"\u003chtml xmlns:o=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office\"\r\nxmlns:w=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word\"\r\nxmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chead\u003e\r\n\u003cmeta http-equiv=Content-Type content=\"text/html; charset=windows-1252\"\u003e\r\n\u003cmeta name=ProgId content=Word.Document\u003e\r\n\u003cmeta name=Generator content=\"Microsoft Word 11\"\u003e\r\n\u003cmeta name=Originator content=\"Microsoft Word 11\"\u003e\r\n\u003clink rel=File-List href=\"2016J23_files/filelist.xml\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctitle\u003eRETROSPECTIVE EFFECT OF NEW PROCEDURAL LAW ON PENDING CASES\u003c/title\u003e\r\n\u003c!--[if gte mso 9]\u003e\u003cxml\u003e\r\n \u003co:DocumentProperties\u003e\r\n  \u003co:Author\u003eOratier\u003c/o:Author\u003e\r\n  \u003co:Template\u003eNormal\u003c/o:Template\u003e\r\n  \u003co:LastAuthor\u003eOratier\u003c/o:LastAuthor\u003e\r\n  \u003co:Revision\u003e2\u003c/o:Revision\u003e\r\n  \u003co:TotalTime\u003e0\u003c/o:TotalTime\u003e\r\n 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Section1\r\n\t{size:8.5in 11.0in;\r\n\tmargin:1.0in 1.25in 1.0in 1.25in;\r\n\tmso-header-margin:.5in;\r\n\tmso-footer-margin:.5in;\r\n\tmso-paper-source:0;}\r\ndiv.Section1\r\n\t{page:Section1;}\r\n--\u003e\r\n\u003c/style\u003e\r\n\u003c!--[if gte mso 10]\u003e\r\n\u003cstyle\u003e\r\n /* Style Definitions */\r\n table.MsoNormalTable\r\n\t{mso-style-name:\"Table Normal\";\r\n\tmso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;\r\n\tmso-tstyle-colband-size:0;\r\n\tmso-style-noshow:yes;\r\n\tmso-style-parent:\"\";\r\n\tmso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;\r\n\tmso-para-margin:0in;\r\n\tmso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;\r\n\tmso-pagination:widow-orphan;\r\n\tfont-size:10.0pt;\r\n\tfont-family:\"Times New Roman\";\r\n\tmso-ansi-language:#0400;\r\n\tmso-fareast-language:#0400;\r\n\tmso-bidi-language:#0400;}\r\n\u003c/style\u003e\r\n\u003c![endif]--\u003e\r\n\u003c/head\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbody lang=EN-US style=\u0027tab-interval:.5in;text-justify-trim:punctuation\u0027\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=Section1\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal align=center style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:center;\r\nmso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;mso-layout-grid-align:none;\r\ntext-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eRETROSPECTIVE EFFECT\r\nOF NEW PROCEDURAL LAW ON PENDING CASES\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal align=center style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:center;\r\nmso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;mso-layout-grid-align:none;\r\ntext-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eBy\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal align=center style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:center;\r\nmso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;mso-layout-grid-align:none;\r\ntext-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eMuhammad Shafiq\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal align=center style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:center;\r\nmso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;mso-layout-grid-align:none;\r\ntext-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003eCivil Judge Ist Class,\r\nRahimyarkhan.\u003cb\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eThe general proposition of law containing\r\nthe presumption against retrospective applicability of law has been clearly\r\nstated by careful writers and judges. Halsbury\u0027s Laws of England explains the\r\nmeaning of the expression `retrospective statute` in Vol.36 at page 423 as\r\nfollows: \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u0026quot;the\r\nCourts regard as retrospective any statute which operates on case or facts\r\ncoming into existence before its commencement\u0026quot;\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e2.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e    \u003c/span\u003eThere is no fundamental difference between\r\nretrospective and ex post facto law. The former expression is used in respect\r\nof civil matters and the latter in respect of criminal matters which by their\r\nnature are more serious. \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e3.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e    \u003c/span\u003eThe people do not mind changes in law, if\r\nonly the procedure is altered without altering the substance of the law. True,\r\nit is not easy to draw a line between substantive and procedural law, but the\r\ntask is not impossible if the essential difference is kept in mind. According\r\nto Salmonds Jurisprudence, 12th Edition of 1966 at page 128.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u0026quot;The\r\nlaw of procedure may be defined as that branch of the law which governs the\r\nprocess of litigation . All the reside is substantive law, and relates, not to\r\nthe process of litigation, but to its purposes and subject matter.