"\u003chtml xmlns:o=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office\"\r\nxmlns:w=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word\"\r\nxmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chead\u003e\r\n\u003cmeta http-equiv=Content-Type content=\"text/html; charset=windows-1252\"\u003e\r\n\u003cmeta name=ProgId content=Word.Document\u003e\r\n\u003cmeta name=Generator content=\"Microsoft Word 9\"\u003e\r\n\u003cmeta name=Originator content=\"Microsoft Word 9\"\u003e\r\n\u003clink rel=File-List href=\"./2005J2011_files/filelist.xml\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctitle\u003eREVIEW OF THE LAHORE HIGH COURT JUDGMENT\u003c/title\u003e\r\n\u003c!--[if gte mso 9]\u003e\u003cxml\u003e\r\n \u003co:DocumentProperties\u003e\r\n  \u003co:Author\u003eAdministrator\u003c/o:Author\u003e\r\n  \u003co:Template\u003eNormal\u003c/o:Template\u003e\r\n  \u003co:LastAuthor\u003esaif\u003c/o:LastAuthor\u003e\r\n  \u003co:Revision\u003e2\u003c/o:Revision\u003e\r\n  \u003co:TotalTime\u003e0\u003c/o:TotalTime\u003e\r\n  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1.25in;\r\n\tmso-header-margin:.5in;\r\n\tmso-footer-margin:.5in;\r\n\tmso-paper-source:0;}\r\ndiv.Section1\r\n\t{page:Section1;}\r\n--\u003e\r\n\u003c/style\u003e\r\n\u003cscript src=\"../../../nc.js\" type=\"text/javascript\" \u003e\u003c/script\u003e\r\n  \r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n\u003cbody lang=EN-US style=\u0027tab-interval:.5in\u0027\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=Section1\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal align=center style=\u0027text-align:center\u0027\u003e\u003cb style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:\r\nnormal\u0027\u003eREVIEW OF THE \u003cspan style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\u0027\u003eLAHORE HIGH COURT\r\nJUDGMENT\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal align=center style=\u0027text-align:center\u0027\u003e\u003cb style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:\r\nnormal\u0027\u003eIN THE CASE OF \u003cspan style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\u0027\u003eFAROOQ AHMED \u003c/span\u003eV.\r\n\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\u0027\u003eFEDERATION \u003c/span\u003eOF\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal align=center style=\u0027text-align:center\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003ePAKISTAN \u003c/b\u003e\u003cb\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:normal\u0027\u003eIN \u003cspan style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\u0027\u003eWRIT\r\nPETITION NO.20654 \u003c/span\u003eOF \u003cspan style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\u0027\u003e2002\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal align=center style=\u0027text-align:center\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003eREPORTED \u003c/b\u003e\u003cb\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:normal\u0027\u003eAS \u003cspan style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\u0027\u003ePLD\r\n2005 \u003c/span\u003eLah. 15\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal align=center style=\u0027text-align:center\u0027\u003e\u003cb style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:\r\nnormal\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal align=center style=\u0027text-align:center\u0027\u003e\u003cb style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:\r\nnormal\u0027\u003eBy\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal align=center style=\u0027text-align:center\u0027\u003e\u003cb style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:\r\nnormal\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal align=center style=\u0027text-align:center\u0027\u003e\u003cb style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:\r\nnormal\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:-.1pt;mso-bidi-font-style:italic\u0027\u003eDr. Faqir\r\nHussain,\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal align=center style=\u0027text-align:center\u0027\u003e\u003cb style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:\r\nnormal\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:-.1pt;mso-bidi-font-style:italic\u0027\u003eSecretary,\r\nLaw \u0026amp; Justice Commission of Pakistan\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:-.1pt;\r\nmso-bidi-font-style:italic\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eThe Lahore High Court in a\r\nlandmark judgment delivered on 6 December, 2004 struck down the Juvenile\r\nJustice Ordinance, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as Ordinance). The verdict was\r\ngiven on a writ petition titled, `Farooq Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan\u0027.\r\nHaving scrutinised the various provisions of the Ordinance, the Court came to\r\nthe conclusion that the Ordinance is defective in drafting, impracticable,\r\nunreasonable and unconstitutional, hence void. Strangely though, some clauses\r\nescaped judicial scrutiny and yet received mortal blow.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003eInadequate \u003c/b\u003e\u003cb\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:normal\u0027\u003eLegal Assistance\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eThe hearing in the case lasted 8\r\ndays during the course of 3 years from 18 December, 2002 to 22 November, 2004.\r\nPerusal of the judgment reveals that the Court was unable to get adequate legal\r\nassistance. It was needed though, in keeping with the critical issues involved\r\nand the importance of the case. The Court in its traditional restrained manner\r\nand polite style expressed its dismay at the inability of some lawyers to\r\nassist the Court. Two prominent senior lawyers and known human rights activists\r\nwere appointed as amicus curiae in the case, but failed to appear regularly.\r\nNotices were also served on the Attorney-General for Pakistan and\r\nAdvocate-General, Punjab. The former was represented by a Deputy\r\nAttorney-General, who also represented the Federation and the later by an\r\nAssistant Advocate-General. The Deputy Attorney-General argued in support of\r\nthe Ordinance whereas, the Assistant Advocate-General, representing the\r\nProvince of the Punjab, ironically, assailed the law, questioning its, validity\r\nand propriety. In the circumstances, the Counsel for the Petitioner had a\r\nheyday, as he alone gave detailed arguments in the case. The 3rd amicus curiae\r\nalso went along the line of arguments advanced by the Counsel for Petitioner and\r\nassailed the validity and propriety of the Ordinance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cb style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:\r\nnormal\u0027\u003eJudgment Analysis\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eNot getting adequate legal\r\nassistance from the Bar, the Court took it upon itself to carry out a\r\nreview/appraisal of the legal literature and judicial precedents of superior\r\nCourts at home and abroad. The analysis is not very comprehensive though,\r\ncertainly not as required by the complexity of the issues involved and\r\nimportance of the subject. A deficiency in the judgment is its reliance on a\r\nrepealed Indian statute. Further, the case-law developed by the superior\r\njudiciary of Pakistan on the application and enforcement of international law\r\nin the domestic sphere is also ignored.