in not following the procedure prescribed in\r\nthe aforesaid provisions of law would not ipso facto render the impugned order\r\nvoid in the absence of any prejudice to either of the parties which has not\r\neven been alleged therein. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eKhadim v. Judge, Family Court, Samundari District\r\nFaislaabad and another\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (1991 MLD 1250).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.7\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eHASTE\r\nIN DECISION OF CASE ON THE BASIS OF STATEMENT ON OATH\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eArticle 163 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order,\r\n1984 was interpreted by the superior Courts and laid down a principle that no\r\ndoubt decision of a case on oath is one of the established modes for disposal\r\nof the case, but at the same time the Courts are bound to handle such cases\r\nwith great care because such cases involve sensitiveness and to avoid haste and\r\nrationalize emotional outbursts. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eQazi Muhammad Saqib Khan v. Ghulam Abbas\r\nand 2 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [DB Lahore] (2003 MLD 131). The provisions of Article 163\r\nof Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 based on a principle that no doubt decision of\r\na case on oath is one of the established modes for disposal of the case but at\r\nthe same time, the Courts are bound to handle such cases with great care\r\nbecause such cases involve sensitiveness and to avoid haste and rationalize\r\nemotional outbursts. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst. Rashida Abdul Rehman v. Zahoor Hussain and 5\r\nothers\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (2007 CLC 1372). The evidence of the deceased\r\npetitioner was concluded and thereafter respondent No.1 had entered in the\r\nwitness box. After her examination-in-chief, she was subjected to lengthy\r\ncross-examination. Towards almost the fag end thereto, the said statement was\r\nmade by respondent No.1 and immediately thereafter her statement was recorded.\r\nThe offer was accepted and oath was taken and the suit was decided. I have\r\nexamined the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the parties. To my mind\r\nthe following excerpts quoted from the judgment in the case of PLD 1990 SC 841\r\nand reproduced by their lordships in the case of Ahmad Khan and others at pages\r\n658 and 659 wholly supports the observation of the learned Additional District\r\nJudge in the impugned judgment:\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u0026quot;In\r\ncase such as the present, where it is not possible to lay down guiding\r\nprinciples as to what facts or circumstances in a given case would induce a\r\nJudge to permit a party to resile from either the offer or the acceptance, it\r\nis necessary for the Court to guard itself and the parties against snap\r\ndecisions taken by the parties in this connection. More open than not, during examination\r\nof a party or a witness or during a heated discussion or argument, a party in\r\nthe excitement of the moment may be led to make a snap decision in this\r\nrespect. He may in the heat of passion make such an offer, or accept such a\r\none, which otherwise in a state of cool deliberation he would not do. The Court\r\nshould be careful to see that such offers and acceptances are not recorded with\r\nthe same snap speed with which they are made, for such offers and acceptances\r\nwould not be founded in piety and grace and would not be made the highest level\r\nof truth. For no sooner a person makes an offer to another to make a statement\r\non the Holy Qur\u0027an or his Holy Book, whichever it may be, with regard to any\r\nmatter or fact, the effect of which will be to bind him in a particular manner,\r\nfor good or for worse, he does so on the assumption that the person who will\r\naccept it is conscious of his trust and whilst making the statement on the Holy\r\nBook shall place himself figuratively before his Maker and his Holy Prophet and\r\nstate the truth, on pain of divine wrath. The Court should, therefore, be\r\nsomewhat circumspect in this matter and refrain from permitting parties to\r\nenter into such agreements, which otherwise do not appear to have been made by\r\nthem in some reasonable frame of mind, or which appear to be the result of\r\nindecent haste, of which otherwise, from the apparent conduct of any of the\r\nparties, appear to be such as would make a mockery of the other. The need for\r\nrecording separate statements of the parties in respect of the offer and\r\nacceptance made in such cases deserves to be over emphasized, for which a\r\nprocedure would give parties some short time to think over the matter and\r\nextricate themselves from hasty decisions, before \u0027appending their signatures\r\nto their statements. We do not wish to go down on the record as suggesting that\r\nthis procedure must invariably be observed, for there is no such legal\r\ncompulsion, nor do we want to suggest that certain safeguard suggested here\r\nshould be treated as rules of prudence to be observed in such cases, because\r\nsections 9 to 11 of the Oaths Act do not admit of such instructions, but we\r\nwould say that all this may be treated as a note of caution; for a Court\r\ninasmuch bound to ensure the solemnity of these proceedings, as the parties are\r\nbound to respect them.\u0026quot;\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e5.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e    \u003c/span\u003eIt will be noted that it has been emphasized\r\nby their lordships that in such like manner Courts are not required to act too\r\npromptly as has been done by the learned trial Court in the present case. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eKhushi\r\nMuhammad through L.Rs. v. Mst. Nazira Bibi and 4 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (2007\r\nCLC 1874). It is also not advisable for the Courts to accept the offer of\r\nanyone of the parties for the decision of the case on oath so promptly because\r\nthere is every possibility that may be, for the time being, the offer for the\r\ndecision of the case on special oath is accepted without knowing its\r\nconsequences but after some time the party may resile from such offer for any\r\ncogent reason. In this behalf this Court has already made certain observations\r\nin the case of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Ali v. Maj. Muhammad Aslam and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e PLD\r\n1990 SC 841. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAhmad Khan and others v. Jewan\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 2002 SC\r\n655).Article 163 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 was interpreted by the\r\nsuperior Courts and laid down a principle that no doubt decision of a case on\r\noath is one of the established modes for disposal of the case, but at the same\r\ntime the Courts are bound to handle such cases with great care because such\r\ncases involve sensitiveness and to avoid haste and rationalize emotional outbursts.\r\n\u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eQazi Muhammad Saqib Khan v. Ghulam Abbas and 2 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore]\r\n[DB Decision] (2003 MLD 131). No doubt, decision of a case on oath is one of\r\nthe established modes for disposal of cases but at the same time the Courts are\r\nbound to handle such cases with great care for involving in it the\r\nsensitiveness and to avoid haste and rationalising emotional outbursts. It is\r\nalso the duty of the Court to scrutinize the relevant record and to record the\r\nnecessary statements. In such a situation, when no statement had yet been\r\nrecorded on oath and the alleged offer and acceptance of the oath was obviously\r\nthe result of heated discussion between the plaintiff and the defendant in the\r\nCourt at a stage when the plaintiff was going to record his\r\nexamination-in-chief, the approach of the learned trial Court to the facts and\r\ncircumstances of the case was quite correct and the learned District Judge has\r\nerred in law while accepting the revision petition. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eShakirullah v.\r\nHidayatullah and 3 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Peshawar] (1999 MLD 389)\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.8\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003ePARTY\r\nOFFERING STATEMENT ON OATH FOR DECISION OF THE CASE MUST BE MENTALLY CALM AND\r\nCONSIDERING EFFECTS OF OATH UPON HIS RIGHTS \u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eThere are circumstances in which such\r\noffer is made to the opposite party after considering its effect and the\r\nopposite party may either accept or reject the offer after considering its\r\nconsequences. In such circumstances, the parties are well-composed and not\r\novercome by spontaneous emotions. The party offering the oath must be mentally\r\ncalm and considering when he so offers, must not be under the influence of\r\nemotions and must be in a position to clearly know that he will lose his right,\r\nif any, if the oath is taken by the opposite party. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuqadar Shah and\r\nothers v. Mudam Gul\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Peshawar] (2005 CLC 1441). More often that not,\r\nduring examination of a party or a witness, or during a heated discussion or\r\nargument, a party in the excitement of the moment may be led to make a snap\r\ndecision in this respect. He may in the heat of passion make such an offer, or\r\naccept such a one, which otherwise in a state of cool deliberation he would not\r\ndo. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Alt v. Major Muhammad Aslam and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1990 SC\r\n841).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.9\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eOATH\r\nTO PARTY OR TO WITNESS MUST BE ADMINISTERED IN PRESENCE OF OTHER PARTY\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eHow an oath could be administered to the\r\nmortgagee in the absence of the mortgagor when he neither offered it nor\r\naccepted the offer for resolution of dispute on its basis? If at all the\r\nresolution of dispute was sought to be made on the basis of oath, it should\r\nhave been, in the first instance offered to the plaintiff-mortgagor and then to\r\nthe defendant-mortgagee. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eUmar Baz Khan through L.Hrs. v. Syed Jehanzeb\r\nand others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 2013 SC 268).