\u0026quot;\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u0026quot;If\r\nin the process any existing rights are affected or the giving of retroactive\r\noperation causes inconvenience or injustice.\u0026quot;\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e4.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e    \u003c/span\u003eWhat is a vested right? According to the\r\nOxford English Dictionary, \u0026quot;vested\u0026quot; means \u0026quot;clothed, robed,\r\ndressed especially in ecclesiastical vestments. A close examination of these\r\nmeanings and explanations reveals that vested right is free from contingencies,\r\nbut not in the sense that it is exercisable anywhere and at any moment. By `vested\r\nright` can be meant no more than those rights which under particular\r\ncircumstances will be protected from legislative interference (unless it is\r\nclearly intended). But as it is a right which vests upon equities, it has\r\nreasonable limits and restrictions.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e5.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e    \u003c/span\u003eAlthough the Legislature can legislate\r\nprospectively and retrospectively, such power is subject to certain\r\nconstitutional and judicially recognized restrictions. According to the canons\r\nof construction, every statute including amendatory statutes is prima facie\r\nprospective, based on the principle of nova constitutio futuris formam imponere\r\ndebet, non praeteritis (which means \u0027a new law ought to regulate what is to\r\nfollow, not the past\u0027). As per Osborn: Concise Law Dictionary, new law shall\r\nnot apply retrospectively unless it is given retrospective effect either\r\nexpressly or by necessary implication. In other words, a statute is not to be\r\napplied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary\r\nintendment, especially where the statute is to affect vested rights, past and\r\nclosed transactions or facts or events that have already occurred.(PLD 1963 SC\r\n322) wherein a five member bench of the august Supreme court of Pakistan held\r\nas under:-\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u0026quot;The\r\nCourt must lean against giving a statute retrospective operation on the\r\npresumption that the Legislature does not intend what is unjust. Even if two\r\ninterpretations are equally possible, the one that saves vested rights would be\r\nadopted in the interest of justice, specially where we are dealing with a\r\ntaxing statute\u0026quot;. Reliance is placed upon the Molasses Trading case PLD\r\n1970 SC 514.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u0026quot;It\r\nis a well-settled principle of interpretation that there is a strong\r\npresumption against the retrospectively of a legislation which touches or\r\ndestroys the vested rights of the parties. No doubt the Legislature is\r\ncompetent to give retrospective effect to an Act and can also take away the\r\nvested rights of the parties, but to provide for such consequences, the\r\nLegislature must use the words which are clear, unambiguous and are not capable\r\nof any other interpretation or such interpretation follows as a necessary\r\nimplication from the words used in the enactment. Therefore, while construing a\r\nlegislation which has been given retrospective effect and interferes with the vested\r\nrights of the parties, the words used therein must be construed strictly and no\r\ncase should be allowed to fall within the letter and spirit of Act which is not\r\ncovered by the plain language of the legislation\u0026quot;. \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e6.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e    \u003c/span\u003eThe principle has been admirably put by\r\nCrawford in his Book on Construction of Statutes, 1940 Edition, page 581, as\r\nfollows:-\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u0026quot;As\r\na general rule, legislation which relates solely to procedure or to legal\r\nremedies will not be subject to the rule that statutes should not be given\r\nretroactive operation. Similarly, the presumption against retrospective\r\nconstruction is inapplicable. In other words, such statutes constitute an\r\nexception to the rule pertaining to statutes generally. Therefore, in the\r\nabsence of a contrary legislation intention, statutes pertaining solely to\r\nprocedure or legal remedy may affect a right of action no matter whether it\r\ncame into existence prior to, or after the enactment of the statute. Similarly,\r\nthey may be held applicable to proceedings pending or subsequently commenced.\r\nIn any event, they will, at least, presumptively apply to accrued and pending\r\nas well as to future actions\u0026quot;. \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e7.