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eThe focal point for determination\r\nwas, as the Court put it, to examine as to whether a youthful offender of\r\nmature understanding and fuller comprehension, who knows full well the\r\nconsequences of his criminal act/conduct, should be extended the extraordinary\r\nconcessions of the law viz. lenient treatment during trial and abolition of\r\ndeath penalty for juvenile involved in heinous offences i.e. murder, rape,\r\nterrorism and drug-trafficking? However, as the Court proceeds to examine the\r\nproposition, the focus is altogether lost and the Ordinance as a whole comes\r\nunder onslaught. At the end of the scrutiny, the conclusion is that the\r\nOrdinance is so defective that it has to be put an end to. The result affects\r\nnot just the mature pubescent or ripe juvenile, having attained sufficient\r\nmaturity of understanding, but also minor and immature juvenile. With the Ordinance\r\ngone, all protections\u0027 meant for all juveniles stand abolished. The judgment\r\nhas a broad sweep; by declaring the Ordinance void, even those provisions stand\r\ndemolished, whose validity was never questioned by any Counsel nor otherwise\r\nexamined by the Court.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003ePerusal of the judgment reveals\r\nthat only one aspect of the law was argued and one shade of opinion projected.\r\nAny contrary view was never raised nor argued. A comparative analysis of the\r\nOrdinance with similar other statutes is made. In case of any difference or\r\ndistinction between the two, the Ordinance is assailed. It appears as though\r\nthe comparison is for the purpose of undermining the relevance or validity of\r\nthe Ordinance. One keeps wondering as to why one statute, out of many, and some\r\nof them of the same genre (Ordinances), is regarded of lesser value or\r\nrelevance? With due respect to the extremely learned observations of the Court,\r\none has to point out that the repeal of a law by the Court, though authorised\r\nby the Constitution, is a serious matter and such power is only sparingly used.\r\nStriking a law tantamount to rejecting the cumulative wisdom of the\r\nlegislature. The Courts do have the power of judicial review, but the law has\r\nto be tested on the touchstone of the Constitution and struck off only, if it\r\nis found to be in conflict with it. The Court must have solid grounds and valid\r\nreasons to do so. In my humble view, this is not the case in the present\r\njudgment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eTrue, the Court did not get\r\nadequate assistance from the Bar; it therefore made a commendable effort in\r\nreviewing the relevant legal literature, taken from national and international\r\njurisdiction. This is however no substitute for legal assistance that the Bar\r\ncould have rendered. Consequently, there remain some loose ends, even loopholes\r\nand shortcomings in the judgment. This is why the judgment is being reviewed in\r\nthe present lines. It being an important judgment, having far-reaching\r\nimplications, national and international, must receive candid response from the\r\nBar and intelligentsia. There is still time for appeal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003eDrafting Errors\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:\r\nbold\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eTo start with, one cannot but\r\nagree with the general observation of the Court that the Ordinance is not a\r\nfine example of legislative draftsmanship. It indeed contains many defects,\r\nambiguities and contradictions. It seems that the draftsman failed to carefully\r\ncollate its contents vis-a-vis similar other laws. This is, however, a general\r\ncriticism and can be made against many other laws/statutes. While examining the\r\nvires of a law, the Court always attempts to harmonize the seemingly\r\ninconsistent or recalcitrant provisions, to bring clarity and give meaning to\r\nlaw. It is only when such reconciliation is not possible; that the provision\r\ncan be struck off, after its conflict or repugnancy with the Constitution is\r\nestablished. This has to be done on minute scrutiny of every clause and every\r\nsection of the statute. It. is not the case in the present judgment. Of the 15\r\nsections of the Ordinance, 9 were examined in full or part, and declared void.\r\nFew were said to be in conflict with the Constitution. The rest were found\r\ninconsistent with or different from other statutes. The remaining 6 sections\r\nbecame casualty, not for any inconsistency or conflict with the Constitution or\r\nany statute, but merely because they were listed in the Ordinance, which, lock,\r\nstock, and barrel was declared void.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003eDefinition of Child\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:\r\nbold\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eThe issue of definition of a\r\nchild is important and has received the greatest attention of the Court.\r\nDifferent definitions of child are given in our national statutes, and perhaps\r\nrightly so, as no uniform age can be prescribed for exercising various rights\r\nand performing functions. Thus, the Constitution also prescribes different age\r\nlimits for the purpose of casting vote, contesting election, securing employment,\r\netc. Similarly, various statutes prescribe different age limits for different\r\npurposes namely immunity from criminal liability, marriage contract, exercise\r\nof civil rights, obtaining a driving licence, etc. The Court looked at the\r\nvariation in age limits, fixed in various substantive/procedural criminal law\r\nviz. sections 82 and 83 of Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (P.P.C.), sections 29-B,\r\n399 and 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (Cr.P.C.) and section 2(a) of\r\nthe Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979. The Reformatory\r\nSchool Act 1897, Sindh Children Act 1955 and the Punjab Youthful Offenders\r\nOrdinance 1983, also prescribe different definitions of a child. Taking notice\r\nof the varying definitions of a child/juvenile offender, the Court focuses on\r\nthe definition of child fixed as 18 years in sections 2(b) of the Ordinance and\r\nobserves that it is too high and unreasonable. In its support, the Court relies\r\non the definition of child given in section 50 of the British Children and Young\r\nPersons Act 1933, as amended by section 16 of the Children and Young Persons\r\nAct 1963. The British Act prescribes inter ilia, safeguards for juvenile\r\noffenders. The law fixes 10 years being the age of doli incapax meaning absence\r\nof mens rea/guilty intent. Thus, child below 10 enjoys conclusive presumption\r\nof innocence. Previously, the law had fixed the age limit of above 10 years but\r\nbelow 14 years for rebuttable presumption of innocence but it was abolished\r\nsubsequently by section 34 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The Court also\r\nrelies on the definition of child contained in Section 2(h) of the Indian\r\nJuvenile Justice Act 1986. This Act prescribed the age limit of 16 years for\r\nboys and 18 years for girls for the purpose of availing the concessions of\r\njuvenile law.