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.10\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e            \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eCOURT\r\nWILL TAKE OATH IN COMPLETE SILENCE AND THE PERSON WHO IS GIVING OATH MUST BE\r\nSTANDING BEFORE THE PRESIDING OFFICER OF THE COURT\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eCourt will take oath from the witness in\r\ncomplete silence and the witness who is giving oath must be standing before the\r\nPresiding Officer of the Court. Furthermore, the words will be repeated in a\r\nclear voice phrase by phrase. Meaning thereby, each and every word will be made\r\nknown to the witness so as to make him understand what is the oath which he is\r\ngoing to give. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eEhsan Ellahi Baig v. Muhammad Pervaiz \u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e(PLD 2018\r\nLahore 693).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.11\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e            \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eSTATEMENT\r\nMADE ON OATH SHOULD HAVE BEEN REDUCED INTO WRITING VERBATIM AND THEN READ OVER\r\nTO MAKER AND HAD HE ADMITTED IT CORRECT THEN HE TO SIGN/THUMB-IMPRESSED THE\r\nSAME\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eIn fact the statement made on special\r\noath should have been reduced into writing verbatim and then read over to the\r\nrespondent and had she admitted the correctness of the same, then her\r\nsignature/thumb-impression should have obtained in token of correctness. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst.\r\nKhairan Bibi v. Mst. Hajran Bibi\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (2012 YLR 2054).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.12\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e            \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eOFFER\r\nTO ABIDE BY STATEMENT ON OATH MAY BE ACCEPTED BY PARTY PERSONALLY OR THROUGH\r\nHIS AGENT\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eIt is also settled principle of law that\r\nthe word \u0027party\u0027 as hinted in sections 8 and 9 of Oaths Act, 1873 includes an\r\nAdvocate of the party also and the offer to abide by the special oath under\r\nSection 9 may be accepted not by party personally but by a party through an\r\nagent. Reliance in this regard may safely be placed on \u0026quot;\u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eHaji Dilbar\r\nKhan Mahaar, A.A.G. Mewo and another v. Mst. Lal Khatoon\u0026quot;\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD\r\n1962 Kar. 162), wherein it was held that an Advocate empowered by a party to\r\nenter into a compromise etc., was fully competent to make an offer to abide by\r\nthe special oath and in doing so he must be deemed to have been instructed by\r\nhis client. In \u0026quot;\u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eHata v. Samail\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u0026quot; (AIR 1932 Lahore 414)\r\nit was held that any act required or authorized to be done by a party to a suit\r\ncan be done by his recognized agent provided the act falls generally within the\r\nscope of the latter\u0027s authority. It cannot be held that an offer to be bound by\r\nthe oath of the other party must be made by the party personally and not by his\r\nduly authorized agent. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eIrfan Javed and 2 others v. Additional District\r\nJudge, Toba Tek Singh and 2 others \u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e[Lahore] (2023 MLD 483). A counsel\r\nacting on behalf of his client is not to be treated on a better footing than an\r\nattorney acting on behalf of his principal. In nutshell the power of counsel\r\nemanates from the Vakalatnama and is dependent upon the terms thereof,\r\ntherefore, if some power does not find mention in the Vakalatnama the same\r\ncannot be exercised by the counsel even by invoking the principle of implied\r\nauthority. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eSh. Muhammad Fazil v. Sh. Abdul Qadir and 7 others \u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e[Lahore]\r\n(1997 CLC 243). Law is well-settled that a counsel appointed by the parties has\r\nthe power to make such an offer as the same flows from the terms of his\r\nappointment. I have gone through the power of attorney/Vakalatnama executed in\r\nfavour of the learned counsel for the revision petitioners and find that\r\nexpress power was given to him to make such an offer. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eTalah Safdar and\r\nanother v. Bashir Ahmad and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (1997 CLC 601). In case the\r\naforesaid basic facts are put in a juxta position then it is crystal clear that\r\nthe appellant has himself signed the power of attorney in favour of the\r\nAdvocate, therefore, offer accepted in presence of his counsel by his Special\r\nAttorney is binding upon the appellant. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Mazhar v. Arshad Mehmood\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(DB decision) (PLD 2005 Lahore 304). The power of attorney in favour of an\r\nAdvocate does bear a clause that all acts done by the attorney would be deemed\r\nto have been done by the parties but the same pertains to the routine matters\r\nand a counsel is not authorized to make an offer for decision of the suit on\r\nspecial oath unless so instructed by the parties concerned in black and white.\r\nThe respondent did not make any statement on special oath and her statement was\r\nconfined only to the effect that she had heard the above statement and same was\r\ncorrect. In fact the statement made on special oath should have been reduced\r\ninto writing verbatim and then read over to the respondent and had she admitted\r\nthe correctness of the same, then her signature/thumb-impression should have\r\nobtained in token of correctness. The statement made by the learned counsel for\r\nthe petitioner in this case was not authorized as he had no specific\r\ninstructions in this regard from the petitioner. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst. Khairan Bibi v.\r\nMst. Hajran Bibi\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (2012 YLR 2054). Although it has not been\r\nspecifically mentioned in his Vakalatnama that he was empowered to settle the\r\ndispute in terms of special oath yet the said two recitals leave little room for\r\ndoubt that he had the authority to agree to the disposal of suit on the basis\r\nof that oath. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuzaffar Ali and 2 others v. Ch. Asghar Ali\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n[Lahore] (1991 CLC 2110). There is thus preponderance of views in favour of the\r\nprinciple that prima facie a party to the judicial proceedings in Sections 8\r\nand 9 of the Oaths Act, 1873 would include an Advocate of the party also. It\r\nappears to us that an Advocate empowered by a party to enter into a compromise\r\netc., is fully competent to make an offer to abide by the special oath and in\r\ndoing so he must be deemed to have been so instructed by his client. This\r\nappears to us to be a well settled principle of law. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eHaji Mewo and\r\nAnother v. Mst. Lal Khatoon\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1962 (WP) Karachi 162).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.13\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e            \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eOFFER\r\nAND ACCEPTANCE ON BEHALF OF MINOR LITIGANT FOR DECISION OF CASE ON THE BASIS OF\r\nSTATEMENT ON OATH\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eLaw by now is fairly well settled that\r\nthe offer of oath as was made by the next friend of the petitioner in the\r\ninstant case is only a special method of proof adopted by the next friend and\r\nis not in the nature of an agreement or compromise and, therefore, it does not\r\nrequire the sanction/leave of the Court contemplated by Order XXXII Rule 7,\r\nC.P.C. Refer \u0026quot;\u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Mahmud Chaudhry and others v. Behary Lal Saha\r\nand others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u0026quot; (AIR 1930 Calcutta 463) wherein it was held \u0026quot;The\r\noffer of the guardian of a minor defendant on behalf of the minor to abide by\r\nthe deposition to be given by a plaintiff on a special oath stands on a very\r\ndifferent ground from an agreement or compromise contemplated by Order 32, Rule\r\n7, and in such a case the minor is bound by the consent of his guardian\r\nalthough given without the leave of the Court provided there is no fraud or\r\ngross negligence on the part of the guardian.\u0026quot; Again in the case reported\r\nas AIR 1936 Lahore 235 \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eSultan Muhammad and others v. Mehr Khan and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthe view taken was that \u0026quot;when the next friend of a minor expressed\r\nwillingness to be bound by the oath of a certain witness, it was not in, the\r\nnature of a compromise.\u0026quot; It was a method of proof which the next friend\r\nhad adopted. There was nothing illegal at all in that method. This view was\r\nfollowed in a Peshawar case reported in PLD 1966 Peshawar 137 wherein it was\r\nheld that the offer of next friend of the minor to abide by the oath of the\r\nopposite party on the crucial question involved in the suit was not in the\r\nnature of compromise but was method of proof, adopted by the next friend and no\r\nillegality was attached to that matter. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eObaid Asghar v. Farhat Shaheen\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(1995 SCMR 865). The question which requires consideration in this case is as\r\nto whether the offer made by the learned counsel for the revision petitioners\r\nfor decision of the case on the basis of special oath if taken by the opposite\r\nparty was the agreement or compromise of the kind and nature as contemplated by\r\nOrder 32, Rule 7, C.P.C. which required express permission of the Court before\r\nthe same was allowed to be materialised and acted upon in case the same also\r\naffected the rights of minor in the suit. This question came up for\r\nconsideration in a case reported as \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eJafar Abbas and 2 others v. Ahmad and\r\nanother\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1991 SC 1134) relied upon by the learned counsel for the\r\nrespondents. In this judgment after examining the law and considering the\r\njudgments of the Full Bench of the Punjab Chief Court in \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMalak Sorab v.