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e    \u003c/span\u003eThe next question, therefore, that arises\r\nfor consideration is as to what are matters of procedure. It is obvious that\r\nmatters relating to the remedy, the mode of trial, the manner of taking\r\nevidence and forms of action are all matters relating to procedure. Crawford\r\ntoo takes the view that questions relating to jurisdiction over a cause of\r\naction, venue, parties pleadings and rules of evidence also pertain to\r\nprocedure, provided the burden of proof is not shifted. Thus a statute\r\npurporting to transfer jurisdiction over certain causes of action may operate\r\nretroactively. This is what is meant by saying that a change of forum by a law\r\nis retrospective being a matter of procedure only. Nevertheless, it must be\r\npointed out that if in this process any existing rights are affected or the\r\ngiving of retroactive operation cause inconvenience or injustice, then the\r\nCourts will not even in the case of a procedural statute, favour an\r\ninterpretation giving retrospective effect to the statute. \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e8.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e    \u003c/span\u003eThe time at which a presumption arises\r\nagainst retrospectivity is thus to be determined by the circumstances which\r\ncall for protection against injustice. \u0026quot;It is a well-recognized principle\r\nin the construction of statutes that they operate only on cases and facts which\r\ncome into existence after the statutes are passed, unless retrospective effect\r\nis clearly intended.\u0026quot;\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e10.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eThe reference to \u0026quot;facts\u0026quot; along with\r\n\u0026quot;cases\u0026quot; in the above quotations should be noted. Further it should be\r\nnoted that not commencement of cases, but only their existence is mentioned,\r\nbecause no technicalities are involved in the idea.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e11.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eThe general principle with regard to the\r\ninterpretation of statutes is that \u0026quot;if the mater in question is a matter\r\nof procedure only\u0026quot;, the provisions will be retrospective. \u0026quot;On the\r\nother hand, if it is more than a matter of procedure, if it touches a right in\r\nexistence at the time of passing of the Act\u0026quot;, then the legislation will\r\nnot operate retrospectively, unless the Legislature has either \u0026quot;by express\r\nenactment or by necessary intendment\u0026quot; given the legislation retroactive\r\neffect.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e12.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eThe same idea was expressed in the well known\r\nand famous case Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. V. Irving (1905 AC 369)\r\nwith reference to a pending case and even a retrospective change in the forum\r\nof appeal was held to be bad. The judicial Committee observed that \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u0026quot;The\r\nreason for the above view, to my mind, is that while abolition of an appeal\r\ntakes away a right entirely, a change in the forum of appeal equally creates\r\ndistrust on the one hand and opens the door to uncertainty on the other. The\r\njudicial Committee has further explained that \u0026quot;if the matter in\r\nquestion\u0026quot; be \u0026quot;more than a matter of procedure\u0026quot;, that is to say,\r\n\u0026quot;if it touches a right in existence at the passing of the Act\u0026quot;, then\r\n\u0026quot;in accordance with a long line of authorities extending from the time of\r\nLord Coke to the present day\u0026quot;, the Act would not operate so as to take away\r\nthat right. The words \u0026quot;touches a right in existence\u0026quot; and the\r\nwords\u0026quot; at the time of passing of the Act\u0026quot;, should be noted. The\r\nrelevant time is stated to be that of the passing of the Act, and protection is\r\ngranted to a \u0026quot;right in existence\u0026quot;..\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e13.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eIn the case of In re: Joseph Sache \u0026amp; Co.\r\nLtd.,(1875) 1 Ch. D 48) similar protection was recognized against alteration of\r\nexisting rights of the parties in \u0026quot;pending actions\u0026quot;. The references\r\nin these two leading judgments to the pendency of cases were appropriate to the\r\nfacts which were considered, but the general proposition of law which emerges\r\nafter eliminating that peculiarity, is that rights of the parties arising from\r\nfacts which come into existence before the passing of a statute, should be\r\npresumed to be unaffected by it, unless it is expressly or by necessary\r\nimplication made retrospective.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e14.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eThis principle has also been fully adopted by\r\nthe august Supreme Court of Pakistan court in the cases of The State v.\r\nMuhammad Jamil (PLD 1965 SC 681) and Muhammad Alam v. The State (PLD 1967 SC\r\n259).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e15.