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eThe Court goes on to trace out\r\nsimilar definition in sections 82 and 83 of the P.P.C., which stipulate that a\r\nchild below 7 years of age shall enjoy absolute presumption of innocence,\r\nwhereas a child above 7 but below 12 years may also be presumed innocent, if\r\nthe Court finds such child of immature understanding. The Court further refers\r\nto the definition of child given in the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood)\r\nOrdinance, 1979, where the limit fixed is, 18 years for male and 16 years for\r\nfemale or puberty. Similarly, section 299(x) of the P.P.C. defines a child as\r\n18 years of age for the purpose of application of the Qisas \u0026amp; Diyat law.\r\nReference is also made to section 29(b) of the Cr.P.C and section 2(a) of the\r\nPunjab Youthful Offenders Ordinance 1983, which define a child to be below 15\r\nyears of age. Enumerating the provisions as to age limit in various national\r\nstatutes as well as the laws of the United Kingdom and India, the Court comes\r\nto the conclusion that the age of 18 years, fixed by the Ordinance is high,\r\narbitrarily fixed and therefore void. The Court maintains that it is based on\r\nan unreasonable classification and is impermissible under the \u0026quot;special\r\nprovisions\u0026quot; clause of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eThe Court went a great length in\r\ncomparing the definition of child in the Ordinance with similar definitions in\r\nother national and some international statutes. Frankly though, one fails to\r\nunderstand the logic of the exercise. There is no uniform definition of\r\njuvenile anywhere. There is no one age limit prescribed in the Indian statutes\r\neither. The Court frequently referred to an Indian statute i.e. the Juvenile\r\nJustice Act 1986, which in section 2(h) defined a child as 16 years, if a boy\r\nand 18 years, if girl. Not getting proper legal assistance, the Court remained\r\nunaware that the statute has long been repealed and substituted by a new one.\r\nThis is the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of the Children) Act, 2000.\r\nIt changed the earlier definition and fixed the age as 18 years, both for boys\r\nand girls (section 2-k). This is identical with the definition of child,\r\nprescribed in the Ordinance. The Indian statute is in compliance with the\r\ninternational Convention on the Rights of Child 1989 (C.R.C.), duly ratified by\r\nthat State. The preamble to the Act clearly says so, perhaps to explain the\r\nchange in definition. On the pattern of India, the Ordinance was Pakistan\u0027s\r\nresponse to fulfil its obligations under the C.R.C., which it ratified in 1990.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003eGlobal Trend to Protect Juveniles\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:\r\nbold\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eThe judgment disregards the\r\nnational, regional and global trend towards creating a protective regime for\r\nchildren in conflict with the law. All civilized nations make provisions for\r\nthe care and protection of juvenile offenders. Legislation exists for the\r\npurpose of fixing criminal liability, prescribing trial procedure, sentencing\r\npolicy and placement of juvenile in borstal institution. The purpose is to save\r\nthe child from possible abuse during investigation, prosecution or trial. It is\r\nto treat juvenile with dignity and respect all through criminal proceedings,\r\nand if proved guilty, then to place him/her in a place/institution, where there\r\nare safeguards for health care and facilities for education and training,\r\nnecessary for reformation and rehabilitation. To achieve the goal, different\r\ncountries have prescribed different age limits for juvenile offenders to avail\r\nthe absolute presumption of innocence i.e. 7 years in Pakistan and India, 8\r\nyears in Scotland, 10 years in England, 12 years in the Netherlands, Greece and\r\nTurkey, 13 years in France, 14 years in Germany and Italy, 15 years in Denmark\r\nand Sweden and 18 years in Belgium and Luxembourg. Again the countries have\r\nprescribed varying age limits for availing the concessions/benefits of juvenile\r\nlaw. The United States prescribes no fixed age limit. It rather leaves the\r\nissue to be determined by the Court, on case to case basis. The Court makes the\r\ndetermination in individual cases, based on inquiry conducted as to the\r\ncharacter/antecedents of the child and the child\u0027s conduct in the criminal act.\r\nIndeed, the juvenile justice system exists all over the world, with varying\r\ndefinitions of juvenile offender. There is no uniformity as to definition of\r\nchild. The uniformity is in respect of the need for and urgency to safeguard\r\nthe juveniles from possible abuse in criminal justice system.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eIt is difficult to agree with the\r\nobservation of the Court that socio-economic development of a society,\r\neasy/difficult life style of the people, urban/rural divide of the community or\r\ndifferent diets have nexus with early/late attainment of adulthood or maturity.\r\nTo say that environment or difference in living conditions induce early\r\nmaturity is a questionable proposition. This is no ground to prove that 18\r\nyears age limit, fixed in the Ordinance is too high and unreasonable. Indeed,\r\nthere is nothing wrong with prescribing different age limits for availing\r\ndifferent rights and performing different functions. This is why all over the\r\nworld, and so in Pakistan, different age limits have been prescribed for the\r\npurpose of criminal liability, entering into marriage contract, seeking\r\nemployment, casting vote, contesting election, obtaining driving licence and\r\nattaining majority to exercise civil, economic, legal rights /obligations. The\r\nclassification is not arbitrary or whimsical or unreasonable. Such distinction\r\nis duly recognized by the Constitution in Articles 11, 25 and 26 (Chapter on\r\nFundamental Rights), Articles 35 and 37 (Chapter on Principles of Policy) and\r\nArticles 41, 51 and 62 of the Constitution. The Constitution recognizes the\r\nstatus of children, being weak and vulnerable, thus dependent on the proiection\r\nof the State/society. It therefore mandates the Government to make\r\n\u0026quot;special provisions\u0026quot; for their protection and welfare. The superior\r\nCourts have held that \u0026quot;affirmative action\u0026quot; is permissible, as held by\r\nthe Supreme Court in the case of Shirin Munir v Government of the Punjab (PLD\r\n1990 SC 295), in respect of quota fixed for girls in admission in educational\r\ninstitutions. The judgment makes a reference to this case, but deviates from\r\nits principle on the plea that it is distinguishable from the principle of\r\nfixing age limit for juveniles in the Ordinance. The definition of child in the\r\nOrdinance, in the Court\u0027s view, has no reasonable linkage with the\r\n\u0026quot;special provisions\u0026quot; clause, as it is violative of Articles 4 and 25\r\nof the Constitution, which provide for equality of citizens. Frankly, one fails\r\nto comprehend as to why a classification based on gender is valid for\r\nprescribing quota in admission or employment or elective bodies, but not for\r\nthe protection of juveniles in conflict with the law?. When the Constitution\r\npermits -- rather mandates -- and the State implements special legislation for\r\nthe humane treatment of children, how is that impermissible, particularly, when\r\nthe need for such measures is undeniable\u0027?