\r\nAnokh Rai and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (18 P.R. 1891) and judgment of Calcutta High Court\r\nin \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eSheo Nath Saran v. Sukh Lal Singh\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (ILR 27 Cal. 229) it was\r\nheld that such an offer did not constitute agreement or compromise as\r\ncontemplated by Order XXXII, Rule 7, C.P.C., therefore, the same did not\r\nrequire express permission of the Court and the same could be acted upon\r\nwithout such leave as the statement if made on special oath amounted to\r\nevidentiary admission and form of proof. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eTalah Safdar and another v. Bashir\r\nAhmad and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (1997 CLC 601).It was authoritatively laid\r\ndown that settlement to decide the matter on oath constituted a valid agreement\r\nfrom which parties could not conveniently wriggle out until contract was\r\nex-facie shown to be void or incapable of implementation, which is not the case\r\nof present petitioner. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Azam v. Additional District Judge and\r\nothers\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (2019 CLC 207).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.14\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e            \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eOFFER\r\nOF A PARTY FOR DECISION OF CASE ON THE BASIS OF STATEMENT ON OATH WITHOUT\r\nACCEPTANCE BY OTHER PARTY\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eThe plaintiffs had not offered disposal\r\nof the suit on the basis of oath as they were confident to establish their\r\nclaim by means of evidence. The offer made by the defendant was also denied and\r\nthus without an agreement between the contesting parties for disposal of the\r\ndispute through special or general oath, the Court cannot force the plaintiff\r\nto take oath in support of their claim or to accept the offer of the defendants\r\nfor taking oath in rebuttal of the claim of the plaintiffs. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eLaiq DAD and others\r\nv. Mst. Noor Jehan and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 2004 Peshawar 30). If the party or\r\nthe witness refuses to take the oath or solemn affirmation, he shall not be\r\ncompelled to make such an oath. The court shall record this fact as a part of\r\nthe proceedings together with reasons, which may be assigned for such refusal.\r\nSince the oath offered by the appellant was not accepted by the respondent and\r\nhe rested his claim before the court on the basis of evidence by showing enough\r\nconfidence, therefore, the case was to be decided on its own merits. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad\r\nAsif v. Muhammad Idrees\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (2013 MLD 1395).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.15\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e            \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eUNILATERAL\r\nOATH TAKEN UNDER ARTICLE 163 OF QANUN-E-SHAHADAT ORDER, 1984 BY THE PLAINTIFF\r\nIN HIS FAVOUR, WOULD NOT BE TREATED AS AN EVIDENCE\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eThe unilateral oath, taken by the\r\nplaintiff in his favour, would not be treated as a conclusive piece of evidence\r\nas to be given preference over evidence produced by the parties. A deposition\r\nof party on oath in his favour nevertheless remains evidence. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMir Sahib\r\nKhan and others v. Ghazi Muhammad and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 2014 Peshawar 29). A\r\ndeposition on oath by a party in his own favour nevertheless remains evidence. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMirza\r\nKhan and another v. Muhammad Ilyas\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1991 SC 383). In this case, if\r\nthe defendants would have left the plaintiff\u0027s oath uncontested then,\r\nobviously, it would have been liable to be considered as strong evidence in\r\nsupport of the truth of his case which the defendants could have disproved in\r\nthe usual manner by means of evidence and in taking the desired oath they\r\ncannot be considered to have placed the matter at any higher footing because\r\ntherein they had not done anything more than merely destroying the weight which\r\nwould otherwise have attached to the plaintiff\u0027s statement made on oath. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst.\r\nHusni alias Husna Begum and 2 others v. Nayyar Qayyum\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (1987\r\nCLC 2485)\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.16\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e            \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eOBJECTIONS\r\nOF THE PARTY GOING TO BE AFFECTED BE INVITED BEFORE DECISION OF THE CASE\r\nPURSUANT TO STATEMENT ON OATH\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eAfter administration of oath and before\r\ndecision of the case on the basis of oath objections of the party going to be\r\naffected by statement on oath should be called. There may be cases where such\r\nparty may offer some genuine facts and adduce evidence which prompted the\r\nofferee to make statement on oath such as he may have been bribed to make such\r\nstatement on oath or other similar natter. \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eIt was in, view of this incident that the\r\nsaid party was permitted to resile from his offer and the said decision was\r\nupheld till the Supreme Court of Pakistan. In the present case also it was\r\nbrought to the notice of the Court that some of the parties had quarrelled with\r\neach other in the office of Income Tax Officer with the result that relations\r\nbetween them had worsened and that the said parties had lost confidence in the\r\nhonesty and integrity of Sh. Manzoor Elahi i.e. the offeree of the oath.\r\nObviously, Sh. Manzoor Elahi did not mind picking a quarrel with his brother\r\nSh. Abu Bakar. his nephew and another for the reason that he knew that the\r\ncases are going to be decided on the basis of his statement. Even otherwise the\r\ntime spent between offer of oath and the administration thereof was definitely\r\na negative feature because the intervening events had made all the differences\r\ninasmuch as almost all the parties had filed objections that they had either no\r\nconfidence in the integrity and honesty of Sh. Manzoor Elahi or had lost\r\nconfidence because of the quarrel. Needless to add that Javed Iqbal etc., had\r\nalso objected on the ground that they had not instructed their counsel to make\r\nsuch a statement. Manifestly the events as they took place between the offer of\r\noath and the administration thereof were enough to relieve the parties of the\r\neffect of their admission/submission or to permit them to resile therefrom. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eSh.\r\nMuhammad Fazil v. Sh. Abdul Qadir and 7 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (1997 CLC 243).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.17\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e            \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eWITHDRAWAL,\r\nRESILING FROM OFFER TO DECIDE CASE ON THE BASIS OF STATEMENT ON OATH\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eThe plaintiff did not make an offer for\r\nadministering special oath as provided in Article 163 of Qanun-e-Shahadat\r\nOrder, 1984 rather the defendant administered oath in the light of a mutual\r\nagreement of the parties and the said mutual consent is the basic theme as\r\nprovided in the above referred provisions of Oaths Act, 1873. The defendant\r\nafter acceptance of the offer made by the plaintiff administered special oath\r\nand to my mind the plaintiff being bound by his words cannot re-open the\r\nmatter. The mere contention urged by learned counsel that the plaintiff could\r\nnot understand the consequences of the offer so made is no ground to retract\r\nfrom the offer, which has already been acted upon. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Rafique v.\r\nNasir Mehmood\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 2016 Lahore 428). Legal position it is quite clear\r\nthat after the offer of special oath made by the petitioners before the trial\r\nCourt was accepted by the respondents, the petitioners could not be allowed to\r\nresile from the said oath unless they were able to establish that the agreement\r\narrived at for disposal of the suit in accordance with special oath was either\r\nvoid or was frustrated. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Rafique and another v. Sam Muhammad and\r\nothers \u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e(PLD 1996 SC 237). The learned District Judge rightly held that\r\nthe above reproduce statement made by the appellant amounted to conceding the\r\nclaim of the plaintiff and, therefore, now he cannot turn around and resile\r\nfrom this statement. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Yousaf v. Bulanda through Legal Heirs\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(1999 SCMR 2115). In the absence of any satisfactory or sufficient cause the\r\nCourt is obligated to implement the agreement and to record the statement of\r\nthe party concerned to make decision in the case accordingly. The petitioner\r\ncannot wriggle out or withdraw his offer which was given by him voluntarily\r\nbefore the Family Court and the same acted upon according to his will. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eSajid\r\nMehmood v. Mst. Shazia Azad and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (2023 SCMR 153). The offer was\r\nmade on behalf of the appellant, as such not the appellant (defendant) but the\r\nrespondent (plaintiff) was required to take oath, as such in case of\r\nnon-appearance, the matter may be decided in favour of the respondent after\r\nadministering special oath on him or if the appellant has withdrawn his offer\r\nbefore administration of oath, there will be no question of administering oath.\r\n\u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAli Asghar Dawood Bhoy through Attorney v. Ibrahim\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Sindh] (2020\r\nCLC 1503).Under the Oaths Act, 1873 once the offer is made and is accepted by\r\nthe other party even then prior to the passing of the final order the person\r\nmaking the offer cannot resile from his offer. In a case-law reported in (PLD\r\n1997 SC 823) captioned \u0026quot;\u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMahmood Ali Butt v. Inspector-General of Police,\r\nPunjab, Lahore and 10 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u0026quot; it was observed that special oath\r\nmade basis of the decision, therefore, is not covered by Art.163,\r\nQanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and reference to said Article and alleged\r\nviolation of any supposed prescribed procedure was not relevant in\r\ncircumstances. Almost same principle was laid down in a case reported in \u0026quot;\u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad\r\nIjaz v. Additional District Judge, Islamabad and 3 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\u0026quot; (2005\r\nCLC 1164). Thus the settled law on the point is that when any person makes an\r\noffer to the other party to make statement on oath then the said offer is not\r\nunder Art.163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat but under the Oaths Act, 1873 if this\r\noffer is accepted then the person making the offer cannot resile from it. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAbdul\r\nGhani v. Muhammad Sharif\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (2011 MLD 1377). It is settled\r\nproposition of law that petitioner cannot be allowed to back out from his own\r\noffer/stand, merely on technical ground. In arriving to this conclusion I am\r\nfortified by the judgment reported as, \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMalik Khan Muhammad alias Khani v.\r\nMaulvi Luqman and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (1993 CLC 1552). The aforesaid proposition of\r\nlaw is also supported by the law laid down by Hon\u0027ble Supreme Court in Muhammad\r\nAli\u0027s case PLD 1990 SC 841. It is also settled proposition of law that offer\r\nonce made by any party and accepted by the same has become binding contract\r\nbetween the parties and nobody is allowed to resile from the contract. In\r\narriving to this conclusion. I am fortified by the law laid down by the Supreme\r\nCourt in Salim Ahmad\u0027s case 1974 SCMR 224. The aforesaid proposition of law is\r\nalso supported by the following judgment of the Hon\u0027ble Supreme Court PLD 1970\r\nSC 241 \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Akbar v. Muhammad Aslam and\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e PLD 1970 SC 331 \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst.\r\nAsifa Sultana v. Honest Traders. Rafi Kashif v. Imtiaz Ahmad and 2 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n[Lahore] (2001 MLD 128). Petitioner cannot be allowed to back out from his own\r\noffer/stand, merely on a technical ground. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMalik Khan Muhammad alias\r\nKhanay v. Moulvi Luqman and 3 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Quetta] (1993 CLC 1552). Superior\r\ncourt had disallowed the withdrawal of offer when the offer has been accepted\r\nand in some of cases it has been held that even if the offer is accepted the\r\noath is administered even then according to the facts and circumstances of each\r\ncase the court is empowered to allow the withdrawal of the offer. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst.\r\nShama Talib and 2 others v. Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi and 4 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(PLD 2014 Lahore 189). The letter of the law makes it unequivocally clear that\r\nunder the provisions of the Oaths Act, 1873 a party in litigation can offer the\r\nopposite party to accept or reject the claim on special oath, but they cannot\r\ncompel each other to take the special oath, however if the offer is accepted by\r\nthe other party then a binding agreement comes into existence and the party\r\nmaking the offer has no right and authority in law to resile from it. When the\r\nCourt communicates the offer to the other party and gets hold of his assent or\r\nrefusal, as the case may be, it in fact plays a role as an intermediary between\r\nthe parties and when the offer is accepted by the other party, the acceptance\r\nis transmitted to the party inviting the other to take special oath, thereafter\r\nthe agreement is completed between the parties unless the offer is withdrawn\r\nbefore its acceptance by the other side. The stipulations of the Oaths Act\r\ncannot be construed to give an unfair or inequitable advantage to one party\r\nover the other, so in the event of an offer or proposal to be bound by the oath\r\nof the opposite party, then obviously, due to the mutuality of the promise\r\nbetween them, the party making an offer has no right to resile from it after\r\nthe offer is accepted and the special oath is taken. In the absence of any such\r\nsatisfactory or sufficient cause the Court is obligated to implement the\r\nagreement and to record the statement of the party concerned to make decision\r\nin the case accordingly. The petitioner cannot wriggle out or withdraw his\r\noffer which was given by him voluntarily before the Family Court and the same\r\nacted upon according to his will.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e7.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e    \u003c/span\u003eIn the case of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Ali v. Major Muhammad\r\nAslam and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1990 SC 841), it was held by this Court that the\r\nwords \u0026quot;be conclusive proof of the matter stated\u0026quot; in Section 11 of the\r\nOaths Act, 1873 obviously means that the evidence on oath so given shall be\r\nconclusive proof in the suit in which such evidence is recorded of the matter\r\nin respect of which the parties have agreed to be bound. Whereas in the case of\r\n\u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Mansha and 7 others v. Abdul Sattar and 4 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (1995\r\nSCMR 795), this Court held that the offer was voluntarily made by the plaintiff\r\nwhich was accepted there and then by the defendant and, as such, the Trial\r\nCourt rightly disallowed the plaintiff to resile from it and after\r\nadministering the oath according to the desire of the plaintiff, dismissed the\r\nsuit of the plaintiff and the appellate Court as well as the High Court rightly\r\nconcurred with it. While in the case of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMahmood Ali Butt v.\r\nInspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore and 10 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1997 SC\r\n823), it was held by this Court in paragraph 10 of the judgment that \u0026quot;the\r\nspecial oath is administered to a party or nominated person or a witness when a\r\nparty offers to bind itself to the statement to be made on oath by the other\r\nparty. In \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst. Asifa Sultana v. Honest Traders, Lahore and another\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(PLD 1970 SC 331) it was observed that the offer to abide by the oath of\r\nopposite-party and its acceptance by the other party was in the nature of an\r\nagreement and the question whether the party who offered can resile from it\r\ndepends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Again, in the cases of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad\r\nAkbar and another v. Muhammad Aslam and another\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e PLD 1970 SC 241; \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAttiqullah\r\nv. Kafayatullah\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e 1981 SCMR 162; \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Mansha and 7 others v.\r\nAbdul Sattar and 4 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e 1995 SCMR 795; \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Rafique and\r\nanother v. Sakhi Muhammad and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e PLD 1996 SC 237; \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMaulvi\r\nMuhammad Ramzan v. Muhammad Ismail\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e 1982 SCMR 908 and \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eSaleem Ahmad\r\nv. Khushi Muhammad\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e 1974 SCMR 224 the principle laid down is that a\r\nparty offering to have a cause decided on oath and undertaking to abide by the\r\nspecial oath of a person (party or not a party to the suit) cannot be allowed\r\nto resile from it, for it amounted to a binding contract unless it was found to\r\nbe void or stands frustrated. So validity of decisions given on the basis of\r\nspecial oath was upheld under the provisions of Oaths Act, 1873. It will,\r\ntherefore, be seen that \u0026quot;special oath\u0026quot; made basis of the decision in\r\nthe instant case is not covered by Article 163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat and\r\nreference to Article 163 and alleged violation of any supposed prescribed\r\nprocedure urged by the learned counsel is misconceived\u0026quot; \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eSajid\r\nMehmood v. Mst. Shazia Azad and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (2023 SCMR 153). Basically,\r\ntherefore, the principle still is that there is no section in the Oaths Act,\r\n1873, dealing with the question whether a party who has made an offer to be\r\nbound by the statement on oath, or special oath, by the opposite party or\r\nwitness, can resile from such an offer and the matter being one left to be\r\ndecided on general principles, the question whether the party who has made an\r\noffer can resile from it, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each\r\ncase. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Alt v. Major Muhammad Aslam and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1990\r\nSC 841).A discrete study of Article 163 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 read\r\nwith Sections 9 and 10 of the Oath Act, 1873, reveals that when an offer made\r\nby one party is accepted by the other party then none can be allowed to travel\r\nbeyond the offer made. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAsif Ali v. Additional District Judge, Faisalabad\r\nand others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (2018 CLC 1350). As a matter of fact there were\r\nenough good reasons to allow the parties to resile from the offer of oath,\r\ntherefore, the findings recorded by the learned trial Court in regard thereto\r\nare hereby reversed and the parties are allowed to resile from the offer of\r\noath as also relieved of the effect of their, submission made in that regard. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eSh.\r\nMuhammad Fazil v. Sh. Abdul Qadir and 7 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (1997 CLC 243).\r\nIt is settled principle of law that once an offer is made and is accepted by\r\nthe other side then the other side has no right whatsoever to wriggle out from\r\nthat offer, which was accepted by the other party on the well?known principle\r\nof approbate and reprobate and also on the principle that the offer by a party\r\nto a suit as to being bound by a statement on oath of his opponent on being\r\naccepted by the opponent is in the nature of a binding agreement. Arshad\r\nMehmood (DB Decision) (PLD 2005 Lahore 304). Party accepting the offer to\r\nsettle any dispute by special oath could not be compelled to abide by the oath\r\nif it decided to resile from agreement in that behalf. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eBashir Ahmad v.\r\nPlastic Bag Packaging Limited and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1991 Lahore 386). We do\r\nnot want to go into this point and leave it open for examination some more\r\nappropriate case because in our opinion the order dated 2-10-1974 was based on\r\nthe consent of both the parties in accordance with which the respondent had\r\nduly taken the oath and in this context, we do not feel any jurisdiction to\r\ntake exception to the same especially when the aforesaid statement had duly\r\nbeen acted upon. For this reason, we do not feel that this is a fit case for\r\nexamination by this Court inasmuch as the parties themselves settled the matter\r\nby a just arrangement and there is no justification to realise them from their\r\naforesaid undertaking. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMaulvi Muhammad Ramzan v. Muhammad Ismail\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(1982 SCMR 908). What else is required to be done after the proceedings which\r\nwere held at the option and volition of the petitioner who in any case is bound\r\nto honour his undertaking. It is well established that breach of undertaking to\r\nthe Court amounts to contempt of Court. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMahmood Ali Butt v.\r\nInspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore and 10 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1997 SC\r\n823).In a later judgment of this Court in case \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAttiqullah v. Kafayatullah\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(1981 SCMR 162) in which the judgment of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Akbar\u0027s\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e case\r\nwas also referred and considered and it was held that party undertaking to be\r\nbound by the evidence given on special oath by the opposite-party cannot resile\r\nfrom it as it amounts to a binding contract and unless it is found to be void\r\nor frustrated, the Court is not justified to permit the petitioner to resile\r\nfrom his offer when it has already been accepted by the opposite side. In the\r\ncase in hand too the offer was voluntarily made by the plaintiff which was\r\naccepted there and then by the defendant and, as such, the trial Court rightly\r\ndisallowed the plaintiff to resile from it and after administering the oath\r\naccording to the desire of the plaintiff. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Mansha and 7 v. Abdul\r\nSattar and 4 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (1995 SCMR 795). It will thus be noticed that there\r\nis no section in the Oaths Act, 1873 dealing with the question whether a party\r\nmaking an offer to abide by a statement on oath, or special oath, by another\r\nparty or witness can resile from such an offer. This question, therefore, must\r\nbe decided on general principles of law. This aspect of the question was\r\nrecently considered by a Bench of this Court in the case of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad\r\nAkbar and another v. Muhammad Aslam and another\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e. It was held in that\r\ncase as under:\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u0026quot;This\r\ncorrect position, therefore, is that the agreement dated the 3rd November 1963,\r\nthat the matters in dispute may be decided in accordance with the statement of\r\nAbdur Razzak was in the nature of a contract and the trial Court could in its\r\ndiscretion decline to hold the appellants by it. The exercise of discretion\r\nwill depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.\u0026quot;\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eThis principle is applicable to the facts\r\nof the present case. The offer to abide by the oath of the opposite party and\r\nits acceptance by the other party was in the nature of an agreement and the\r\nquestion whether the party who offered can resile from it depends on the facts\r\nand the circumstances of each case. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst. Asifa Sultana v. Honest Taders,\r\nLahore and another\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1970 SC 331). The oath within, the contemplation\r\nof Section 8 to 11 of the Oaths Act, 1873 stems from a voluntary agreement\r\nbetween the parties and when taken has a binding effect leaving the party\r\nmaking the offer with no choice to turn around and strike a discordant note as\r\nobserved in \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMaulvi Muhammad Ramzan v. Muhammad Ismail\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e 1982 SCMR\r\n908, \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eFirm Chiragh Hussain v. Khawaja Habib Joo\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e PLD 1983 SC\r\n(AJ\u0026amp;K) 86, \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eKhan Sher v. Mst.Kabla and another\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e PLD 1988\r\nPeshawar 86 and \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuzaffer Ali and 2 others v. Ch. Asghar Ali\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e 1991\r\nCLC 2110 while the oath, envisaged by Article 163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984\r\nis entailed by the initiative taken by the plaintiff who takes an oath in\r\nsupport of hisclaim first and then on his application the Court calls upon the\r\ndefendant to deny the claim on oath and in any event the Court is not precluded\r\nfrom recording evidence of the parties and deciding the case on merits as\r\nobserved in \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eRehmatullah v. Nasir Khan and 7 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e 1991 MLD\r\n(Pesh.) 101, \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eNazir Ahmad v. District Judge, Laiah\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e PLD 1986 Lahore\r\n137 and \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Shahbaz v. Ghulam Rasool\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e 1987 CLC 1512. In\r\ntechnical terms the oath referred to in Article 163 of the Oanun-e-Shahadat,\r\n1984 is a general oath C and the oath provided by the Oaths Act,1873 is a\r\nspecial oath and both are diametrically opposed to each other. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eBhore Khan\r\nv. Noor Din\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1993 Peshawar 72). The High Court rejected both the\r\ncontentions and held that there was no ground in law or in equity on which the\r\npetitioner could claim the right of resiling from the solemn agreement which\r\nwas entered into by him. Such an agreement was in the nature of a contract and\r\none of the contracting parties could not be allowed to back out of it unless\r\nthe contract was void or had become frustrated. None of these eventualities had\r\noccurred in this case. Indeed even the attempt to resile was only a\r\nhalf-hearted attempt, for even after filing the application the petitioner\r\nhimself offered the Holy Quran to Wali Mohammad and the latter took the oath.\r\nThe petitioner now seeks special leave to appeal and it is contended on his\r\nbehalf that the High Court was wrong in taking the view that the petitioner\r\ncould not resile from his statement. In support of this contention reliance is\r\nsought to be placed on a decision of this Court in the case of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMohammad\r\nAkbar v. Mohammad Aslam\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1970SC 241). This case does not, however,\r\nsupport the petitioner\u0027s contention. All that is said there is that such an\r\nagreement though not an adjustment of the suit under O. XXIII, Rule 3 of the\r\nCode of Civil Procedure, 1908 is in the nature of a contract and whether the\r\ncontracting parties should be bound to that contract will depend on the facts\r\nand circumstances of each case. This view was further clarified and confirmed\r\nin the case of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst. Asifa Sultana v. Honest Traders\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD1970SC331).\r\nApplying this principle to the facts of the present case we have no hesitation\r\nin holding that the High Court was right in taking the view that the trial\r\nCourt acted on correct principles in deciding the suit on the basis of the\r\nspecial oath. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eSaleem Ahmad v. Khushi Muhammad\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (1974 SCMR 224).The\r\nquestion as to whether or not a person making an offer to get the case decided\r\non oath to be taken by the opposite party can be permitted to resile from the\r\noffer when the other party has accepted the same was considered inter alia in \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eJalal\r\nDin v. Chiragh Din and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1972 Kar. 622), wherein relying on\r\nAIR 1941 Lah. 173, AIR 1948 All. 125 and A I R 1957 Orissa 226, it was observed\r\nthat \u0026quot;an agreement made in Court to be bound by evidence given on special\r\noath is a settlement to which the Court is also a party, therefore, such an\r\nagreement is not one of these agreements which a party may keep or break as it\r\nliked subject only to a claim from the aggrieved party for damages. To allow a\r\nparty to resile, without adequate reasons, from an undertaking of this nature\r\nwould amount to allow him to play the game of hide and seek with the other\r\nparty and even to abuse the process of the Court. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAttiqullah v.\r\nKafayatullah\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (1981 SCMR 162). Evidently settlement to decide the matter\r\non oath constitutes valid agreement from which parties cannot conveniently\r\nwriggle out unless contract is ex-facie shown to be void or incapable of\r\nimplementation. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eSyed Abdul Hakeem v. Abdul Wahid \u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e[Quetta] (1991\r\nMLD 762).Now considering background of case, the incorporation of facts in the\r\nimpugned order and reaffirmation of agreement for taking special oath by way of\r\nsignature of appellant, his counsel constitute sufficient proof, that impugned\r\norder and decree is quite lawful. Appellant cannot be permitted to take any\r\nsomersault or resile from Oath which has been factually acted upon. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eSyed\r\nAbdul Hakeem v. Abdul Wahid\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Quetta] (1991 MLD 762). When the statement\r\non oath was for the satisfaction of the plaintiff\u0027 and he had offered to\r\nwithdraw his appeal in the event of Rahmat Ali taking an oath, the question of\r\nhis retraction did not arise. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAbdul Hameed v. Mian Muhammad Akhtar and\r\nothers\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (1983 CLC 595). After making an offer of special oath\r\npermission could not be given to resile from the same except in very proper\r\ncase. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eIkram-ul-Haque v. Khan Rafique Ahmed Khan\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Quetta] (1992\r\nMLD 867).As the petitioner himself made an offer to the respondent No.2 to give\r\nstatement on the Holy Our\u0027an in presence of his counsel which he did and the\r\nsame was duly signed by the learned Addl. District Judge as such the petitioner\r\nis now bound by the statement of the opposite party and he cannot resile after\r\nsuch an oath. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eSyed Muhammad Ramzan v. Muslim Zaidi and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(1990 SCMR 681). When the plaintiffs took oath on the Holy Qur\u0027an in the open\r\nCourt, the petitioners did not object to it. Now, when the plaintiffs have\r\ntaken oath on the Holy Qur\u0027an and the District Judge has decided the suit\r\naccordingly, it does not lay with the petitioners to resile from agreement and\r\ntheir offer and to say that the decision was made against their consent. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eNajibullah\r\nKhan and another v. Fazal Karim and 2 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (1997 SCMR 1085).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.18\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e            \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eWITHDRAWAL,\r\nRESILING FROM OFFER TO DECIDE CASE ON THE BASIS OF STATEMENT ON OATH AMOUNTS TO\r\nCONTEMPT OF COURT\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eWhat else is required to be done after\r\nthe proceedings which were held at the option and volition of the petitioner\r\nwho in any case is bound to honour his undertaking. It is well established that\r\nbreach of undertaking to the Court amounts to contempt of Court. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMahmood\r\nAli Butt v. Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore and 10 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(PLD 1997 SC 823). Breach of undertaking to a Court is amount to contempt of\r\nCourt. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst. Raheela Salamat v. Additional District Judge, Faisalabad and\r\n2 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (2010 YLR 314).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.19\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e            \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eDECISION\r\nOF CASE ON THE BASIS OF OATH MUST BE SUPPORTED BY REASONS AND MUST DETERMINE\r\nRIGHTS OF THE PARTIES \u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eTaking it from another angle, the order\r\npassed by the learned District Judge on the basis of oath is not supported by\r\nany reason nor recorded after due process of law for determination of right of\r\nthe parties. So, this order of the District Judge cannot bind the petitioners\r\nnor can deprive her from her legal right. Likewise, it has nowhere been\r\ndeclared by the learned District Judge that the suit property is not a legacy\r\nof Shahi Lal and rightly so because he could not do so without recording\r\nevidence. In this view of the matter, order/judgment of District Judge based on\r\nagreement of oath cannot operate as res-judicata nor effect the interest of the\r\npetitioner. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eHaji Sultan Yousaf and others v. Mastoria and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n[Peshawar] (2012 YLR 398).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.20\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e            \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eWHEN\r\nBOTH PARTIES HAVE TAKEN OATH IN SUPPORT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE CASE\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eAn examination of Article 163 would show\r\nthat it does not contemplate the dismissal or decree of a suit in a case where\r\nboth the parties support their claim on oath under this Article. Sub-clause (2)\r\nA of this Article provides that Court may pass any order as it may think fit\r\nregarding the costs and other matters. It was held in \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eNazir Ahmad v.\r\nDistrict Judge, Leiah\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e PLD 1986 Lah. 137, \u0026quot;if the Legislature had\r\nintended that in case of defendant\u0027s failure to deny the plaintiff\u0027s claim on\r\noath, the plaintiff\u0027s suit is to be decreed or some other penal consequence is\r\nto follow, it could have made its intention manifest by making a clear\r\nprovision to that effect. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Shahbaz and another v. Ghulam Rasool\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n[Lahore] (1987 CLC 1512). In this case, if the defendants would have left the\r\nplaintiff\u0027s oath uncontested then, obviously, it would have been liable to be\r\nconsidered as strong evidence in support of the truth of his case which the\r\ndefendants could have disproved in the usual manner by means of evidence and in\r\ntaking the desired oath they cannot be considered to have placed the matter at\r\nany higher footing because therein they had not done anything more than merely\r\ndestroying the weight which would otherwise have attached to the plaintiff\u0027s\r\nstatement made on oath. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst. Husni alias Husna Begum and 2 others v.\r\nNayyar Qayyum\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (1987 CLC 2485).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.21\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e            \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eBINDING\r\nEFFECT OF STATEMENT ON OATH UPON A PERSON WHO ALTHOUGH WAS PARTY TO LIS BUT WAS\r\nNOT PARTY TO OATH PROCEEDINGS\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eIt is also general principle of law as\r\nwell, that if a person is not party to any legal proceedings he would not be\r\nbound by any order or decree of the court passed in those proceedings. Taking\r\nit from another angle, the order passed by the learned District Judge on the\r\nbasis of oath is not supported by any reason nor recorded after due process of\r\nlaw for determination of right of the parties. So, this order of the District\r\nJudge cannot bind the petitioners (who were not party to oath proceeding) nor\r\ncan deprive her from her legal right. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eHaji Sultan Yousaf and others v.\r\nMastoria and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Peshawar] (2012 YLR 398).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.22\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e            \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eROLE\r\nOF THE COURT WHILE DECIDING CASE ON THE BASIS OF STATEMENT ON OATH \u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eWhen the Court communicates the offer to\r\nthe other party and gets hold of his assent or refusal, as the case may be, it\r\nin fact plays a role as an intermediary between the parties and when the offer\r\nis accepted by the other party, the acceptance is transmitted to the party\r\ninviting the other to take special oath, thereafter the agreement is completed\r\nbetween the parties unless the offer is withdrawn before its acceptance by the\r\nother side. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eSajid Mehmood v. Mst. Shazia Azad and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (2023\r\nSCMR 153).The question as to whether or not a person making an offer to get the\r\ncase decided on oath to be taken by the opposite party can be permitted to\r\nresile from the offer when the other party has accepted the same was considered\r\ninter alia in \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eJalal Din v. Chiragh Din and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1972 Kar.\r\n622), wherein relying on AIR 1941 Lah. 173, AIR 1948 All. 125 and AIR 1957\r\nOrissa 226, it was observed that \u0026quot;an agreement made in Court to be bound\r\nby evidence given on special oath is a settlement to which the Court is also a\r\nparty, therefore, such an agreement is not one of these agreements which a\r\nparty may keep or break as it liked subject only to a claim from the aggrieved\r\nparty for damages. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAttiqullah v. Kafayatullah\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (1981 SCMR 162).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.23\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e            \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eNATURE\r\nOF DECREE PASSED WHEN CASE IS DECIDED ON THE BASIS OF STATEMENT ON OATH\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eAdmittedly the matter was decided on\r\nspecial oath with the consent of the parties. Under Section 96(3), CPC no\r\nappeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad\r\nNasrullah Khan v. Shaukat Ali and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (2021 CLC 1798). It\r\nis settled law that consent decree or decree based on compromise has no better\r\nstatus in law than agreement between the parties albeit it bears seal of the\r\ncourt. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eHaji Sultan Yousaf and others v. Mastoria and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n[Peshawar] (2012 YLR 398). The findings arrived at by the learned District\r\nJudge are in consonance with law and the claim of the respondent had been\r\nconceded by the appellant and it amounted to a consent decree and, thus, the\r\nappellant now cannot be allowed to turn around so as to challenge the consent\r\ndecree. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Yousaf v. Bulanda through Legal Heirs\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (1999 SCMR\r\n2115).Settlement on oath between the parties has resulted in a consent decree\r\nwhich is not appealable as held in \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eRahmat Ali v. Muhammad Yousuf\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n1985 CLC 72. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eSyed Abdul Hakeem v. Abdul Wahid\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Quetta] (1991 MLD\r\n762). We are, therefore, convinced that the appellant had rightly taken the\r\noath that he had not sold more than one Chakoram of land and sanctity being\r\nattached to oaths, the decree based thereon could not be annulled on any ground\r\nby any higher forum. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAbdul Qayyum Beg v. Rehmat Wali and 4 others \u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e(PLD\r\n1993 SC 289). Where any dispute was resolved in pursuance of offer of oath made\r\nby one party and accepted by the other and oath was completed on basis of such\r\noffer and acceptance culminated in decree, such decree should not be lightly interfered\r\nwith and set aside on flimsy and technical grounds in view of sanctity attached\r\nto oath on Holy Qur\u0027an. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eNasrullah Jan v. Rastabaz Khan\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (1996 SCMR\r\n108).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.24\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e            \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eONLY\r\nMAIN SUIT COULD BE DECIDED ON THE BASIS OF STATEMENT ON OATH AND NOT ANY\r\nSUBSIDIARY MATTER INVOLVED IN SUIT\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eEvidently the application under Article\r\n163 of\u0027 the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 was not submitted in support of the\r\nplaintiffs\u0027 claim as envisaged under the provisions of the Article 163 which\r\nprimarily are meant in respect of the claim as made in the suit and not to be\r\nresorted to in respect of any other fact or event relatable to the\r\nsubject-matter of the suit, thus, the application being not related to the\r\nclaim of the plaintiff was not required to be proceeded with. The trial Court\r\nno doubt did not reject the application on the above mentioned ground, yet the\r\napplication even if be competent under Article 163, was rejected on valid\r\nground. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eHaji Nauroze Khan v. Malik Raz Muhammad and 2 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [DB\r\nQuetta] 2006 CLC 144). For the proposition that for the application of Section\r\n11 of the Oaths Act, 1873 it is necessary that the statement given by a person\r\nshould relate to a matter in controversy between the parties, \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eRati Ram v.\r\nHardewa\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (AIR 1927 All. 676) and \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eGhinno Ram v. Kanhya\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (AIR\r\n1957 Him Pra. 35) have been cited. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Alt v. Major Muhammad Aslam\r\nand others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1990 SC 841). \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.25\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e            \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eREFUSAL\r\nTO TAKE OATH AND ITS EFFECTS IN TERMS OF ARTICLE 163 OF QANUN-E-SHAHADAT ORDER,\r\n1984\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eQuestion which arises for consideration\r\nis as to what is the effect of the defendant failure to deny on oath the claim\r\nof the petitioner made on oath. Should the claim of the petitioner have been\r\ndecreed straightaway without any further proof as contended by the learned\r\ncounsel? Quite clearly such a result is not countenanced by the language of\r\nArticle 163, Even sub-clause (2) of the Article only provides that the Court\r\nmay pass such orders as it may think fit regarding the costs and other matters.\r\nIf the legislature had intended that in case of defendant\u0027s failure to deny the\r\nplaintiff\u0027s claim on oath, the plaintiff\u0027s suit is to be decreed or some other\r\npenal consequence is to follow, it could have made its intention manifest by\r\nmaking a clear provision to that effect. In the absence of any specific\r\nprovision laying down the penal consequence of the defendants non-appearance to\r\ndeny the claim on oath, learned trial Court acted rightly in proceeding to\r\nadjourn the case for the petitioner\u0027s evidence. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eNazir Ahmad v. District\r\nJudge, Leiah and 9 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1986 Lahore 137). An appeal thereagainst\r\nfiled by the plaintiff came up for hearing before the learned District Judge,\r\nJhang who found that whereas the plaintiff himself had not offered in his\r\napplication that his suit may be dismissed in the event of the defendants\r\ntaking the proposed oath on the Holy Quran, such was not the consequence\r\nprovided even in the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst. Husni alias Husna\r\nBegum and 2 others v. Nayyar Qayyum\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (1987 CLC 2485). An\r\ninference was attempted to be drawn by the learned counsel that the plaintiff\r\nwas a liar and that having made the gift voluntarily, she should not be\r\npermitted to resile from the same. This argument is not tenable because\r\nbringing the Holy Quran in such matters besides being alien to law could not be\r\na substitute for leading positive evidence on the point in issue. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eNoor\r\nMuhammad and others v. Mst. Azmat-e-Bibi\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (2012 SCMR 1373). In the case\r\nin hand no statement of offer and acceptance of the parties has been recorded.\r\nOnly on the day of arguments the plaintiff stated on oath, which was refused by\r\nthe other party, therefore, adverse presumption does not come against the\r\ndefendant. In another case of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eBashir Ahmed v. Muhammad Luqman\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e\r\n1999 SCMR 378 the Hon\u0027ble Supreme Court has observed that refusal of a party to\r\ntake oath, in contemplation of Section 9 of the Oaths Act, 1873, cannot result\r\nin itself defeating the claim or defence of that party. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst. Rashida\r\nAbdul Rehman v. Zahoor Hussain and 5 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (2007 CLC 1372).\r\nIf the legislature had intended that in case of defendant\u0027s failure to deny the\r\nplaintiff\u0027s claim on oath, the plaintiff\u0027s suit is to be decreed or some other\r\npenal consequence is to follow, it could have made its intention manifest by\r\nmaking a clear provision to that effect. In the absence of any specific\r\nprovision laying down the penal consequence of the defendants non?appearance to\r\ndeny the claim on oath, learned trial Court acted rightly in proceeding to\r\nadjourn the case for the petitioner\u0027s evidence. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eNazir Ahmad v. District\r\nJudge, Leiah and 9 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1986 Lahore 137).If without making such\r\nstatement, the appellant had refused to take oath in rebuttal, then of course\r\nno decree could have been passed under Article 163(2) of the Order because the\r\nsaid provision of law does not provide any penalty in the event of the opposite\r\nparty\u0027s refusal to take oath in rebuttal. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Yousaf v. Bulanda\r\nthrough Legal Heirs\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (1999 SCMR 2115). When both the parties have led\r\nevidence, then provision of this Article shall not be applied. Any initiative\r\ntaken by the plaintiff contrary to the provision of Article 163 of the\r\nQanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 shall not burden the defendant and no adverse inference\r\ncould be drawn against him when the necessary conditions of the oath as\r\nenumerated in Article 163 are missing. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMir Sahib Khan and others v. Ghazi\r\nMuhammad and others \u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e(PLD 2014 Peshawar 29). There is also no cavil with\r\nthe proposition that if a party without consent of his adversary at his own\r\nmade a statement on special oath and in rebuttal the latter did not opt to make\r\nsuch type of statement, then no adverse inference could be drawn against him.\r\nThe fact remains that unilateral statement of a party, if any, made on special\r\noath has to be collaborated by the other independent evidence. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAbdul\r\nRehman and others v. Ghulam Fatima and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (2017 YLR 2276).\r\nThe above statement of law, as would be noticed, visualises a situation when\r\nboth the plaintiff and the defendant agree to take the oath but does not lay\r\ndown the penal consequence of refusal on the part of the defendant to take\r\noath, This authority, I am afraid, is not of any help to the petitioner. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eRehmatullah\r\nv. Nasir Khan and 7 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Peshawar] (1991 MLD 1011).In this case, if\r\nthe defendants would have left the plaintiff\u0027s oath uncontested then,\r\nobviously, it would have been liable to be considered as strong evidence in\r\nsupport of the truth of his case which the defendants could have disproved in\r\nthe usual manner by means of evidence and in taking the desired oath they\r\ncannot be considered to have placed the matter at any higher footing because\r\ntherein they had not done anything more than merely destroying the weight which\r\nwould otherwise have attached to the plaintiff\u0027s statement made on oath. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst.\r\nHusni alias Husna Begum and 2 others v. Nayyar Qayyum\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (1987\r\nCLC 2485). \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.26\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e            \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eREFUSAL\r\nTO TAKE OATH AND ITS EFFECTS IN TERMS OF OATHS ACT, 1873\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eWhile it is settled law that a refusal of\r\na party to take oath, in contemplation of section 9 of the Oaths Act, 1873\r\ncannot result in itself defeating the claim or defence of that party such is an\r\nimportant piece of material under Section 12 of the Act and can always be\r\nconsidered in conjunction with other facts of the case to arrive at a proper\r\nfinding. This we can do even at this stage. The refusal, together with other\r\nmaterial on the record, has definitely weakened the plaintiff\u0027s claim in the\r\nsuit. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eBashir Ahmed v. Muhammad Luqman\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (1999 SCMR 378). The reason\r\nwhy the case had proceeded ex parte against the father was because of the\r\nlatter\u0027s failure, or it may be refusal, to attend the Court in person in order\r\nthat he should be put to the oath as to whether the plaintiff\u0027s case was true\r\nor not. We are unable to see that the powers given by Order IX, Rule 12, Civil\r\nProcedure Code can be employed for such a purpose as in the present case\r\nnamely, to force an old and respectable merchant, quite possibly from a sick\r\nbed, upon the demand of the plaintiff, to Court in order to make an oath in\r\nsupport or otherwise of the plaintiff\u0027s case. Indeed Section 9 of the Oaths\r\nAct, 1873, which enables the Court to give effect to an offer by one party to\r\nbe bound by the oath of the opposite party clearly provides that \u0026quot;no party\r\nor witness shall be compelled to attend personally in Court solely for the\r\npurpose of answering such question\u0026quot; i.e. whether or not he will make the\r\noath. Quite obviously, the power under Order IX, Rule 12, C.P.C. was misused in\r\nthis case by the Munsif. It appears to be the foundation of the bias which from\r\nthat point onwards seems to us to have affected his attitude in the case. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad\r\nIsmail Chowdhury v. Abdul Khaleque Sowdagar and another\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 1960 SC\r\n(Pak.) 301).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.27\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e            \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eVALUE\r\nOF STATEMENT ON HOLY QUR\u0027AN\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eAny statement made on oath is a solemn\r\ncommitment and it is never made lightly, especially by a Muslim. In view of the\r\nsanctity of the Holy Qur\u0027an, every Muslim shudders to make oath thereon. Even\r\nan illiterate Muslim is aware of the fact that he would incur the Wrath of\r\nAlmighty Allah if a false oath is made on the Holy Our\u0027an. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuzaffar Ali\r\nand 2 others v. Ch. Asghar Ali\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (1991 CLC 2110).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.28\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e            \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eCOURT\r\nCAN DIRECT PARTIES TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT ANY ONE OR BOTH\r\nOF THE PARTIES HAVE TAKEN OATH IN SUPPORT OF THEIR CASE\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eArticle 163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat\r\nOrder, 1984 does not in any way preclude a Court from recording evidence of the\r\nparty in spite of the oath by both the parties or either of the parties. The\r\nlearned trial Judge was, therefore, correct to ignore the refusal of the\r\nrespondent to take the desired oath at the behest of the petitioner and direct\r\nthem to adduce evidence in support of their respective stands. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eRehmatullah\r\nv. Nasir Khan and 7 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Peshawar] (1991 MLD 1011).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.29\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e            \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eDECREE\r\nPASSED ON THE BASIS OF STATEMENT ON OATH COULD OPERATE RES-JUDICATA\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eIt is also general principle of law as\r\nwell that if a person is not party to any legal proceedings he would not be\r\nbound by any order or decree of the court passed in those proceedings. Taking\r\nit from another angle, the order passed by the learned District Judge on the\r\nbasis of oath is not supported by any reason nor recorded after due process of\r\nlaw for determination of right of the parties. So, this order of the District\r\nJudge cannot bind the petitioners nor can deprive her from her legal right.\r\nLikewise, it has nowhere been declared by the learned District Judge that the\r\nsuit property is not a legacy of Shahi Lal and rightly so because he could not\r\ndo so without recording evidence. In this view of the matter, order/judgment of\r\nDistrict Judge based on agreement of oath cannot operate as res judicata nor\r\neffect the interest of the petitioner. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eHaji Sultan Yousaf and others v.\r\nMastoria and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Peshawar] (2012 YLR 398).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.30\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e            \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003eDECISION\r\nOF CRIMINAL CASE ON THE BASIS OF STATEMENT ON OATHIS PROHIBITED IN TERMS OF\r\nARTICLE 163 OF QANUN-E-SHAHADAT ORDER, 1984\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eThe criminal cases cannot be decided on\r\noath and such proceedings on oath are not applicable in criminal cases reliance\r\n\u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst. Bashiran Bibi v. Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e PLD 1990 SC\r\n83, \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAbdul Sattar and others v. The State\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (1995 PCr.LJ 1793). \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst.\r\nJamila v. The State\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Islamabad] (2019 PCr.LJ 1176). The evidentiary\r\nvalue of taking oath by the accused or other party in criminal proceedings has\r\nbeen held to be not legal in view of Article 163 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order,\r\n1984 as ruled by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in PLD 1990 SC 83. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eNaveed\r\nAhmad v. The State\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (2000 YLR 2820). The same proposition came under\r\nconsideration before the Supreme Court and their Lordships in the case of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst.\r\nBushran Bibi v. Nisar Ahmad Khan and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e PLD 1990 SC 83 observed\r\nthat even under Article 163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order,1984 procedure of\r\nswearing on Holy Qur\u0027an (oath proceedings) is not applicable in criminal cases.\r\n\u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Munir v. The State\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (1995 PCr.LJ 1255). Contends\r\nthat third investigation was also carried out by Crime Branch Punjab, however,\r\nthe petitioner was found involved on the basis of special oath offered in the\r\nmosque which is against the spirit of Article 163 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order,\r\n1984. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eNoor Muhammad v. The State and another\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (2020 SCMR 1049).\r\nAnd secondly, because there was no provision in any law which empowered an\r\nInvestigating Officer to examine people on oath. Examining them on the Holy\r\nQur\u0027an even while sitting in a Mosque would not cure the illegality. It is so\r\nbecause, as has been discussed above in some detail, it is not the function of\r\nan investigating officer to find out whether an accused person was or was not\r\nguilty of committing the crime of which lie was being accused. Such is the task\r\nassigned, by law, to the Courts and it is the Courts alone which then have the\r\nauthority to examine people on oath including their examination on special\r\noath. It also needs to be known that an investigation is not a judicial\r\nproceeding and as per section 4(1)(m) of the Cr.P.C., it is in judicial\r\nproceedings that evidence could be taken on oath. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMuhammad Arshad and\r\nothers v. The State and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD 2011 SC 350). In case of \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst.\r\nJamila v. The State\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Islamabad] (2019 PCr.LJ 1176) it was held by\r\nHon\u0027ble Islamabad High Court that Article 163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order,\r\n1984 provides a mechanism to accept or denial through the claim on oath\r\nalthough it is different from Oaths Act, 1873 and though the said Article is\r\napplicable in the civil proceedings only. The criminal cases cannot be decided\r\non oath and such proceedings on oath are not applicable in criminal cases\r\nreliance \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst. Bashiran Bibi v. Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e PLD\r\n1990 SC 83. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eAbdul Sattar and others v. The State\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (1995\r\nPCr.LJ 1793). Nevertheless, the learned Judge lost sight of the fact as to\r\nwhether the procedure of swearing on Holy Qur\u0027an was applicable in criminal\r\nproceedings. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eMst. Bashiran Bibi v. Nisar Ahmed and others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e (PLD\r\n1990 SC 83).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.31\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e            \u003c/span\u003e\u003cu\u003ePOWER\r\nOF COURT OF APPEAL AND COURT OF REVISION TO DECIDE CASE ON THE BASIS OF\r\nSTATEMENT ON OATH\u003c/u\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003ePerusal of underlined portion of above\r\nprovision of law makes it crystal clear that only a plaintiff and a defendant\r\ncan make statements on oath in support or rebuttal of the claims made in the\r\nsuit. For being a plaintiff and a defendant, there should be a suit pending\r\nbefore the court. Admittedly, the said application was filed by the petitioner\r\nbefore learned revisional court in a civil revision. Appeal is a continuation\r\nof suit but a revision petition is not. Since there was no suit, there was no\r\nplaintiff or defendant in the revision petition and when there was no plaintiff\r\nor defendant, the application under Article 163 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984\r\nwas not entertainable and the same merited for dismissal. \u003ci\u003e\u003cu\u003eDr. Farooq\r\nAnwar Khawaja v. Mst. Naila Anwar Khawaja and 3 others\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/i\u003e [Lahore] (2018\r\nCLC 1699).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/body\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/html\u003e\r\n"