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eEven if there is not a statutory protection,\r\nyet the principle has by virtue of all presumption of fair-play effectively\r\nchecked encroachments on existing rights by the all powerful British\r\nParliament, unless they were found to have been clearly and unambiguously so\r\nintended. What is the nature and strength of this presumption? I conceive that\r\nits origin is to be found in the conscientious abhorrence that all just men\r\nhave for the injustice that is inherent in changing the legal implications of a\r\nsituation to the disadvantage of those who would otherwise benefit by a right\r\nwhich existed at the time of the change. In Midland Railway Company V. Peye\r\n(142 ER 419) Elre, C.J. said: \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u0026quot;Those\r\nwhose duty it is to administer the law very properly guard against giving to an\r\nact of Parliament a retrospective operation, unless the intention of the\r\nLegislature that it should be so construed is expressed in clear, plain and\r\nunambiguous language; because it manifestly shocks one\u0027s sense of justice that\r\nan act, legal at the time of doing it, should be made unlawful by some new\r\nenactment.\u0026quot;\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e16.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eAs a manifestation of more or less, a natural\r\nor instinctive sense of justice, or perhaps an instinctive repugnance to what\r\none feel to be injustice, the Courts have held that laws do not \u0026quot; impose\r\nnew liabilities in respect of events taking place before their commencement\u0027.\r\nIn Bowling V. Camp(128 L T 342) and in Henshall V. Porter (1923) 2 K B 192), a\r\nbar created by the Gaming Act, 1922 against the institution of suits, was held\r\nnot to prohibit the continuance or even commencement of actions where liability\r\nwas created before the Act came into force.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e17.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eSince the above way of thinking is the\r\nconsequence of a sense of aversion for injustice, it is immaterial\r\n\u0026quot;whether the law is changed before the hearing of the case at first\r\ninstance or whilst an appeal is pending\u0026quot;.. In support of the above view,\r\nsee Re: A Debtor, exparte Debtor(1936 Ch. 237). \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e18.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eIn England, the basic sentiment of revulsion\r\nagainst injustice is strengthened by the jealously of Courts to preserve their\r\njurisdiction uncontaminated by extra-judicial consideration. They regard all\r\nconsiderations, whether political, administrative or even legislative, if they\r\nare not embodied in the law itself, as subordinate, if not entirely extraneous,\r\nto the judicial outlook. \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e19.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eIn the United States of America, emphasis on\r\nthe constitutional separation of power is added. In the words of the American\r\nJurisprudence, 16th Volume, page 771, Ar.429.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u0026quot;The\r\nposition has been taken, however, in some jurisdictions that when an action is\r\nonce commenced, jurisdiction of purely a judicial question, and it is\r\nunconstitutional, under the doctrine of the separation of the powers of\r\nGovernment, for the Legislature to attempt to usurp the judicial function by\r\ninterfering legislation to oust the jurisdiction of the Court\u0026quot;\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e20.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eOne more consideration which appeals to me is\r\nthat law abiding members of society regulate their lives according to the law\r\nas it exists at the time of their actions, and they expect the law to be\r\nsteadfast and reliable See Hughes and others v. Lumley and others(1854) 4 E\r\n\u0026amp; B 358). They assess and weigh the consequences according to the demands\r\nof existing law, including the requirements implicit in the existing system of\r\nlaw, and are entitled to feel, cheated if the law later lets them down by\r\ntaking away or reducing their rights, or increasing their burdens. As pointed\r\nout by Willes, J. in Philips v. Eyre(22 L T 869) at 0. 876.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u0026quot;Retrospective\r\nlaws pre no doubt prima facie of questionable policy, and contrary to the\r\ngeneral principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be\r\nregulated ought, when introduced for the first time, to deal with future acts,\r\nand ought not to change the character of past transactions carried on upon the\r\nfaith of the then existing law.\u0026quot;\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e21.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eIn America in Calder v. Bull (1798) 2 Pall\r\n386) Justice Holmes of America has emphasized that law should be reliably\r\nascertainable. This is important for law abiding persons, so that they may\r\narrange their lives accordingly, but it is equally, if not more, important for\r\nwrong-doers in order to know their chances in law. The learned judge has said\r\nin his address delivered in 1897 that\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u0026quot;if\r\nwe take the view of our friend the bad man, we shall find that he does not care\r\ntwo straws for the axioms of deductions, but that he does want to know what the\r\nMassachusetts or English Courts are likely to do in fact. I am much of his\r\nmind. The prophecies of what the Courts will do in fact, and nothing more\r\npretentious, are what I mean by the law.