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eHaving ratified the C.R.C., the\r\nOrdinance was in compliance with binding international obligation. As an\r\nhonourable member of international committee, Pakistan had to fulfil its\r\ncommitment. A State obligation indeed becomes an obligation of the organs of\r\nthe State i.e. legislature, executive and judiciary. All State organs and their\r\nfunctionaries are required to act in unison and perform their functions in accord\r\nwith international norms/principles. To act otherwise will be to create\r\nanarchy/chaos in the system and will surely undermine the status and image of\r\nthe State in international community.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eThe Ordinance may not be ideal,\r\nthe finest example of draftsmanship. True, there are problems of implementation\r\nof its provisions, but still it contains very laudable goals to achieve. It\r\nincorporates new principles of saving juvenile delinquents from abuse and\r\nreforming them to become useful members of the society. It serves some very\r\nuseful functions e.g.:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e(1) It incorporates norms of\r\ncivilized and humane treatment of the child, while in custody or during trial;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e(2) The arrest/detention of a\r\njuvenile offender should be a measure of last resort and for shortest possible\r\nperiod of time;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e(3) Any action concerning\r\njuvenile shall take full account of the welfare and best interest of the child;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e(4) Certain types of punishments\r\ni.e. death, labour, fettering/handcuffing and corporal will not be awarded to\r\nchildren;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e(5) Rather than sending the child\r\nto prison, he/she be placed in a borstal institution, where there are\r\nfacilities for health care, education and training to help rehabilitate/reform\r\nthe child.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eWith the Ordinance quashed, all\r\nsafeguards stand abolished. This will expose the child to abuses and hardships,\r\nprevalent in the criminal justice system. The criminal justice system of\r\nPakistan is harsh. It can break the back of the strongest. It can transform an\r\ninnocent person into a hardened criminal. Children, on account of their\r\ninherent physical weakness and immature understanding, should not be exposed to\r\nit, without adequate safeguard/protection. It is important to respect and\r\nprotect their dignity and honour. It is the State\u0027s legal and international\r\nobligation and the community\u0027s social responsibility to ensure a humane and\r\ndignified treatment to children. Their weak/vulnerable status warrant special\r\nprotective measures. A juvenile may not necessarily be the perpetrator of\r\ncrime. Instead, he/she may be a victim of abuse or exploitation by adults. In\r\nsuch a situation, the child of immature understanding must enjoy the privilege\r\nof being treated doli incapax (incapable of having mens rea or guilty intent).\r\nA reason quoted by the Court for striking out the Ordinance is, its potential\r\nmisuse by adults to abuse/exploit children for settling vendetta. It may be\r\ntrue, but there is a remedy available: abetment, inducement is an offence. The\r\nrepeal of Ordinance\u0027is not an appropriate response to the malady. It will merely\r\nmake the juvenile vulnerable to greater abuse and exploitation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003eJuvenile Courts\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:\r\nbold\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eThe Court correctly brings out\r\nthe apparent contradiction in Sections 4 and 14 of the Ordinance. The former\r\nstipulates the establishment of juvenile Courts for the trial of juvenile\r\noffenders, whereas the later provides that the provisions of the Ordinance\r\nshall beread in addition to and not in derogation of the any law for the time\r\nbeing in force. There are other laws which also confer jurisdiction on juvenile\r\nCourts. One such provision is 29-B of the Cr.P.C. It states that an offence,\r\nother than one punishment by death or imprisonment of life, committed by a\r\nchild under the age of 15 years, may be tried by a Judicial Magistrate,\r\nspecially empowered by the Provincial Government for the purpose. The Sindh\r\nChildren Act 1955 (in Sections 7 and 8 thereof) provides for the establishment\r\nof juvenile Courts for the trial of children under the age of 16 years. The\r\nPunjab Youthful Offender Ordinance, 1983 (in Sections 4 and 5 thereof) also\r\nprovides for juvenile Courts to be established for the exclusive trial of\r\njuveniles under the age of 15 years.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eThe Ordinance is a central law\r\nand ordinarily should take precedence over any provincial statutes, as criminal\r\nlaw/procedure is listed in the Concurrent List of the Constitution. However,\r\nsection 14 of the Ordinance creates confusion by saying that its provisions are\r\nin addition to and not in derogation of other laws. This provision undermines\r\nthe effect of several other provisions in the Ordinance, especially Section 12\r\nthereof, which abolishes certain types of punishments i.e. death, labour,\r\nfettering/handcuffing and corporal in respect of a juvenile offender. And\r\nwhereas this Section gives an overriding effect to itself, there exists certain\r\noffences such as blasphemy (section 295-C), gang rape (section 10(4) of the\r\nOffence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979), where the only\r\npunishment prescribed is death. Again, death punishment is also prescribed by \u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\u0027\u003eP.P.C. \u003c/span\u003eand certain special laws such\r\nas the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997,\r\netc. Section 12 is problematic inasmuch as it abolishes death penalty for\r\njuvenile but prescribes no alternative punishment in lieu of death. Should then\r\nthe juvenile offender go scot free, taking advantage of the draftsman\u0027s\r\nmischief? This certainly is defect in drafting. It could not have been the\r\nintention or purpose of the law maker. Furthermore., the special laws also\r\nprovide for trial of offenders by Special Courts. The juvenile Courts are also\r\nspecial Courts. The confusion introduced of Section 14 of the Ordinance further\r\naggravates the situation as to which is the proper forum for the trial of\r\njuvenile offender involved in a crime under any special law. This is perhaps a\r\nvalid observation of the Court and the defect in law need to be rectified.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003eSeparate Trial\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:\r\nbold\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eThe Court also took exception to\r\nthe provision of Section 5 of the Ordinance, providing for separate trial of\r\njuvenile and adult, involved together in an offence. The Court dilated upon the\r\ndifficulties involved in implementing this provision, particularly because the\r\njuvenile Courts are also (general) trial Courts, responsible for the trial of\r\nall criminals. The Court alludes to related provisions in the Indian and\r\nBritish laws. However, having examined its pros and cons, the Court favours the\r\nUK approach to the issue, where no such provision for separate trial exists.\r\nThe Court mentions the practical difficulties faced by the trial Courts in\r\nimplementing this provision and expresses the apprehension that it is likely to\r\nresult in different verdicts being given by different juvenile/ordinary Courts\r\nin one and the same offence. The Court further apprehends that the lenient\r\napproach in the juvenile law may also benefit the adult accused. Whereas one\r\ncertainly appreciates the concern of the Court, the fact remains that the\r\nalternative i.e. joint trial will be unfavourable to the child as he/she will\r\nbe deprived of flip concessions of the juvenile law.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eThe issue of separate trial is\r\nnot new in Pakistan. The Ordinance is not the first statute to introduce the\r\nprinciple. Similar provisions exist in the Sindh Children Act 1955 and the\r\nPunjab Youthful Offender Ordinance, 1983. No other superior Court ever had the\r\noccasion to single the principle for criticism on account of the difficulties\r\ninvolved in its implementation. New approaches are different to accept or\r\nimplement. There are numerous difficulties involved in enforcing the juvenile\r\nlaw or for that matter any other law e.g. the family law. Day in and day out,\r\nthe Courts perform \u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.3pt\u0027\u003ea \u003c/span\u003emost difficult\r\ntask of weighing competing claims/assertions in trial and in the process\r\nexploring new and imaginative methods and approaches to remove or mitigate\r\ndifficulties, so as to implement the express desire of the law. The Ordinance\r\nhas been in the field hardly for 4 years. Perhaps more time was needed to\r\nsettling issues. Given time, the difficulties could have been resolved. They\r\nwere not insurmountable. If at all they were so proven, then remedy could have\r\nbeen sought from the legislature in the shape of amendments. Striking a law on\r\naccount of difficulties of implementation is not a good policy. It is\r\nimpermissible under the law.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cb style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:\r\nnormal\u0027\u003eSpecial Trial \u003cspan style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\u0027\u003eProcedure\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eSection 6 of the Ordinance is\r\nalso assailed. This Section prescribes special procedure for the trial of\r\njuvenile, which is naturally different from the ordinary procedure, followed in\r\ncriminal cases. In practice, one and the same judicial officer acts as both\r\ntrial Court and juvenile Court. But the requirements of fixing different\r\ndays/timings of trial and limitation on persons to be present in a juvenile\r\nCourt will create difficulties for other under-trials and litigant parties. The\r\nCourt therefore considers the provision discriminatory to other adult accused\r\npersons/parties involved in litigation. The Court apprehension is valid, but\r\nonce again, it is a momentary difficulty. The intention of Ordinance is to\r\ncreate specially designated Courts for the trial of juveniles. Such Courts are\r\nto be comprised of trained and expert Judges. It is expected that in due course\r\nof time the juvenile Courts would be made into exclusive Courts, as indeed has\r\nbeen done by the Province of Sindh, where a couple of juvenile Courts have been\r\ndesignated for the exclusive trial of juveniles. Nothing prevents the High\r\nCourts to create such special Courts with exclusive jurisdiction. Necessary\r\nfunding could be claimed for the purpose to fulfil the object of law. This is\r\ncertainly no ground for striking down the law.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003eAge Determination\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:\r\nbold\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eThe Court alludes to\r\ndifficulties, rather corrupt practices employed by people on account of section\r\n8 of the Ordinance, which provides for determination of age of a person in\r\norder to qualify for the concessions of juvenile law. The Section says that in\r\ncase any question, as to the age of the offender arises, the juvenile Court\r\nshall determine the age by recording a finding to this fact, after carrying out\r\nan inquiry including medical report for determination of the age. The Court\r\ntakes the view that this provision has caused enormous increase in corruption\r\nin society, inasmuch as people are trying to get favourable determination\r\nthrough use of corrupt means including forged entries in record/ registers.\r\nWith profound respect to the observation of the Court, the determination of age\r\nis required in so many other cases, including service matters. If corrupt means\r\nare employed by the public, this is not the fault of the law. What will be the\r\nfate of electoral law and many other laws like income tax, custom law, if the\r\nCourt logic is accepted. Every law or policy, in its implementation creates\r\nproblems of the kind, the Court is referring to. The Government however must\r\nensure that illegal or improper or corrupt means or practices are not employed.\r\nUse of such means /practices, is any way, unlawful and carry penalty. This is\r\nno ground for repeal of the \u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.3pt\u0027\u003elaw.\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.3pt\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003eRelease on Bail\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:\r\nbold\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eException is also taken to\r\nSection 10(3) of the Ordinance, which provides for the Court\u0027s power to refuse\r\nthe release of a child on bail,\u0026quot;, even in a bailable offence. The Court\r\nconsiders this provision to be in conflict with Section 496 of the Cr.P.C. and\r\nother laws, which say that bail cannot be refused in bailable offences. Such a\r\ncomparison is uncalled for because the Ordinance prescribes the procedure for\r\ntrial of juveniles. The juvenile law prescribes new concepts and principles and\r\noffers new perspectives to provide for the care and treatment of children.\r\nSpecial measures are prescribed to suit the condition and status of juveniles.\r\nThis is why an extraordinary discretion is given to the juvenile Court to\r\nrefuse bail, if there is any apprehension that the child will be exposed to any\r\nthreat or danger or relapse into life of crime. This is however no shady treatment\r\nto the juvenile, as the child will not be given to police custody nor thrown\r\ninto prison. Instead, will be entrusted to the care of a parent or guardian or\r\nprobation officer or a suitable person or a suitable institution, responsible\r\nfor the care and welfare of the child. This is no infirmity in law, it is\r\nmerely a safeguard for the child, and should be understood in that perspective.