\u0026quot; \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e22.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eThe question of applicability of any law with\r\nretrospective effect has been dealt with by the august Court in the case of Gul\r\nHussan and Co. v. Allied Bank of Pakistan (1996 SCMR 237) wherein after\r\nexamining plethora of case law, Mr. Justice Saleem Akhtar, as he then was,\r\nobserved that Statute providing change of forum, pecuniary or otherwise, is\r\nprocedural in nature and has retrospective effect unless contrary is provided\r\nexpressly or impliedly or its effects the existing rights or causes injustice\r\nor prejudice. The relevant para from the said judgment is reproduced herein\r\nbelow:-\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u0026quot;..\r\nIt is well-settled principle of interpretation of statute that where a statute\r\naffects a substantive right, it operates prospectively unless\u0026quot; by express\r\nenactment or necessary indictment\u0026quot; retrospective operation has been\r\ngiven.(Muhammad Ishaq v. State PLD 1956 SC(Pak) 256) and (State v. Muhammad\r\nJamil, PLD 1965 SC 681). This principle was affirmed in Abdul Rehman v.\r\nSettlement Commissioner (PLD 1966 SC 362). However statute, which is procedural\r\nin nature, operates retrospectively unless it affects an existing right on the\r\ndate of promulgation or causes injustice or prejudice the substantive right. In\r\nAdnan Afzal v. Capt. Sher Afzal (PLD 1969 SC 187). \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e23.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eThe same view was expressed in Ch. Safdar Ali\r\nv. Malik Elahi and another (1969 SCMR 166) and Muhammad Abdullah v. Imdad\r\nAli(1972 SCMR 173), which was followed in Bashir v. Wazir Ali(1987 SCMR 978),\r\nMst. Nighat Yasmin v. N.B of Pak.(PLD 1988 SC 391) and Yusuf Ali Khan v.\r\nHongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Karachi(1994 SCMR 1007). From the\r\nprinciple enunciated in these judgments it emerges that statue providing change\r\nof forum pecuniary or otherwise is procedural in nature and has retrospective\r\neffect unless contrary is provided expressly or impliedly or it affects the\r\nexisting right or causes injustice or prejudice.\u0026quot;\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e24.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eAccording to Halsbury\u0027s Laws of England:\r\nVolume 44 (4th Edition) a declaratory statute is a statute which either\r\nresolves doubts on a particular point or restates the law on a particular\r\nsubject. This definition of a declaratory statute leads to the irresistible\r\nconclusion that a declaratory provision does not purport to change the law.\r\nNotwithstanding their placement the amendments in question cannot be termed as\r\ndeclaratory for the simple reason that they have created new obligations and\r\nchanged the existing law considerably. It is true that the statutory increase\r\nin the wages was not incorporated in the Ordinance but the existing law did not\r\nsuffer from any legal defect, therefore, the amendments are not purely\r\nremedial. Be that as it may, the amendments cannot be held to be retroactive in\r\noperation even if the same are presumed to be remedial because they tend to\r\naffect vested rights. In any even giving retrospective effect to the amendments\r\nwould tantamount to nullifying the binding effect of the dictum laid down in\r\nPLD 1988 SC 1, which squarely applies to the facts and circumstances of the\r\ncases.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e25.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eIn this context, reference may also be made to\r\nFederation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Siddiq(PLD 1981 SC 249), Chairman, PIAC V.\r\nNasim Malik PLD 1990 SC 951), Gul Hussan v. Allied Bank of Pakistan(1996 SCMR\r\n237) and Muhammad Afzal v. Karachi Electric Supply Corporation(1999 SCMR 92).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e26.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eIt is well-settled where the main object and\r\nintention of statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the\r\ndraftsman\u0027s unskillfullness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of\r\nnecessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used. (Maxwell, 11th\r\nEdition, page 221).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e27.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eIt is pertinent to mention here that \u0026quot;the\r\ninitial presumption is that an absurdity is not intended by the law-maker. (PLD\r\n1964 Dacca 756, PLD 1962 Lah. 878). In case of doubt as to the intention of\r\nLegislature, an interpretation which leads to manifest absurdity should, if\r\npossible, be avoided. (PLD1964 Lah 101 \u0026amp; PLD 1966 Azad J \u0026amp; K 38). If\r\nproposition accepted, leads to absurd result, there is always a presumption\r\nagainst such absurdity. (PLD 1959 Quetta.1). It is well-settled by now that\r\n\u0026quot;the Courts are not only competent to modify the language of the Act to\r\ngive effect to the manifest and undoubted intention of the Legislature, but the\r\nCourts are under statutory obligation to supply the omission with a view to\r\nprevent the defeating of the very object of the Act\u0026quot;. (PLD 1965 Pesh.65).\r\nThey can fill, in the gaps in a piece of legislation, where a plain\r\nconstruction would lead to absurd results. (PLD 1964 Dacca. 773 and PLD 1961 SC\r\n119). However, initially the Court is to presume that an absurdity was not\r\nintended by the law-maker\u0026quot;. (PLD 1966 Azad J\u0026amp;K 38). See also The\r\ninterpretation of Statutes\u0027 by M. Mahmood.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e28.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eLaw cannot be said to be retrospective unless\r\nit takes away or impairs a vested right acquired under existing law or creates\r\nsome obligation or disability with regard to closed and past transactions.(PLD\r\n1966 Karachi 480). However, retrospective operation of statute- cannot diver\r\nrights already vested in the absence of clear provision to that effect\u0026quot;.\r\n(PLD 1973 Lah.114).\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e29.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eEven otherwise it has been observed by the\r\nSupreme Court quoting Maxwell in PLD 1965 SC 681 that where the Legislature has\r\nmade its intention clear that the amending Act should have a retrospective\r\noperation, there is no doubt that it must be so construed even though the\r\nconsequences may entail hardship to a party. But even without express words to\r\nthat effect, retrospective effect may be given to an amending law if the new\r\nlaw manifests such a necessary intendment with regard to procedural laws, says\r\nMaxwell at p.217 of his Book the general principle seems to be that alterations\r\nin procedure are retrospective unless there be some good reason against such a\r\nview. \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e30.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eIt is settled principle of law that if during\r\nthe pendency of proceedings the existing law has repealed or amended, the\r\nmatter will be decided under the provision of repealed law as if law has not\r\nrepealed.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e31.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eA provision creating or establishing a forum\r\nfor getting redress is a procedural matter; therefore, its change is\r\nretrospective. But it is not retrospective if such an amendment touches the\r\nexisting right or deals simultaneously with procedure. The general principle is\r\nthat every right has a remedy. It is also a general principle that where two\r\nproceedings or two remedies are available under the law, one of them must not\r\nbe taken as operating in derogation of the order. An in fragment of an existing\r\nlegal right is always actionable in a civil Court unless its cognizance is\r\nexpressly or impliedly barred. A suit is said to be expressly barred when it is\r\nbarred by an enactment for the time being in force. Where a right of action\r\nexists, a suit is maintainable to enforce that right independently of the\r\nspecial remedy provided by law. There is, however, one qualification for this\r\nrule. Where a right is created by statute and a method of enforcing the right\r\nor of redressing grievance caused in the exercise of enforcement of the right,\r\nis pointed out by the statute creating such right, then the general remedy of\r\nsuit will be impliedly barred. In AIR 1955 Mad 378 and AIR 1952 Cal 879, similar\r\nview was adopted by indian courts.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e32.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eBindra\u0027s book page 587 is also referred to\r\nwherein under the heading Right of a suitor in Court\u0027 it is written that:-\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u0026quot;The\r\nright of a suitor to have his pending application disposed of by a competent\r\nCourt is a matter of right and not a matter of procedure. The Civil Procedure\r\nCode is not confined to procedure. The provisions of the Code are regulations\r\ndealing with the jurisdiction and governing the procedure of the Courts in\r\nIndia. But jurisdiction and procedure are distinct: jurisdiction does not come\r\nunder the description of procedural matter. The right of a party to institute a\r\nsuit or to file an appeal in a particular Court must, in view of the decision\r\nof the Privy Council in 1905 A C 369 (Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving) be\r\nregarded as a substantive right and not merely a matter of procedure or\r\nprocedural law.\u0026quot;\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e33.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003ePage 588 of Bindra\u0027s book is also referred to\r\nwherein under heading jurisdiction it is written that:-\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u0026quot;When\r\na statute deprives a person of his right to sue or affects the power or\r\njurisdiction of a Court in enforcing the law as it stands, its retrospective\r\ncharacter must be clearly expressed. The rule that a statute relating to\r\nprocedure operates retrospectively unless otherwise provided in the statute is\r\nnot applicable when the statute in question affects the jurisdiction of a\r\nCourt. Provisions relating to jurisdiction are more than matters of procedure.