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003eAbolition of Certain Types of\r\nPunishments\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:\r\nbold\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eThe Court further takes exception\r\nto Section 12 of the Ordinance, which prohibits the award of certain types of\r\npunishments i.e. death, labour, fettering/handcuffing and corporal to a\r\njuvenile. The Court compares this extraordinary concession vis-a-vis similar\r\nprovisions in India and the UK. In the case of India, reliance is placed on the\r\nJuvenile Justice Act, 1986, which prescribed different age limits i.e, 16 for\r\nboys and 18 for girls to be eligible for similar concession. In the UK,\r\nreliance is placed on Children Act, 1908 which provides for immunity from the\r\nsentence of death to an offender who is under 16 years of age. The Court,\r\ntherefore, questions as to why the Ordinance prescribes a high limit of 18\r\nyears. This, the Court considers to be unreasonable and discriminatory;\r\ntherefore the law is struck off. In reality though, the India statute, quoted\r\nin the judgment, no longer holds the ground. It stands repealed and substituted\r\nby the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, which\r\nprovides for a uniform definition of a child, being under 18 years of age (section\r\n2(k). The Act also prohibits the awarding of sentence of death or life\r\nimprisonment or committal to imprison in default of payment of fine or payment\r\nof security (section 16). As such, the Pakistan and India statutes are\r\nidentical. As regards the UK, usually children under 17 years of age are\r\ntreated as juvenile offenders and death penalty has been abolished.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eIn the USA, only 40 jurisdictions\r\nprescribe death penalty for juveniles involved in heinous crimes. 14 such\r\nStates having retained death penalty, practically never carried it out. Only\r\none State i.e. Texas is said to be responsible for bulk i.e. 2/3 of execution\r\nof juvenile murderers. The US Supreme Court held in the case, Thompson v.\r\nOklahoma, 487 US 815 (1988), that the 8th Amendment of the Constitution\r\nprohibits the execution of young persons, under the age of 15 years for crimes\r\ncommitted by them. Thus different States have prescribed different age limits\r\nranging from 16 to 18 years for award of capital punishment in heinous\r\noffences. Unlike the UK, India and Pakistan, who have ratified the C.R.C., the\r\nUSA is not a party to it. The provision for abolition of certain types of\r\npunishments such as death is therefore in no way, out of step or in conflict\r\nwith the rest of the civilised world. It is also not violative of the\r\nConstitution or the law. Indeed, the observation of the Court that death\r\npenalty is reasserting itself in the world, is incorrect as the trend is for\r\nthe abolition of death penalty. In respect of children, even life imprisonment\r\nis abolished in many jurisdictions including India. The Court\u0027s conclusion for\r\nrepeal of the Ordinance on this account is therefore untenable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cb style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:\r\nnormal\u0027\u003eRelease \u003cspan style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\u0027\u003eon Probation\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:\r\nbold\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eThe Court also examines the\r\nsomewhat lenient provision contained in Section 11 of the Ordinance, which\r\nprovides for the release of a convicted juvenile on probation. The law says\r\nthat instead of sending the juvenile to prison, he/she may be released on\r\nprobation and placed under the care/supervision of a guardian or suitable\r\nperson or sent to a borstal institution. The provision further provides for a\r\nperiodic review of the case, and if the Court is satisfied that further\r\nimprisonment or probation is not necessary, then it can reduce the period of\r\nimprisonment or probation. The Court says that this provision along with\r\nsection 12, which provides for the abolition of death penalty, is extremely\r\nlenient and serves as an inducement or encouragement for children to commit\r\nmost heinous offences such as, murder, rape, terrorism or trafficking in narcotics.\r\nThe Court states that the increasing incidents of heinous crimes committed by\r\nchildren are directly attributable to the given laxity in law; it should\r\ntherefore be struck off. The finding however does not seem to be backed by\r\nstrong and authentic data. Reliance is placed on a report, `State of Human\r\nRights in 2003\u0027 of the Human Right Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) and a press\r\nclipping of the Daily \u003cspan style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-style:italic\u0027\u003eJang, \u003c/span\u003eLahore\r\ndated 15-11-2003. The HRCP data is not based on any authentic survey or data\r\ncollected from relevant agencies. It is based on press reports and statements\r\nissued by NGO\u0027s. The data does not indicate any trend of increasing or\r\ndecreasing incidents of juvenile offences. Scrutiny of HRCP annual reports\r\nreveal sometimes a consistent pattern and at other times, variation in figures.\r\nFor example, figure quoted in the report for the year 2003 is taken from a\r\nreport of the Amnesty International, stating that in June, 4500 juveniles were\r\nin detention across the country (page 266). The report for the year 2002,\r\nquotes the figure of 5000 (page 267). The same report further states that as\r\nper announcement of an NGO i.e. Juvenile System Network, over 8000 juveniles\r\nremain behind bars in the N.-W.F.P. (page 268). Similarly, the report for the\r\nyear 2001 gives the figure of 4000 juveniles (page 230). The same report\r\nhowever states that in June, 447 juveniles were detained in the N.-W.F.P. jails\r\n(page 230). The report for the year 2000 again gives the figure of 4000 (page\r\n195). And the same figure of 4000 is repeated in the report for the year 1999\r\n(page 194). No particular trend is discernible from the data, even it be\r\nadmitted as correct. A pending report of the Law \u0026amp; Justice Commission of\r\nPakistan states that on 31st December 2003, there were a total of 2679 juvenile\r\nprisoners in the country, with 1616 in the Province of Punjab, 552 in Sindh,\r\n351 in N.-W.F.P., 142 in Balochistan and 18 in AJ\u0026amp; K. The data quoted in\r\nthe judgment is not free from doubt. It indicates no particular trend of\r\nincrease in juvenile offences. It is therefore hard to agree with the Court\u0027s\r\nconclusion that juvenile delinquency is on the increase or more and more\r\njuveniles are indulging in the commission of heinous offences, like murder,\r\nrape, terrorism and drugs-trafficking. Even if it be so assumed, the fault does\r\nnot lie with the law, it lies elsewhere. Therefore, the real causes and factors\r\nresponsible for increased tendency of offence by juveniles be explored and\r\nremedial measures suggested. Striking off of the law is no remedy and will not\r\nserve the desired purpose.