\r\nThey touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute\u0026quot;.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e34.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eIt was held in Narayanaroju v. Parimi\r\nVenkatanarayana( A I R 1941 Mad. 506) that \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u0026quot;An\r\namendment is generally prospective, unless the Legislature has expressly made\r\nit otherwise. One of the exceptions to it is that an amendment is generally\r\nretrospective if it is procedural. An exception to the latter proposition is\r\nthat it is prospective if it deals with or affects not only procedure but also\r\nvested rights. For example, the law of limitation is ordinary procedural;\r\ntherefore, its amendment is ordinarily retrospective; but if it were to\r\ninterfere with or impair or imperil a vested right, it would be prospective.\r\nThe right to sue is not a procedural matter; therefore, it cannot ordinarily be\r\ntaken away after it has accrued to a plaintiff.\u0026quot;\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e35.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eEven Article 264 of the CONSTITUTION OF\r\nISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN, 1973 protects the pending lis if through repeal\r\nor amended law, any vested right of the citizen is infringed. Article 264 of the\r\nConstitution is in a language that deals with the effect of repeal of laws and,\r\nunless the Constitution provides otherwise, nothing will be revived which was\r\nnot in force or existing at the time when the repeal takes effect.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e36.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eSection 4 of the West Pakistan General Clauses\r\nAct, 1956 is reproduced as under for further explanation: -\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u0026quot;(1)\r\nWhere this Act or any other West Pakistan Act repeals any enactment then,\r\nunless different intention appears, the repeal shall not:-\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003erevive\r\nanything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect;\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eaffect\r\nthe previous operation of any enactment so repealed or incurred under suffered\r\nthere under; or\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eaffect\r\nany right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred\r\nunder any enactment so repealed; or\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eaffect\r\nany penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence\r\ncommitted against any enactment so repealed; or affect any investigation, legal\r\nproceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability,\r\npenalty forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, and any such investigation,\r\nlegal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any\r\nsuch penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the Repealing Act\r\nhad not been passed.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e37.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eWhat the Courts will do tomorrow depends a\r\ngreat deal on the answer to the question: This is why, to my mind, the Privy\r\nCouncil held in Colonial Sugar Co.(supra) that there is no difference between\r\nchanging the forum of a remedy and altogether abolishing it. A past and closed\r\ntransaction must be taken to have been concluded according to the law in force\r\nat that time, and the ultimate legal consequences of a legal duty or a legal\r\nright arising there from must according to justice Holmes, means to the parties\r\nto it, \u0026quot;a prophecy\u0026quot;. Civilization is in justice bound to respect that\r\n`prophecy`, because the need for such prophecy is a creation of a civilized\r\nsociety. The above discussion is intended to explain the meaning and purpose of\r\nthe principles that support the presumption against retrospective or ex post\r\nfacto legislation. They show that pendency of proceedings is not an\r\nindispensable condition of the presumption that exists against retrospectively,\r\nbut the case of the Sugar Refining Co. (supra) has attracted the most attention\r\nin India and Pakistan, because it, was decided by the Privy Council. In almost\r\nevery important case of India and Pakistan that case has been cited as the\r\nbasic authority with the result that pendency of proceedings has been treated\r\nas sine qua non of the presumption.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e38.