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003eUnreasonable Classification\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:\r\nbold\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eThe Court compares the preamble\r\nof the Ordinance with the preamble given by the (repealed) Indian Juvenile\r\nJustice System Act, 1986 and notices a distinction in phraseology between the\r\ntwo statutes. In the words of the Court, the Pakistani law provides for the\r\n\u0026quot;protection of rights for-the children involved in criminal\r\nlitigation\u0026quot;, whereas, the Indian statute provides for \u0026quot;the care,\r\nprotection, treatment, development, rehabilitation of neglected or delinquent\r\njuveniles. Thus, in the opinion of the Court, the Indian \u003cspan\r\nstyle=\u0027letter-spacing:.1pt\u0027\u003elaw \u003c/span\u003erelates to juvenile already found guilty\r\nof committing a crime or helpless and neglected juvenile whereas, the Pakistani\r\nlaw focuses only on the protection of rights of children, involved in criminal\r\nlitigation. The Court then goes on to enumerate the various rights guaranteed\r\nby the Ordinance and concludes that they are not recognized by the Constitution\r\nof Pakistan. Referring to Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution and quoting\r\ncase-law viz. Shirin Munir v Government of the Punjab (PLD 1990 SC 295), the\r\nCourt takes the view that the precedent is not relevant to the Ordinance. The\r\nCourt also refers to the case, Muhammad Iqbal Khokhar v Government of the\r\nPunjab (PLD 1991 SC 35) and draws the conclusion that the so called\r\n\u0026quot;special provisions\u0026quot; clause in Articles 25 and 26 of the.\r\nConstitution does not extend to giving extraordinary concessions to juvenile\r\noffenders. The Court goes on to elaborate that the protection accorded to children\r\nunder \u0026quot;special provision\u0026quot; clause in Articles 25 and 26 cannot be\r\nstretched to the extent of causing harm and injury to adult victims. Again,\r\nmaking a detailed mention of similar provisions in the P.P.C.; Cr. P. C.,\r\nOffence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance and referring to certain\r\njudgments of the superior Courts of Pakistan, India, the UK and USA, the Court\r\nconcludes that the ambit of the Ordinance goes far beyond the permissible\r\nlimits and therefore is void. With due respect to the Court observation, such a\r\nconclusion, is not tenable because in the quoted precedents, the Courts have\r\nmerely laid stress on compliance with national statute. Frankly, the Ordinance\r\nwas also the law of the land, at par with other statutes i.e. P.P.C., Cr.P.C.\r\nor for that matter the Offence. of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance. It\r\nis not proper to pick one statute out of many on the same subject and strike it\r\ndown for its inconsistency with the other(s). There are rules of\r\ninterpretation, which provide for an attempt to remove inconsistency between\r\nlaws/statutes, with a view to bringing harmony and coherence between them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eFurther, it is difficult to agree\r\nwith the Court\u0027s conclusion that the Ordinance is so defective that it is\r\nbeyond repair and has to be struck off, root and branch, along with certain\r\nbenign provisions e.g. legal aid/assistance to a juvenile accused or victim,\r\nprohibition on publication of juvenile Court\u0027s proceedings in the media and\r\nfunctions of Probation Officers. These and some other clauses of the Ordinance\r\nwere not examined by the Court and yet abolished. The arguments in the judgment\r\nfollow a consistent pattern, to expose the weaknesses and highlight the\r\ndifficulties in implementing the Ordinance. Opposite contention is neither\r\nraised nor pursued. Again, it is too strong a statement made by the Court, that\r\nthere was no special need for the promulgation of the Ordinance, as adequate\r\nprovisions existed in the law and the Courts were mindful of their role and\r\nresponsibility to protect and safeguard the interests of children. This is\r\neasily said but difficult to prove. It has no substance to it. The ground\r\nrealities are otherwise. True, few sketchy provisions existed as to\r\nsafeguarding the rights of juveniles. These provisions were however too\r\ninadequate to cater to the special needs and requirements of children. The\r\nOrdinance was needed. Certain provinces namely the N.-W.F.P. and Balochistan\r\nhad no legislation for juveniles. The State \u003cspan style=\u0027letter-spacing:.3pt\u0027\u003ewas\r\n\u003c/span\u003ecriticized internationally for its failure to protect its children. At\r\nhome, the human rights activists were complaining of official complacency of on\r\ngoing abuse of juvenile offenders. Indeed, the Government was under pressure to\r\nact. It did so by promulgating the Ordinance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eThe way and manner the criminal\r\njustice system functions in our country, leaves a lot to be desired! Had the\r\nsystem been performing well, perhaps there would not have been any need for\r\nspecial provisions for juveniles. Perhaps, the framers of the Constitution\r\ncould not, have vainly inserted safeguards for children and mandated the\r\nGovernment to take special measures for their protection and welfare. No\r\nprovision of law and especially the Constitution should be taken lightly and\r\nbrushed aside, for it being unnecessary or undesirable or creating problems of\r\nimplementation. Every action has reaction. Every special provision or\r\naffirmative action leads to some form of discrimination or limitation on the\r\nrights of others. But it is justified as a goal, to do away with the\r\ncentury-old injustices and abolish harsh customary practices that have led to\r\ndiscrimination or unfair treatment of the weaker/vulnerable sections of\r\nsociety. The objective of the special measures, also called affirmative actions,\r\nis to restore balance by empowering and protecting the weak and exploited. The\r\naffirmative action taken by the U.S. Government in favour of the African\r\nAmerican community, though discriminatory in appearance, were validated by the\r\nSupreme Court, the measure was held to be justifiable and reasonable. In the\r\nsame way, the creation of quota for women in educational institution was\r\napproved by the Supreme Court. Women quota in elective bodies and employment\r\nalso operates, it being in a justifiable measure under the \u0026quot;special\r\nprovisions\u0026quot; clause of Article 25 of the Constitution. Why similar measures\r\ncannot be taken for children?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cb\u003eInternational Obligations\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003cspan style=\u0027mso-bidi-font-weight:\r\nbold\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eInternational law is making\r\ninroads to the State\u0027s domestic jurisdiction, thereby encroaching upon the\r\nprinciple of sovereignty. Besides states, international law now also applies to\r\nindividuals. Practice varies, but it is generally enforceable by domestic\r\nCourts. Under the US Constitution, international conventions form part of the\r\nlaw of the land and are enforced by the Courts. In the United Kingdom,\r\ninternational customs are enforceable by Courts. So are international\r\nconventions, provided that they are not in conflict with an Act of Parliament.\r\nThe French and German Constitutions also provide for the enforcement of\r\ninternational law in the domestic sphere. The practice in Pakistan is identical\r\nwith the United Kingdom. International customs get enforced. International\r\nconventions are, also enforced, except, when in conflict with the Constitution\r\nor a statute. The international law is not an alien concept; it is the law of nations,\r\nformed through practice or treaties. As such, it is binding and enforceable.\r\nThe Constitution makes a mention of it. This is an approach also dictated by\r\nIslam, which acknowledged many and formulated several new principles of\r\ninternational law, relating to war and peace, human rights and socio-economic\r\ndevelopment. International law provides for the welfare and benefit of mankind.\r\nThe Constitution of Pakistan, in its Preamble and chapter on Principles of\r\nPolicy obligates the State to endeavour to promote international peace and\r\nsecurity and foster goodwill and friendly relations among nations. It further\r\nexpresses the determination of founding fathers that the people of Pakistan may\r\nprosper and attain their rightful and honoured place amongst the nations of the\r\nworld and make their full contributions towards international peace and\r\nprogress and happiness of humanity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003ePakistan is signatory to various\r\ninternational human rights declarations and has ratified some human rights\r\nconventions, including the Convention on the Rights of Child 1989.\r\nInternational conventions, ratified by the State, become binding. The State is\r\nexpected to fully honour its commitments and obligations. Failure to comply may\r\nlead to action -- mild in the shape of criticism/condemnation or severe like economic\r\n/financial sanctions. International law is a law, binding and enforceable.\r\nEffect is given to it by the legislative, executive and judicial authorities. A\r\nview consistently maintained by the superior Courts in Pakistan is that\r\ninternational conventions are enforceable, if not inconsistent with domestic\r\nstatute. Further, that domestic statute is to be interpreted in a manner, so as\r\nto be in harmony with international law. The High Court of Sindh in the case,\r\nMessrs Najib Zarb Ltd v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1993 Kar. 93) observed\r\nthat every effort should be made to accommodate and implement the rules of\r\ninternational law within the municipal law, even though they may not have been\r\nspecifically incorporated into the domestic legislation. The Lahore High Court\r\nin the case, Nargis Shaheen v. Federation (PLD 1993 Lah 732) held that a\r\nprovision of the Constitution or the law shall be interpreted in accord with\r\nthe principles of the Islamic common law, particularly to fill gaps in municipal\r\nlegislation. The Court further observed that while examining the vires of a\r\nlaw, the. principles of international law should be kept in view. In the case\r\nof Hitachi Ltd v. Rupali Polyester (1988 SCMR 1610), the Supreme Court observed\r\nthat the rules of conciliation and arbitration of the International Chamber of\r\nCommerce may be recognised and enforced by the Courts, as they are not\r\nprohibited. by domestic law. In the case \u0027of Nasrullah Khan Henjra v.\r\nGovernment of Pakistan (PLD 1994 SC 23), the Supreme Court again observed that\r\nit will make every effort to blend any inconsistency between municipal law and\r\ninternational law, so as to bring about harmony between the two. In the case of\r\nShehla Zia v. WAPDA (PLD 1994 SC 693), the Supreme Court referred to 2\r\ninternational declarations, namely, the Declaration of UN Conference on Human\r\nEnvironment at Stockholm, 1972 and the Rio Declaration, 1992 and expressed the\r\nview that international instruments, even though not ratified by the State,\r\nhave a persuasive value and should be given due importance and weight. In yet\r\nanother case, Wajid Shams ul Hassan v. Federation (PLD 1997 Lah. 617), the\r\nLahore High Court referred to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948\r\nand the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1976, even though\r\nthe later has not been ratified by the Government, and opined that mere\r\nnon-ratification of a human rights instrument should not undermine the\r\nsignificance of valuable safeguards contained therein for the protection of individual\r\nliberty and freedom. The superior Courts point to the relevance and application\r\nof norms and principles of international law in the domestic sphere and stress\r\non compliance. This approach is missing in the judgment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal style=\u0027text-align:justify\u0027\u003eThe judgment creates a somewhat embarrassing\r\nsituation for the State. Having ratified the C.R.C., its provisions are binding\r\non the State but now unenforceable by the Courts. The C.R.C. is indeed a\r\nframework convention and requires incorporation of its principles into domestic\r\nlegislation. The Ordinance was the State\u0027s compliance with international norms,\r\nas it sought to incorporate such norms/principles into the domestic law. The\r\nimplementation of international convention is the responsibility of the State,\r\nperformed through its organs, institutions and functionaries. The Court perhaps\r\nthinks otherwise, when it says that international declarations/conventions do\r\nnot create any enforceable legal obligations. This is not true. Effect must be\r\ngiven to the Convention, except when it is in conflict with the domestic law.\r\nIn case of conflict between 2 national statutes, the Court has to determine as\r\nto which of the conflicting provision is also repugnant to the Constitution;\r\nthen and then alone, may the Court strike it down. No clear repugnancy of the\r\nOrdinance with the Constitution is established. What is considered to be an\r\nunjustified or unreasonable principle by one judicial forum can very well be\r\ndetermined by another as reasonable and permissible. It is surely a matter of\r\ninterpretation. The Constitution clearly \u0027provides for the care and protection\r\nof children. Humane and dignified treatment of juveniles and their\r\nreformation/rehabilitation is a laudable objective, supported by Islam,\r\nConstitution of Pakistan and international law. The Ordinance goes no further\r\nthan furnishing a protective umbrella to safeguard and protect children,\r\ninvolved in criminal trial. Such protective legislation is no threat to others.\r\nWith the protection withdrawn, children. are exposed to greater abuse and exploitation.\r\nThere is therefore, a pressing need to reassess the judgment. It calls for an\r\nappeal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=MsoNormal\u003e\u003c![if !supportEmptyParas]\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c![endif]\u003e\u003co:p\u003e\u003c/o:p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/body\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/html\u003e\r\n"