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eI am also fortified by the case law PLD 2016\r\nSupreme Court 398, PLD 1969 Supreme Court 187, 2011 SCMR 1254, 2002 SCMR 39,\r\n2003 SCMR 271, PLD 2001 Supreme Court 38, 2001 SCMR 103, PLD 1965 SC 681, PLD\r\n1991 SC 197 1996 P.Cr.L.J 586, 2003 CLC 1001, PLD 1994 Lahore 170, PLD 1982\r\nPeshawar 172, 2011 CLC 609, PLD 1970 Azad J \u0026amp; K 35 wherein our superior\r\ncourts also acknowledge the principle that \u0026quot;if the mater in question is a\r\nmatter of procedure only\u0026quot;, the provisions will be retrospective. \u0026quot;On\r\nthe other hand, if it is more than a matter of procedure, if it touches a right\r\nin existence at the time of passing of the Act\u0026quot;, then the legislation will\r\nnot operate retrospectively, unless the Legislature has either \u0026quot;by express\r\nenactment or by necessary intendment\u0026quot; given the legislation retroactive\r\neffect. Even inconvenience, distrust, uncertainty and injustice are also the\r\nconsiderable points\u0026quot; \u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e39.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eFor example in view of latest amendment in\r\nSection 67 vide The Canal \u0026amp; Drainage (Amendment) Act, 2016, following legal\r\nissue may arised:\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eWhether\r\njurisdiction of Civil Court pertaining to the matters given in new subsection\r\n(2) of 67 vide The Canal \u0026amp; Drainage (Amendment) Act), 2016 is barred or\r\nnot?\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e40.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eThe Provincial Assembly of the Punjab passed\r\nTHE CANAL AND DRAINAGE (AMENDEMENT) ACT, 2016 on 17.02.16 which was assented on\r\n22.02.2016 and published on 23.02.16. Before discussing in detail about the\r\neffect of the stated amendment in the pending suits, it will be appropriate to\r\nreproduce old as well as new provision of Section 67 for ready reference.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eSection 67 (Old Provision)\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u0026quot;Jurisdiction\r\nunder this Act of Civil Courts--- Except where herein otherwise provided, all\r\nclaims against the Provincial Government in respect of any thing done under\r\nthis Act may be tried by the civil courts but no such courts shall in cases\r\npass an order as to supply of canal-water to any crop sown or growing the time\r\nof such order\u0026quot;\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003eSection 67 (New Provision)\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e\u0026quot;Jurisdiction-(1)\r\nSubject to subsection (2), all claims against the Provincial Government in\r\nrespect of anything done under this Act may be tried by the civil court of\r\ncompetent jurisdiction.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:.1in;\r\nmargin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.3in;mso-pagination:none;\r\npage-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:none;text-autospace:\r\nnone\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e       \u003c/span\u003e(2)\r\nA court shall not assume jurisdiction in any matter in respect of anything\r\ndone, being done or purported to be done under section 20, 20-A, 20-B, 20-C,\r\n31, 32, 32-A, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 45 of the Act and shall not pass any order\r\ninterrupting any proceedings under the Act.\u0026quot;\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e41.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eNewly enacted section 67 although has ousted\r\njurisdiction of civil court in certain matters provided therein but it applies\r\nonly on the actions done after present enactment not on pending actions or\r\nsuits because there is no specific provision provided in The Canal \u0026amp;\r\nDrainage (Amendment) Act, 2016 pertaining to its retrospective effect. Section\r\n1 of the Act ibid says about \u0026quot; at once\u0026quot; enforcement which means that\r\nit will operate from the date of its assent. Even the provision itself and\r\nPreamble do not indicate its retrospective effect. So old section 67 has\r\nalready given vested rights to irrigators in way of suit to challenge orders of\r\ncanal authorities which cannot be affected by new provision.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027margin-bottom:.1in;text-align:justify;text-indent:\r\n.2in;mso-pagination:none;page-break-after:avoid;tab-stops:.5in;mso-layout-grid-align:\r\nnone;text-autospace:none\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.2pt\u0027\u003e42.\u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-tab-count:1\u0027\u003e  \u003c/span\u003eConcluding the above discussion, it can be\r\nsaid if the mater in question is a matter of procedure only\u0026quot;, the\r\nprovisions will be retrospective. \u0026quot;On the other hand, if it is more than a\r\nmatter of procedure, if it touches a right in existence at the time of passing\r\nof the Act\u0026quot;, then the legislation will not operate retrospectively, unless\r\nthe Legislature has either \u0026quot;by express enactment or by necessary intendment\u0026quot;\r\ngiven the legislation retroactive effect. Even inconvenience, distrust,\r\nuncertainty and injustice are also the considerable points because the pending\r\ncases in civil courts may be at different stages such as summoning, evidence\r\nand arguments etc new procedural amendment in law may cause inconvenience,\r\ndistrust, uncertainty, injustice and costs amongst the parties to the pending\r\ncases.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/body\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/html\u003e\r\n"